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Abstract 
Funds of hedge funds (FOFs) are portfolios of investment in hedge funds. Marketed 
to retail investors who are otherwise unable to access hedge fund investments, FOFs 
are normally depicted as well-diversified investment vehicles that benefit investors 
with their due-diligence selection process. 
However, some earlier research has suggested that FOFs work like disaster insurance 
writers (Stulz, 2007; Agarwal and Naik, 2004). The implication is that they gain stable 
premium income during normal times but lose dramatically when the insured event 
occurs. The primary objective of this dissertation is to study the tail risk exposures of 
FOFs. Compared with hedge funds, which are exposed to tail risk mainly through 
dynamic trading, large leverage, and holdings of tail-risk-sensitive or illiquid assets 
(Agarwal et al., 2015), FOFs are obviously exposed to tail risk for different reasons. 
After conducting a hedge fund tail risk measurement (HFTR), I found that HFTR 
significantly explains the returns of FOFs. Moreover, HFTR substantially enhances 
the adjusted R-square of Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model. Despite FOFs 
being ostensibly more diversified portfolios, they have even higher exposure to tail 
risk compared to hedge funds. Moreover, FOFs with short histories, higher 
management fees and leverage, and shorter lockup periods are more sensitive to tail 
risk. I further documented a strong return-predictive power in FOFs’ tail risk 
exposures. In particular, I found that the possible losses to one unit of tail risk exposure 
in a bearish market are double the possible gains in a bullish market. This non-linear 
payoff structure is a testimony to the claim that FOFs write crash insurance for hedge 
funds.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and research objective  
Hedge funds are private investment vehicles that use dynamic trading strategies to 
pursue absolute returns. Compared with mutual funds, hedge funds are not heavily 
regulated and remain less transparent. In addition, hedge funds are less correlated to 
the other asset classes (Liang 1999) so that investors may further diversify their 
portfolio risk by adding hedge funds to their investment universe. However, hedge 
funds are generally not open to ordinary individual investors, and many hedge funds 
do not accept new capital injection. Moreover, information about hedge funds is not 
readily available to the public, which sets an investment barrier for smaller investors 
who do not have the necessary expertise on fund selection. Funds of hedge funds 
(FOFs) provide a good solution to the above-mentioned problems by offering a 
portfolio of hedge funds. A FOF invests heavily in the hedge fund market and holds 
diversified hedge fund portfolios. Ang, Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao (2008) pointed out 
that unskilled investors benefit from investing in FOFs because the due diligence and 
oversight performed by FOFs help to reduce the due diligence and monitoring costs. 
As a result, FOFs have become more and more important in the financial markets. 
According to Schizas (2012), the total value of assets under management (AUM) of 
FOFs reached US$533 billion in 2012, accounting for about 25% of the total market 
value of the hedge fund industry.  
The strong growth of FOFs has been driven by investor belief that a hedge fund 
portfolio will diversify the idiosyncratic risk of individual hedge funds and finally 
deliver better risk-adjusted returns. However, the recent performance of FOFs 
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provides no support for such an expectation. Based on the mean return and the Sharpe 
ratio, quite a few studies have documented underperformance of FOFs compared with 
hedge funds (e.g., Brown and Goetzmann 2003; Beckers, Curds and Weinberger 2007). 
Furthermore, the entire FOF sector has been heavily shocked by the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis (GFC). According to Schizas (2012), the monthly return of FOFs has 
decreased from 0.66% to 0.27% and remained at this low level in the aftermath of the 
GFC. According to modern portfolio theory, combining loosely correlated assets in a 
portfolio can generate a diversification effect so that one can achieve higher risk-
adjusted return. The underperformance of FOFs seems to be a living contradiction of 
diversification theory.  
It stands to reason that the second-layer fees paid to FOF managers, in addition to the 
fees charged by the individual hedge fund managers, may cause the return of FOFs to 
be consistently lower than a homemade hedge fund portfolio. Some pioneering studies, 
such as Brown, Gregoriou, and Liang (2004) and Ang, Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao 
(2008), claim that fees on fees have trimmed the diversification benefits. However, 
even after adjusting for the influence of second-layer fees, the performance of FOFs 
is still inferior to average hedge funds in terms of mean return1 as well as volatility.2 
In addition, it is hard to use a double-layer fee structure to justify the even worse 
performance of FOFs during market turmoil. Since the late 1990s, more and more 
                                                 
1 According to the Morningstar database, the average monthly risk-adjusted return (Sharpe ratio) of 
FOFs from 1992 to 2012 is 0.192%, which is substantially lower than the risk-adjusted return of other 
hedge fund strategies (1.02%).  
2 The standard deviation of FOFs’ monthly return from 1992 to 2012 is 2.025%, which is marginally 
higher than the standard deviation of the monthly return of other hedge fund strategies (2.016%). The 
standard deviation of FOFs’ monthly return increases to 2.201% after adjusting for the extra fee 
charged by FOFs.  
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scholars have advocated the rethinking of FOF returns beyond the mean-variance 
framework assuming a Gaussian distribution for the following reasons.  
First, hedge fund returns do not follow a normal distribution and usually have negative 
skewness and excess kurtosis. Most hedge fund managers define their objectives in 
terms of absolute return irrespective of market conditions. Reflected in trading 
strategies, hedge fund managers tend to avoid tracking the performance of a predefined 
index but use dynamic tactics to take advantage of market deficiencies, momentum, 
or other opportunities arising from market anomalies. Adding the fact that many hedge 
funds use highly leveraged positions, it is reasonable to expect the return distribution 
of a hedge fund to depart greatly from normality.  
Furthermore, the dependence between hedge fund returns tends to be more complex 
than one might expect under modern portfolio theory. Diversification is closely related 
to the central limit theorem, which states that the mean of a large number of 
independent distributions tends to follow a normal distribution. As such, idiosyncratic 
returns of a single asset will be smoothed out in a well-diversified portfolio, leaving 
the portfolio return normally distributed with reduced variance. Diversification has a 
stronger effect when the individual assets are loosely correlated, but this is clearly 
untrue for hedge funds. As previously explained, hedge fund returns are highly 
abnormal, which means that the correlation in higher moments cannot be ignored when 
constructing an FOF portfolio. Moreover, researchers have observed significant 
contagions among hedge fund returns in bear markets (Agarwal and Naik 2000a; 
Boyson, Stahel and Stulz 2010). Hence, combining loosely correlated hedge funds 
may reduce variance but at the same time increase the probability of extreme losses, 
represented by lower skewness and higher kurtosis.  
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Last, although individual hedge funds may be less correlated with other asset classes, 
portfolios of hedge funds do not deliver such benefits (Kat 2002). In other words, the 
correlation between FOFs and traditional assets such as equity and debts is higher 
compared with individual hedge funds. As a result, FOFs should be more sensitive to 
the extreme downturns in the other markets and consequently deliver large losses 
under extreme market shocks.  
In light of the above-mentioned reasons, we strongly believe the tail risk in hedge 
funds constitutes a non-diversifiable risk for FOFs. By definition, tail risk is the 
investment outcome that deviates from expected performance because of extreme 
events. Modern portfolio theory assumes that asset returns follow a bell-shaped normal 
distribution. The left tail of the bell shape represents the losses with rare chances of 
occurrence. In the long run, investors may incur large losses because of such left-tail 
events. In addition, if asset returns are non-normally distributed with fat left tails, 
modern portfolio theory will fail to capture the tail events. As a result, investors relying 
on the mean-variance framework tend to overprice a financial asset with a fat-tailed 
return distribution and eventually suffer unendurable losses. Many studies have found 
evidence to confirm the above description. For example, Agarwal and Naik (2004) 
found that a wide range of hedge fund strategies exhibited payoffs similar to that of 
writing a put option on an equity index. They suggested that such strategies usually 
incur large losses in market downturns. In addition, Brown and Spitzer (2006) revealed 
that market-neutral hedge funds become more sensitive to the substantial downside 
market movements.  
Holding portfolios of hedge funds, FOFs nevertheless will be affected by the tail risk 
in the hedge fund industry. In the existing literature, the tail risk in ordinary hedge 
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funds has drawn intensive interest, but researchers have largely ignored FOFs as a very 
special class of hedge funds that may have unique exposure to tail risk. This 
dissertation aims at filling this void in the literature with an investigation into the tail 
risk exposure of FOFs.  
The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between 
hedge fund tail risk and the returns of FOFs. I follow Stulz (2007) in suggesting that 
FOFs write disaster insurance so that they earn stable premium income during normal 
times but lose dramatically when the insured event comes about. In our opinion, if the 
tail risk in hedge funds is undiversifiable, it should determine the expected returns of 
FOFs, the same as the other systematic risk factors. To test this proposition, I 
developed a measurement that directly associates with the tail risk in the hedge fund 
industry over the sample period from January 1995 to December 2012, named the 
“hedge fund tail risk factor” (HFTR). This approach follows the spirit of Kelly and 
Jiang (2014), who used cross-sectional equity returns and generated a tail risk factor 
that captures the systematic tail risk shocks in the equity market.  
The second objective of this dissertation is to study the differences between hedge 
funds and FOFs with regard to tail risk. Compared with hedge funds – which are 
exposed to tail risk mainly through dynamic trading, large leverage, and holdings of 
tail risk-sensitive assets (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 2015) or illiquid positions – FOFs 
could be exposed to tail risk for different reasons. For example, during market turmoil, 
the contagion among hedge funds may cause tail risk to aggregate in FOFs. 
Furthermore, FOFs gain direct risk exposure to the hedge fund industry instead of the 
other assets. Holding a long-only position in hedge funds, FOF managers lack the tail 
risk hedging tools that are usually available to hedge fund managers. For comparison 
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purposes, I investigated the exposure of hedge funds to HFTR on both an aggregated- 
and individual-fund basis. Moreover, I investigated the relation between tail risk 
exposure and fund characteristics and documented what types of FOFs and hedge 
funds are more sensitive to tail risk shocks in the hedge fund industry.  
Last, I am interested in studying the return predictive power of FOFs tail risk exposure 
– or, in other words, whether the current tail risk exposure of a FOF can predict its 
return in the next period. In practice, FOF managers can hardly adjust their holdings 
when the market turns sharply weaker because of the many restrictions set by hedge 
funds on redemptions. As a result, tail risk-sensitive hedge funds may remain in a 
FOF’s portfolio after a tail risk event has occurred. Holding illiquid hedge fund 
portfolios, FOFs tend to be very sensitive to tail risk shocks during market turmoil. As 
such, the tail risk exposure of FOFs may possess certain predictive powers regarding 
their future returns, at least on a short-term horizon during a bearish period.  
The value of the studies in this thesis lies in the following aspects. Theoretically, the 
research is among the first to link tail risk to the returns of FOFs as a systematic risk 
factor. As a result, I proved that the tail risk of hedge funds cannot be eliminated by 
diversification. This problem has been raised in the previous literature but has not been 
formally tested so far. Moreover, I contributed to the literature with HFTR, which 
captures systematic tail risk in the hedge fund industry. Adding HFTR to Fung and 
Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model, I have documented prominent improvements in 
the model’s explanatory power at both the individual-fund and aggregated-portfolio 
levels. Based on HFTR, I found that FOFs are more sensitive to tail risk shocks in the 
hedge fund industry than hedge funds. In addition, I have found that HFTR possesses 
strong state-dependent predictive power. The results of this thesis highlight the 
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importance of practitioners understanding tail risk in FOFs. A FOF investor should 
assess the hedge fund market state carefully, as randomly allocating capital to a FOF 
with significant negative HFTR exposure may lead to tremendous loss if the market 
state tends to be unfavourable in the next one to three months.  
1.2 Structure and content of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2: Literature review 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on hedge funds and FOFs, with a special 
focus on tail risk in the hedge fund industry. First, I present a general summary of 
studies on the performance of hedge funds and FOFs. Above all, studies on the return 
distribution of hedge funds and FOFs are introduced. Next, some important literature 
on modelling hedge fund and FOFs returns is summarised. This section addresses the 
following three aspects: 1) hedge fund and FOF risk exposure and factor models; 2) 
tail risk in hedge funds and FOFs; and 3) predicting hedge funds and FOF returns. Last, 
I review the literature on hedge fund data bias.  
Chapter 3: Data and methodology 
The first section of Chapter 3 introduces the data used in the thesis. In particular, I 
discuss the descriptive statistics of the data and introduce the processes that have been 
followed to moderate hedge fund data bias. The second section introduces the 
methodology, which is categorised according to the three studies in the thesis.  
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Chapter 4: Managerial differences between hedge funds and funds of funds 
In the first study, I compared FOFs with hedge funds with respect to managerial 
characteristics. I performed comparison analysis on two sets of hedge funds and FOF 
samples and found that a large number of tail risk-sensitive FOFs 
 Do not accept additional investments, 
 Tend to have lower average fund size and net assets, 
 Require longer notice in advance days and redemption frequency, 
 Charge lower management fees and incentive fees, 
 Tend to use less leverage and prefer bank credit to margin borrowing when 
taking leverage, and  
 Turn over total assets fewer times in a year.  
The results confirm the distinction between FOFs and hedge funds with respect to 
managerial arrangements. Furthermore, I show some possible links between such 
distinctions and the tail risk aggregation in FOF portfolios. In particular, the above-
mentioned fund attributes relate to different areas of fund management, including 
investment capacity, liquidity restrictions, reward schemes, and fund leverage. The 
cross-sectional regression analysis further confirmed that the tail risk exposure of 
FOFs is significantly related to reward schemes and liquidity restrictions such as 
advance notice days and redemption frequency. In the existing literature, researchers 
tend to attribute the tail risk aggregation effect in FOF portfolios to a specific channel. 
Our findings, however, indicate a more complex tail risk aggregation dynamic. 
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Chapter 5 – Tail risk in funds of funds 
The second study investigated the tail risk of FOFs relative to hedge funds. Following 
Kelly and Jiang (2014), I constructed the hedge fund tail risk factor (HFTR) using 
monthly returns of 7,782 hedge funds. I examined the tail risk exposures at the 
individual-fund level as well as the strategy level by comparing FOFs and hedge funds. 
I performed a range of regressions to test the significance of HFTR in explaining the 
returns of FOFs. The regressions were performed on various bases, including equally 
weighted portfolios, value-weighted portfolios, and individual FOFs. In addition, I 
varied the regression window and added more controlling factors to verify the 
robustness. Moreover, I examined whether tail risk exposure determines differences 
in cross-sectional returns using decile portfolio sorting.  
The regression results using HFTR provide strong evidence against the tail risk 
management ability of FOF managers. At the individual FOF level, I found that the 
majority of our sample FOFs (83.79% of 4,275 FOFs) had significant negative 
exposure to HFTR during the sample period. At the portfolio level, all FOF portfolios 
exhibited significant negative exposure to this factor.  
In addition, I performed cross-sectional regression using HFTR beta as a dependent 
variable and fund managerial characteristics as independent variables. I documented 
some relationships between fund characteristics and tail risk exposure. I found that tail 
risk-sensitive hedge funds and FOFs share some characteristics, such as younger age, 
higher management fees, and closure to new capital. There are also unique 
characteristics that explain the cross-sectional HFTR beta variations in FOFs. For 
example, HFTR-sensitive FOFs trade more actively in a year and use higher-water 
marking performance evaluation.  
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Chapter 6 – Can tail risk exposure predict the return of a fund of funds under 
different market states?  
In this chapter, I used two approaches to examine the predictive power of HFTR 
exposure. First, I performed the Fama–MacBeth regression (1973), using both 
ordinary least square regression and quantile regression to investigate the relation 
between the tail risk exposure of an FOF and its return one month, two months, and 
three months ahead. The results indicate that, controlling for Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) 
seven factors, HFTR beta significantly explains the FOFs’ return in the next one month 
to three months regardless of market states. I documented similar explanatory powers 
for the tail risk betas calculated on the rolling windows of 12, 18, and 24 months. 
Second, I sorted FOFs according to their tail risk exposures and constructed tail risk-
sensitive and insensitive portfolios. Controlling for market states, I found very 
significant differences between the portfolio returns assuming monthly, quarterly, 
semi-annual, and annual rebalancing frequency. In general, I found that the predictive 
power of HFTR beta was strong under different market states but neutralised over the 
whole sample period.  
Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
In this chapter, the major findings in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are briefly summarised and 
some further comments provided. Finally, I introduced the limitations of the thesis and 
discussed the directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 An overview of hedge fund research3 
Scholarly studies on hedge funds emerged in the late 1990s, accompanied by the rapid 
growth of the hedge fund industry. Given the limited availability of data, early hedge 
fund research concentrated on an introduction to the industry, hedge fund performance 
appraisal, and the evaluation of data quality.  
The early work on hedge funds was led by Fung and Hsieh (1997a), whose research 
used a database containing 409 hedge funds and compared the performance of the 
hedge funds with that of 3,327 mutual funds. The research adopted Sharpe’s factor 
models to study the return attributions of both hedge funds and mutual funds but found 
that the traditional asset factors in Sharpe’s model can only explain a very small 
proportion of hedge fund returns. The authors thus argued that it is the dynamic trading 
strategy of hedge funds causing the low explanatory power of Sharpe’s model, and 
they suggested including style factors to improve the model. Fung and Hsieh (1997a) 
also found that hedge funds are very sensitive to extreme market movements, which 
leads to the view that hedge fund returns exhibit option-like characteristics. Moreover, 
the authors raised the issue of survivorship bias4 in commercial hedge fund databases. 
They claimed that survivorship bias may have mixed influence on the reported return, 
and the extent of the bias is related to different incentives to quit databases by hedge 
funds.  
                                                 
3 This section was prepared by consulting the following summaries of hedge fund literature: Das et al. 
(2002); Agarwal and Naik (2005); and Agarwal et al. (2015).  
4 Survivorship bias is caused by the data vendors’ practice of excluding defunct funds from their 
databases, which leaves only living funds in the databases. As a result, research based on such 
databases tends to overestimate the average performance of the hedge fund industry.  
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Some other early work on hedge funds includes that by Brown, Goetzmann, and 
Ibbotson (1999), Ackermann et al. (1999), and Liang (1999). These early studies 
generally relied on traditional performance evaluation techniques such as mean-
variance, the Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s 𝛼 to analyse the returns of hedge funds. Most 
of these studies agreed on the hedge fund managers’ ability to deliver absolute returns 
or higher Sharpe ratio results relative to the mutual funds. Since the early 2000s, hedge 
fund research has expanded in the following strands: 1. modelling hedge fund and FOF 
risks and returns; 2. the specific characteristics of hedge funds and their influence on 
hedge fund performance; 3. the effect of hedge funds in the global market; and 4. the 
problem of hedge fund data bias.  
Hedge funds’ dynamic strategies have been further investigated by many, with 
researchers noting that hedge funds adopt dynamic trading strategies that may cause 
time-varying systematic risk exposures (see Fung and Hsieh 2001; Brown and 
Goetzmann 2003) as well as non-linear payoff structures (see Lo 2001; Agarwal and 
Naik 2004). Therefore, the traditional factor models such as the Fama–French (1993) 
three-factor or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model do not work well to explain the 
returns of hedge funds. Given the non-linearity in hedge fund returns, a group of 
researchers suggested adding option-type factors to enhance the existing factor models. 
For example, Fung and Hsieh (2001) used lookback straddles to explain the returns of 
trend-following hedge funds, and Fung and Hsieh (2004a) later proposed seven factors 
to explain the returns of hedge funds. Another multifactor model containing option-
type factors can be found in Agarwal and Naik (2004). Furthermore, researchers have 
also found that hedge funds gain exposure to other macro risk factors such as funding 
risk (Dudley and Nimalendran 2011); liquidity risk (Sadka 2010); correlation risk 
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(Buraschi, Kosowski and Trojani 2014); and tail risk (Kelly and Jiang 2014)5. Most of 
the above-mentioned research tested the significance of the proposed factors after 
controlling for the common factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004a). In general, previous 
research has shown that systematic risk is a primary resource of return for hedge funds, 
so caution should be applied when assessing hedge fund managers’ ability to deliver 
absolute returns.  
FOFs have usually been studied as a strategy group of hedge funds in many of the 
above-mentioned papers. The early research has found that FOFs tend to underperform 
hedge funds (see, for example, Brown, Goetzmann and Liang 2004; Amin and Kat 
2003). Brown, Goetzmann, and Liang (2004) suggested that the double-layer fee 
structure of FOFs may explain their underperformance. Ang, Rhodes-Knopf, and Zhao 
(2008) argued that many previous studies did not use proper benchmarks to assess the 
performance of FOFs. They claimed that FOFs deserve the fees on fees, should a 
proper benchmark be used. Agarwal and Naik (2005), Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert 
(2016), and Getmansky, Lee, and Lo (2015) provided comprehensive reviews of hedge 
fund and FOF risk studies and return modelling literature.  
Instead of explaining hedge fund returns using macro risk factors, another group of 
researchers have tried to develop linkages between fund-specific characteristics and 
fund performance. Several characteristics have drawn the interest of researchers, such 
as fund age and size (Frumkin and Vandegrift 2009; Jones 2007); manager experience 
(Li, Zhang and Zhao 2011; Bernhardt and Nosal 2013); manager incentive schemes 
(Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross 2003; Brown, Goetzmann and Liang 2004; Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik 2009); redemption restrictions (Park and Whitt 2013; Ang and Bollen 
                                                 
5 A more comprehensive review of these risk factors is presented in Section 2.4.3. 
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2010); and hedge fund leverage (Schneeweis et al., 2005; Ang, Gorovyy and van 
Inwegen 2011). Quite a few studies have tested the influence of hedge fund 
characteristics on the cross-sectional variation of hedge fund returns or risk exposures. 
It has also become a general procedure to control fund characteristics when performing 
cross-sectional regression on hedge fund performance measurements. For example, 
Schaub and Schmid (2013) investigated the relation between hedge fund liquidity risk 
exposure and share restrictions. In their cross-sectional regression analysis, nine fund 
attributes were used as control variables, and they found that redemption notice 
periods are the most important liquidity restriction for hedge funds gaining exposure 
to liquidity risk.  
Hedge funds are subject to less regulation and fewer disclosure mandates compared 
with mutual funds. As a result, hedge funds can use excessive leverage and take 
sophisticated positions in the derivative markets. Their exact holdings and trading 
activities, however, usually remain secret. Hedge funds are often criticised by the 
public for being opportunistic and an important cause of market turmoil such as 
occurred during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007-2008 GFC. Some studies 
have shed light on this issue under the growing concern on the role of hedge funds in 
the financial system. Brown et al. (2000) studied the role of hedge funds in the 1997 
Asian currency crisis but found no evidence that hedge funds were responsible for the 
crisis. In the study of Halstead, Hedge, and Linda (2005) on the influence of the 
collapse of LTCM, the researchers suggested that the hedge fund crisis had little 
contagious effect on firms without exposure to hedge fund activities. In contrast, 
several studies have found that hedge funds contribute to the systemic risk of financial 
markets in many ways. For example, Chan et al. (2006) documented growing systemic 
risk caused by hedge fund activities and suggested that the banking sector is exposed 
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to such risk by facilitating hedge fund activities, i.e., by means of primary brokerage. 
Racicot and Théoret (2016) investigated the relation between hedge fund activities and 
macroeconomic risk. They found that hedge funds’ strategies become more 
homogeneous during a crisis period. Coupled with deleveraging activities, hedge 
funds thus contribute to the increased systemic risk in the financial system.  
Last, hedge fund researchers are often concerned about the quality of data from 
commercial data vendors because hedge funds report to the vendors on a purely 
voluntary basis. There is some data bias that may influence the studies of hedge funds, 
such as survivorship bias, backfill bias, and multi-period sampling bias. In addition, 
hedge fund managers have been found to misreport their returns (Bollen and Pool 2009) 
or tactically delay reporting poor returns (Aragon and Nanda forthcoming). The 
literature on hedge fund reporting will be introduced in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
As a special investment style of hedge funds, the return and risk profile of FOFs also 
appears to be very different from the other hedge fund styles. Past studies on FOFs 
have raised some interesting questions that need further investigation such as the 
aggregation of hedge fund tail risk in FOFs. This thesis thus endeavours to contribute 
new evidence to the understanding of this issue.  
The remainder of this chapter will introduce the relevant literature in four sections: 
Section 2.2 discusses the previous findings on the statistical characteristics of hedge 
fund return distributions; Section 2.3 introduces the previous studies on hedge fund 
return modelling, with an emphasis on hedge fund factor models; Section 2.4 
summarises the literature on FOF performance relative to hedge funds and introduces 
the research on the diversification trap; and Section 2.5 presents a summary of the 
studies on tail risk or downside risk of hedge funds and FOFs.  
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2.2 Statistical properties of hedge fund returns 
2.2.1 Fat tail and autocorrelation in hedge fund returns 
Because of their short history and data limitations, hedge fund indices published by 
various data vendors were often used in hedge fund research in the early 2000s to 
proxy the returns of hedge funds. Brooks and Kat (2002) studied the statistical 
properties of 48 hedge fund indices constructed by different data vendors. In their 
research, hedge fund indices are categorised into eight groups according to the 
investment strategy. Their results show that the distribution of most indices is non-
normal, except for the Macro and Long-Short Equity indices. A similar investigation 
was conducted by Geman and Kharoubi (2003). They used the monthly returns of 14 
hedge fund style indices over seven years and found that most of them generated a 
higher return and lower volatility than equity market indices. Significant negative 
skewness was observed in 11 hedge fund styles, and all fund indices failed to pass the 
Jarque–Bera normality test. Eling (2006) studied Credit Suisse First Boston/Tremont 
(CSFB) hedge fund indices between 1994 and 2004 and found that most of them 
displayed negative skewness, excess positive kurtosis, and autocorrelation. Eling 
(2006) suggested that the asymmetric return distribution and fat tails are caused by 
hedge funds’ investment in derivative instruments. Negative skewness and high levels 
of kurtosis in the return distributions of different hedge fund indices are also 
documented in various studies, such as that of Agarwal and Naik (2000a), Bergh and 
van Rensburg (2008), Ranaldo and Favre (2005), and Zakamouline and Koekebakker 
(2009).  
Instead of using hedge fund indices, many hedge fund researchers choose to construct 
hedge fund portfolios, usually equally weighted portfolios, to proxy the returns of 
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hedge funds following similar investment strategies. Fung and Hsieh (1997a) analysed 
five hedge fund investment styles and found that three of them exhibited high kurtosis 
in return distribution and displayed sensitivity to extreme market states. Kat and Lu 
(2002) studied the statistical properties of 2,183 hedge funds and documented 
significant average negative skewness and kurtosis in the sample. Getmansky, Lee, 
and Lo (2015) found that eight out of 12 hedge fund strategies displayed negative 
skewness, and 11 out of 12 strategies showed excessive high kurtosis in their return 
distribution during the period from 1994 to 2006. In addition, they uncovered that the 
categories with higher autocorrelation also exhibited a fat-tailed return distribution. 
The return autocorrelation problem in hedge fund returns was formally investigated 
by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004). The authors argued that the serial correlation 
in hedge fund returns may be attributed to a variety of reasons, but they concluded that 
illiquidity and smoothed returns are the primary reasons, according to the empirical 
results.  
As a subclass of hedge funds, FOF returns were found to display negative skewness 
and excess kurtosis (Beckers, Curds and Weinberger 2007; Bollen and Whaley 2009). 
For example, Bollen (2011) investigated the cross-sectional return distributions of 
hedge funds and FOFs in three sample periods: 1994 to 2006, 2007, and 2008. He 
documented a thicker left tail in FOF distribution as compared to hedge funds. These 
observations suggest that FOFs have a higher chance of incurring extreme losses than 
that described by a normal distribution, thereby being an indicator of tail risk.  
The implication of non-normally distributed and autocorrelated return to asset 
management is twofold. First, as argued by Kat (2002), when encountered with non-
normality, the standard deviation cannot fully reveal the potential risk carried by a 
financial asset. Thus, the higher moments including, skewness and kurtosis, should be 
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taken into account when assessing the riskiness of an investment. As standard 
deviation is a biased risk measurement given non-normally distributed returns, the 
Sharpe ratio – the universally accepted performance measure – also loses its power in 
the evaluation of hedge fund performance. According to Kat (2002), the Sharpe ratio 
can systematically overstate the true hedge fund performance. Second, the unique 
return patterns of hedge funds will add complexity to portfolio construction. Given the 
non-normality of hedge fund returns, if an investor has non-quadratic preferences, 
mean-variance tools may not be appropriate for portfolio construction. Fung and Hsieh 
(1997a) provided an illustration where an investor’s major concern is the downside 
risk, but a traditional mean-variance approach may wrongly exclude hedge funds from 
the portfolio. Eling (2006) demonstrated that autocorrelation and a fat tail in hedge 
fund returns may distort the traditional performance measurements and result in over-
allocation in the hedge fund sector when constructing portfolios.  
2.2.2 Non-linear and dynamic risk exposures 
Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) compared hedge funds with mutual 
funds using data from Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR). They found that hedge funds 
generate a higher average return and Sharpe ratio than mutual funds. In addition, hedge 
funds were found to exhibit weak correlation with the selected market indices. Several 
other studies in the same period (see Liang 1999 and Fung and Hsieh 1999, among 
others) also suggested that hedge funds provide diversification benefits to a portfolio, 
given their weak correlations with the traditional asset classes.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the global financial market experienced several 
extreme events, such as the 1997 Asian market crisis, the 1998 Russian debt crisis and 
the dot-com crash in the US equity market. Many hedge funds exhibited strong 
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correlation with the markets and suffered great losses in the market downturns. 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) argued that the traditional factor models such as CAPM and 
APT assume a linear relation between factors and returns, which is usually not the case 
for hedge funds. Using buy-and-hold and option-based factors, Agarwal and Naik 
(2004) found that many hedge fund strategies generate returns akin to writing a put 
option on the equity index. In addition, controlling for the option-based risk factors, 
hedge funds were found to be significantly exposed to Fama and French’s (1993) size 
and value factors and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.  
The risk exposures of hedge funds are also dynamic. Bollen and Whaley (2009) 
studied the time-varying exposures of hedge funds and attempted to use optimal 
changepoint regression and the stochastic beta model to remedy the problem. The 
authors found that 40 per cent of the sample hedge funds displayed significant changes 
in risk factor loadings between 1994 and 2005. They thus concluded that the alphas 
from a constant parameter regression will be biased measures of abnormal returns. 
Patton and Ramadorai (2013) studied the dynamic hedge fund risk exposure using 
high-frequency variables6, finding significant intra-month variation in hedge fund risk 
exposures, which suggests active exposure management at a high frequency.  
The correlation between hedge fund return and the market is also state-dependent. In 
Fung and Hsieh (1997a), hedge fund returns are explained as a combination of the 
returns from style factors and those from exposure to Sharpe’s asset class factors. The 
authors found that the correlations between style factors and asset class returns are 
uncorrelated most of the time but become correlated during extreme moves or tail 
                                                 
6 Most existing hedge fund studies use monthly reported hedge fund returns. Patton and Ramadorai 
(2013) used a daily factor model to resemble the monthly returns of hedge funds to capture the 
exposure change on a daily basis.  
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events. Guesmi, et al. (2015) investigated the correlations between hedge fund strategy 
indices and other asset classes (i.e., stocks and bonds) during bull and bear markets. 
Using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation GARCH model, they documented 
significant correlations between hedge funds and the stock market, particularly during 
the 2007–2008 GFC.  
One possible explanation of the state-dependent risk exposure is that hedge fund 
managers may actively change their exposures following the market conditions and 
produce procyclical portfolio betas. Racicot and Théoret (2013) studied this problem 
using conditional modelling, Kalman filtering of hedge funds’ absolute returns, and 
systematic risk exposures. The authors found that hedge fund betas react to cyclical 
change in the macroeconomic variables. In Racicot and Théoret (2014), hedge fund 
managers were found to modify portfolio betas, according to the volatility of financial 
markets, but the strategies’ alphas and betas co-moved less strongly in the subprime 
crisis compared with previous crises. The results thus indicate a maturation process in 
the hedge fund sector.   
In summary, existing literature has found that hedge fund returns are non-normally 
distributed, with negative skewness and excessive high kurtosis. There is 
autocorrelation in hedge fund reported returns, mainly because of an illiquid portfolio 
or the return smoothing of hedge fund managers. Hedge funds have a loose correlation 
with traditional markets, but the correlation may increase during extreme market 
events.  
Compared with other hedge fund strategies, FOFs are more correlated with the 
traditional asset classes. Kat and Lu (2002) investigated the correlation between hedge 
funds and market indices in terms of return, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis 
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and found that FOFs exhibit the highest correlation to market indices in the higher 
moments. Ennis and Sebastian (2003) calculated the Effective Style Mix (ESM)7 
benchmark for the HFR FOF index and analysed the performance of the FOF index 
from 1994 to 2003. The authors documented two characteristics of the FOF index. 
First, they found that the index behaved the same as a portfolio with 44 per cent of its 
holdings directed towards various asset classes. Second, they uncovered intertemporal 
variation in the index’s risk exposures. Interestingly, even though risk factor exposures 
vary markedly over time, the FOF index’s correlation with markets remained 
consistently around 60 per cent during the whole.  
                                                 
7 ESM is calculated by mixing market indices in proportion to form a benchmark with the highest 
possible degree of correlation with a particular return series (Ennis and Sebastian, 2003).  
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2.3 Modelling hedge fund and fund of hedge fund returns 
Linear factor models are widely adopted in the hedge fund performance attribution 
literature. A general factor model can be represented by 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝒊,𝟏𝑭𝟏,𝒕 + ⋯ + 𝜷𝒊,𝒏𝑭𝒏,𝒕 +
𝝐𝒊,𝒕  
(2. 1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the return of fund 𝑖  in the 𝑡 th period and {𝐹𝑘,𝑡} are “the explanatory 
variables such as an equity or bond index, or the returns of well-defined strategies such 
as mean-reversion, momentum, and trend-following strategies” (Getmansky, Lee and 
Lo 2015, p.41). The inability of traditional factor models such as CAPM to explain the 
returns of hedge funds can be attributed to two reasons. First, factor models normally 
assume a linear relationship between a dependent variable and factors, which is not 
realistic in the situation of hedge funds. As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, hedge funds 
adopt dynamic trading strategies to remain market neutral and trade derivative 
contracts with payoff non-linearly correlated with the traditional markets. As a result, 
hedge fund returns are usually not linearly correlated with equity and bond returns. 
Second, the significant unexplained residuals, such as those in Liang (1999), may 
contain unidentified systematic factors that are significantly correlated with hedge 
fund returns. In the hedge fund literature, a considerable number of studies have been 
performed to enhance the explanatory power of factor models by tackling the above 
two problems.  
2.3.1 Early attempts  
The mainstream literature on the risk–return relationship of hedge funds attributes 
hedge fund returns to the rewards from taking exposures to systematic risk factors and 
unexplained returns to managers’ skills or fund-specific factors. Such efforts have 
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their roots in Jensen (1967) as well as the Sharpe (1992) asset class factor model. Liang 
(1999) regressed the returns of hedge fund strategy groups on four benchmarks, 
including Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P500) index, Eurodollars, U.S. bond returns, and 
emerging markets. He noted that the factor loadings of hedge funds on the benchmarks 
are scattered, and the unexplained returns are statistically significant in many hedge 
fund groups. Fung and Hsieh (1997a, 1997b) adopted principal component analysis 
(PCA) and a factor analysis approach to distil style factors from a pool of hedge fund 
returns. This found higher explanatory power by adding the new style factors to the 
Sharpe asset class factor model.  
2.3.2 Factors measuring non-linearity in hedge fund returns 
Recognising the difficulty in using traditional asset class factor models to explain the 
option-like returns of hedge funds, Fung and Hsieh (2001) proposed studying non-
linear hedge fund payoffs using trend-following hedge funds as an example. The 
authors found that lookback straddle 8  returns are similar to the returns of trend-
following hedge funds. They also documented that the returns of trend-following 
funds can be significantly explained by a combination of lookback straddles on 
currencies, commodities, and debt securities. The authors thus concluded that trend-
following funds are exposed to risk that cannot be observed in a linear-factor model.  
Based on their findings in 2001, Fung and Hsieh (2004a) studied the risk exposures of 
different hedge fund styles, following a top-down approach, and eventually proposed 
seven factors that can explain the returns of hedge funds: two equity market factors, 
two debt security market factors, and three trend-following risk factors. The seven-
factor model was found to explain the returns of a variety of hedge fund and FOF 
                                                 
8 In theory, a lookback straddle is made up of a lookback call option and a lookback put option, which 
allows the holder rights to buy or sell at the most favourable prices observed in a past period. 
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indices significantly. The authors, however, highlighted that the seven-factor model is 
not flawless. For example, the explanatory power of the model will decrease when 
applied to a single hedge fund or a particular hedge fund style. The seven-factor model 
received an update in Edelman et al. (2012). This study found that the emerging market 
factor has significant power to explain FOF returns and should be added to the seven-
factor model to form an eight-factor model. The eight-factor model was then used to 
analyse the performance of FOFs from 2005 to 2010, and finding that FOFs tend to 
generate insignificant alphas, the authors suggested classifying the majority of FOFs 
as beta-only producers.  
In the same year as the publication of Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model, 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) published their research findings on modelling hedge fund 
returns. Instead of using lookback straddles to represent the option-like returns of 
hedge funds, Agarwal and Naik (2004) constructed four option-based factors 9  to 
approximate the non-linear hedge fund returns and used them in a multifactor model 
to investigate the common risk exposures of different hedge fund indices. It was found 
that many hedge fund indices gain significant negative exposure to the put option 
factors; in other words, they display the same payoff structure as writing a put option 
on the S&P500 index.  
Multifactor models have several limitations, and one is called non-investability 
(Getmansky, Lee and Lo 2015). In general, investors cannot rely on these models to 
replicate the indicated hedge fund, as many factors are not marketable, such as the 
lookback straddles in the Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven-factor mode. Agarwal, Bakshi, 
                                                 
9 The four factors of Agarwal and Naik (2004) are constructed by assuming the monthly holding of at 
the money call options, out the money call options, at the money put options, and out the money put 
options on the S&P500. The model does not assume a long/short position in the options but leaves it 
to be decided by the sign of the regression coefficients.   
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and Huji (2009) attempted to tackle this problem by constructing investable factors for 
higher moments (volatility, skewness, and kurtosis) of equity risk, and they showed 
that the returns of equity-oriented hedge funds are significantly exposed to these higher 
moment factors.  
2.3.3 The other factors that may explain hedge fund returns  
Besides using various techniques to approximate non-linearity in hedge fund returns, 
researchers have also tried to identify the factors that may be tightly correlated with 
hedge funds but have not been identified in the traditional asset-based factor model.  
Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) pointed out that hedge fund returns can be 
influenced by changes in macroeconomic factors such as inflation and unemployment. 
This is because many of them pursue investment opportunities by varying exposure to 
leading economic factors. To test this proposition, the authors constructed 
macroeconomic risk measurements using the conditional standard deviation of some 
economic indicators such as default spread, aggregated dividend yield, and the US 
inflation rate. Using quintile portfolio sorting and a conditional asset pricing model 
with macroeconomic risk, Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) found that 
macroeconomic uncertainties can explain the variation in cross-sectional hedge fund 
returns. Thus, the authors concluded that macroeconomic risk has a stronger influence 
on cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns compared to the standard measures 
of risk.  
Buraschi, Kosowski, and Trojani (2014) analysed the relation between correlation risk 
and cross-sectional hedge fund returns. The authors defined correlation risk as “an 
unexpected change in the correlation of the returns between different assets or asset 
classes” (Buraschi, Kosowski and Trojani 2014, p.581). In this study, correlation risk 
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was measured by the swap price of the average S&P500-realised correlation. Using 
the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model as the base model, the authors tested the 
correlation risk exposures of a range of hedge fund strategies. FOFs were found to 
have a significant negative exposure to the correlation risk factor. Moreover, hedge 
funds were found to be rewarded by taking higher exposures to the correlation risk 
factor. However, such funds exhibit larger drawdowns when market correlation 
tightens during an economic crisis.  
Sadka (2010) investigated the influence of liquidity risk on the cross-sectional 
variation in hedge funds returns. Liquidity risk was measured by the covariance of 
fund returns with the unexpected shocks’ aggregated liquidity. This paper showed that 
funds with significant exposure to liquidity risk outperform the low-loading funds by 
about 6 per cent annually. The question of whether liquidity risk is priced in hedge 
fund returns was also investigated in Brandon and Wang (2013). The authors 
suggested that a large portion of the previously observed manager skill should be 
attributed to the liquidity risk premium; in other words, liquidity is a priced systematic 
factor in hedge fund returns.  
In addition to the above-mentioned studies, research has also been undertaken to find 
other factors that may significantly explain the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund 
returns. Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2012) studied systematic risk in cross-sectional 
hedge fund returns; Agarwal, Arisoy, and Naik (2016) examined the influence of 
uncertainty about aggregate volatility (referred to as the aggregate volatility factor) on 
hedge fund returns; and Ilerisoy, Sa-Aadu, and Tiwari (2014) investigated the relation 
between funding liquidity risk and hedge fund performance.  
 27 
 
2.3.4 Predicting hedge fund returns 
One of the purposes of modelling hedge fund returns is to forecast hedge fund 
performance. Many previous studies have found that hedge fund performance persists 
over various time horizons. For example, Agarwal and Naik (2000a) and Bares Gibson 
and Gyger (2003) documented short-term performance persistence from one to three 
months. Edwards and Caglayan (2001) and Jagnnathan, Malakhov, and Novikov 
(2010) found strong evidence of performance persistence on longer horizons from one 
to three years.  
Most of the above-mentioned studies attributed performance persistence to manager 
skills, but Glode and Green (2011) argued that it might be the ability to maintain one’s 
proprietary strategy that leads to persisting performance. The authors suggested that 
good performance is the result of an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector 
instead of the skill of a manager. Thus, informed initial investors will partner with the 
incumbent manager and be reluctant to leave, which causes performance persistence. 
However, the profitability of the strategy may disappear when information spills over 
and other competitors join the same strategy market. Eling (2009) pointed out that 
short-term performance persistence could also be caused by data bias and return 
smoothing.  
The main takeaway from the above-mentioned hedge fund performance literature is 
that there may be some hedge funds that can consistently outperform or underperform 
others, but the duration of the persistence varies when different methods, databases, 
market states, or sample periods are used. As a result, we cannot rely only on past 
returns to forecast the returns in the next period. For instance, Boyson (2008) 
documented no performance persistence when focusing only on past returns, but she 
found that persistence is partially influenced by manager tenure and hedge fund style. 
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It thus becomes crucial to find some appropriate filters, with a degree of reliability, to 
assist in hedge fund selection, and much of the hedge fund performance predictability 
research is aimed at this.  
A group of studies used hedge fund-specific characteristics as filters combined with 
some performance indicators to predict future performance. Edwards and Caglayan 
(2001) suggested that hedge funds paying higher incentive fees may motivate better 
performance and produce predictability in hedge fund returns. Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) found that actively managed portfolios, measured by their active share 
indicator, deliver superior performance ex-ante. Fund flows were also shown to predict 
future performance (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 2007; Fung et al., 2008; Ding et al., 
2007).  
In contrast, many researchers use risk measurements, i.e., loadings on risk factors, as 
predictors of future performance. Avramov et al. (2011) proposed incorporating 
predictability in managerial skills when constructing optimal portfolios of hedge funds. 
The authors found that macroeconomic variables, such as the default spread and VIX, 
have strong return-predictive power. In addition, the simulated portfolio, following the 
suggested strategy, outperformed ex-post the other competing strategies. Further to 
this study, Avramov, Barras, and Kosowski (2013) conducted a more comprehensive 
analysis on hedge fund return predictability. They found that a large proportion of 
hedge funds are predictable using a single predictor strategy, where predictors are 
mainly macroeconomic variable. Further, if a combined forecast strategy is followed, 
the portfolio can deliver superior performance.  
Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) investigated whether hedge fund betas possess 
predictive power regarding the returns in the next period. Using a wide range of 
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financial and macroeconomic risk factors in a multifactor model, the authors found 
that hedge fund returns are sensitive to changes in the default premium and inflation 
rate. The two factors are proven to possess predictive power using Fama–MacBeth 
(1973) regression and decile portfolio sorting, and the results remained robust during 
various sample periods and using alternative measurements.  
To sum up, a growing body of literature has shown that hedge funds have significant 
exposure to a variety of systematic risk factors. Therefore, hedge fund returns can be 
effectively explained by a multifactor model that incorporates the traditional equity 
and debt factors as well as the other factors that reflect the unique risk-return profile 
of hedge funds.   
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2.4 The performance, diversification puzzle, and tail risk of 
funds of hedge funds 
FOFs benefit investors in a variety of ways. For example, Brand and Gallagher (2005) 
documented diversification benefits in FOF portfolios in a mean-variance setting. Ang, 
Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao (2008) found that unskilled investors receive cost savings 
because FOFs perform due diligence in fund selection. Darolles and Vaissié (2012) 
found evidence that FOFs add value mainly from strategic asset allocation, which 
accounts for 68 per cent of the variability and 45 per cent of the level of return of FOFs. 
The authors thus suggested that the value added by FOFs across market regimes 
outweighs the costs of the double fee structure. Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2015) 
showed that FOFs make skilful termination decisions after they invest in a hedge fund. 
Above all these benefits, arguably, the greatest one is the ability of FOFs to deliver 
better risk-adjusted performance via diversification.  
2.4.1 The performance of FOFs  
Although it is expected that FOFs provide better risk-adjusted performance than an 
ordinary hedge fund, there is growing evidence from academic literature suggesting 
that this expectation may not be realistic. The performance of FOFs between 1994 and 
1999 is examined by Brown Goetzmann and Liang (2004), who found that FOFs offer 
more consistent, lower risk-adjusted returns than hedge funds. Gregoriou et al. (2007) 
found that FOFs underperformed hedge funds in the bullish market from 1995 to 1999 
and underperformed non-directional hedge funds in the period from 1995 to 2002, 
irrespective of the market conditions. Moreover, they found that simple, equal-
weighted portfolios of no more than four hedge funds dominate the performance of 
the best FOFs, and they claimed that the second layer of fees trims down the 
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performance of FOFs. As suggested by Brown Goetzmann and Liang (2004), the more 
diversified portfolio an FOF holds, the more likely it is that the investors have to pay 
an incentive fee to the underlying hedge fund managers even if the FOF delivers poor 
overall performance. Ammann and Moerth (2008) found a positive relation between 
fund size and performance, but they claimed that FOFs failed to generate significant 
alpha over a 120-month period.  
Table 1 summarises some selected empirical results of FOF performance. Across all 
the selected studies, FOFs generated lower returns than other hedge funds but, in 
contrast, deliver lower volatility. Based on the return and standard deviation measures, 
I calculated the coefficient of variation to represent the risk-adjusted return. I found 
that, overall, FOFs generated lower risk-adjusted returns in seven out of nine studies. 
In addition, the returns of FOFs were found to be non-normally distributed. Most 
research has found negative skewness and high-level kurtosis in the return distribution 
of FOFs.  
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Table 2.1 The performance of funds of hedge funds (FOFs) and hedge funds in different empirical research 
This table summarises the performance of FOFs and hedge funds in a variety of empirical studies. Four performance measurements are summarised: return, standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. Moreover, the author manually calculated the coefficient of variance (CV) following 𝐶𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑠𝑡𝑑. 𝑑𝑒𝑣 as a simple measure 
of risk-adjusted return. 
  Return Std. dev CV Skewness Kurtosis Time span 
Brown Goetzmann and Liang (2004) 
FOFs 0.86***a 3.91*** 0.22 -0.31*** 4.06 
1989–2000 
HFs 1.38 5.74 0.24 -0.13 3.79 
Beckers et al. (2007) 
FOFs 10.28 6.13 1.67 n.a. n.a. 
1991–2005 
HFs 12.95 11.48 1.23   
Brooks and Kat (2001) 
FOFs 1.25 2.32 0.54 0.03 2.32 
1995–2001 
HFs 1.42 2.35 0.6 -0.26 2.13 
Malkiel and Saha (2005) FOFs 7.02 7.44 0.94 -0.14 6.31 1995–2003 
HFs 8.82 9.21 0.96 -0.25 5.51 
Ranaldo and Favre (2005) 
FOFs 0.9 1.7 0.53 -0.3 3.7 
1990–2002 
HFs 1.2 -2.1 0.57 -0.7 2.6 
Diez De Los Rios and Garcia (2011) 
FOFs 6.69 6.21 1.08 -0.19 3.08 
1996–2004 
HFs 8.5 6.88 1.23 -0.23 2.44 
Gregoriou et al. (2007) 
FOFs 0.81 2.87 0.28 -0.38 8.2 
1995–2002 
HFs 1.08 5.28 0.2 -0.16 7.29 
Avramov et al. (2009) 
FOFs 2.2 7.3 0.3 -0.09 3.4 
1994–2008 
HFs 4.7 9.4 0.5 -0.06 3.5 
Capocci Corhay and Hubner (2005) 
FOFs 0.72 1.77 0.4 -0.11 3.34 
1994–2002 
HFs 1.08 2.28 0.47 -0.26 2.77 
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2.4.2 The diversification puzzle of FOFs 
Under the mean-variance framework (Markowitz 1952), the diversification effect 
takes place by combining loosely correlated assets to eliminate the unsystematic risk 
of individual assets. However, the mean-variance framework assumes that portfolio 
returns are normally distributed, yet this has been proved untrue in the hedge fund 
portfolios. According to Low, Faff, and Aas (2016), asymmetries within the joint 
distribution of asset returns, such as the skewness of individual assets or the 
asymmetric dependence between individual asset returns, are the major concerns when 
constructing portfolios under the mean-variance framework. These statistical 
properties, as discussed in the previous section, are typical in hedge fund and FOF 
returns.  
In FOF literature, there is limited evidence in favour of the diversification benefits of 
FOFs (Brands and Gallagher 2005; Amo, Harasty and Hillion 2007). Instead, 
mounting studies show strong contradictory evidence of FOF diversification, 
especially when the higher moments of portfolios are considered. Amin and Kat (2002) 
examined the relationship between underlying fund numbers and the diversification 
effect of FOF portfolios. They constructed random, equally weighted hedge fund 
portfolios with a varying number of underlying hedge funds, from 1 to 20, and 
calculated the statistical characteristics of the portfolios. They found that, by 
increasing the number of underlying hedge funds, the standard deviation and the 
skewness of the portfolios tend to decrease, whereas correlations between the 
portfolios and equity markets increase. This means that, for an investor with a low 
tolerance to extreme losses and high market correlation, investing in a single hedge 
fund would be a better choice than investing in an FOF. Lhabitant and Learned (2002) 
performed a similar study on the optimal number of underlying funds to achieve 
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diversification. By constructing naïve equally weighted random portfolios, they found 
that diversification reduces variance at the cost of lower skewness, higher kurtosis, 
and stronger correlation with equity markets. Lhabitant and Learned (2002), however, 
noted that the unfavourable changes in the higher moments may be caused by the naïve 
portfolio construction approach.  
In the most recent study of Joenväärä and Scherer (2016), the authors used a data set 
containing holding information of 127 FOFs. Assuming frictional diversification costs 
(such as due diligence and monitoring costs per extra underlying fund), they found a 
positive log-linear relation between the number of underlying funds in an FOF and the 
corresponding AUM of the FOF. Joenväärä and Scherer (2016, p. 2) thus argued that 
diversification in FOF is not a free lunch: “over-diversification is as detrimental to 
performance as under-performance”.  
Brown, Gregoriou, and Pascalau (2012) found that FOFs with higher numbers of 
underlying hedge funds are more exposed to left-tail risk. The author defined this 
observation as a diversification puzzle. The authors thus proposed that FOFs tend to 
over-diversify their positions, leading to excessive left-tail risk. Allen et al. (2014) 
studied FOF diversification by simulating FOF portfolios using a variety of 
optimisation techniques, including the Markowitz mean-variance, naïve 
diversification, and optimisation with draw-down strategies. They found that 
Markowitz portfolios, which match the characteristics of hedge fund indices well, 
outperform the other portfolios on the Sharpe ratio and a series of downside risk 
measurements. Allen et al. (2014) noted that the various draw-down strategies are 
unable to dominate the Markowitz mean-variance portfolio in relation to controlling 
portfolio drawdowns. This evidence strongly supports the proposition of Brown, 
Gregoriou, and Pascalau (2012) that tail risk in hedge funds is not diversifiable.  
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2.4.3 Why is tail risk relevant to funds of hedge funds? 
As introduced in the last section, FOFs seem to exhibit an inability to diversify the 
extreme losses of underlying hedge funds. This diversification puzzle may find its 
roots in the general asset pricing theory with regard to the aggregation of tail risk. 
Ibragimov and Walden (2007) proved that, as long as the risks are concentrated on a 
sufficiently large interval, diversification may increase value at risk (VaR) irrespective 
of whether the distribution support is bounded or unbounded. Based on this theoretical 
framework, Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2009) modelled catastrophic risk and 
found that the value of diversification decreases dramatically or in some cases 
becomes negative when the underlying asset distributions are heavy-tailed. Ibragimov, 
Jaffee, and Walden (2009) named this phenomenon a “diversification trap”. As a 
conclusion, the authors suggested that the heavier the tails are, the less reliable 
standard mean-variance analysis is, based on the normal distribution assumption. 
FOFs may be a living example that supports the diversification trap theory.  
Hedge funds are found to have non-linear payoff structures and exhibit strong tail 
dependence in the traditional asset classes (Fung and Hsieh 1997b; Amin and Kat 2003; 
Agarwal and Naik 2004). They are also very sensitive to market downturns, as pointed 
out by Geman and Kharoubi (2003), Brown and Spitzer (2006), and Guesmi et al. 
(2015). Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) further provided evidence on the contagion 
of worst returns across the hedge fund industry. These characteristics exactly fulfil the 
condition of Ibragimov, Jalfee, and Walden (2009) to form a diversification trap in the 
portfolios of FOFs. In fact, Brown and Spitzer (2006) found that the extreme losses of 
FOFs are significantly correlated to the extreme losses of the market. They suggested 
that an FOF portfolio cannot effectively diversify the tail risk of ordinary hedge funds.  
 36 
 
Ignoring tail risk may result in detrimental consequences when constructing an FOF 
portfolio. Agarwal and Naik (2004) compared a portfolio constructed under a mean-
variance framework (ignoring tail risk) with another portfolio constructed under the 
mean-conditional VaR framework. They found that ignoring tail risk may result in 
excessive asset allocation to hedge funds and significant losses during large market 
downturns. This opinion is also held by Brown, Gregoriou, and Pascalau (2012), who 
found that the higher moments of simulated hedge fund portfolios become more 
outstanding with more underlying funds being added (see the discussion in Section 
2.3.2).  
2.4.4 Modelling the tail risk of hedge funds 
According to the existing evidence, the tail risk of hedge funds cannot be eliminated 
by diversification. It thus follows that tail risk could be a systematic risk that should 
be priced in the returns of hedge funds10. Ideally, we should have a tail risk factor that 
may explain the variation in the returns of hedge funds and capture the tail risk shocks 
to the hedge fund industry. This topic remains a focal point in hedge fund research in 
recent years, for example in the work of Jiang and Kelly (2012) as well as that of 
Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016). 
Kelly and Jiang (2014) assumed that the tail risk of individual firms follows a power 
law but is influenced by market tail risk. The magnitude of market tail risk thus can be 
estimated by using the Hill estimator from the cross-sectional asset returns. This tail 
risk factor was utilised in Jiang and Kelly (2012) to study the tail risk exposures of 
hedge funds. They found that the tail risk factor can significantly explain fund returns 
                                                 
10 The findings in Bali, Gokcan, and Liang (2007), as well as those in Liang and Park (2007), provide 
evidence on the significant relation between downside risk and the cross-section of hedge fund 
returns. 
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in both time series and cross-sectional regressions. They found that a unit tail risk 
shock may lead to a 2.88 per cent decrease in the value of an aggregated hedge fund 
portfolio.  
Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016) developed a tail risk factor by employing the 
tail sensitivity of hedge funds to equity market tail returns. This non-parametric tail 
risk factor contains information of equity market tail risk shocks as well as the 
sensitivity of cross-sectional hedge funds to the market tail risk shocks. Similar to that 
of Jiang and Kelly (2012), this research documented a robust explanatory power of 
market tail risk. Furthermore, using funds’ quarterly holding information from 13F 
filing, Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016) found that the tail risk exposure of hedge 
funds mainly stems from their holdings of tail risk-sensitive stocks and options.  
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Chapter 3: Data and methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data and methodology used in this thesis. Hedge funds are 
not subject to an information disclosure mandate in most jurisdictions, but many hedge 
funds voluntarily report their performance to commercial data vendors. Hedge fund 
researchers have identified some data bias in hedge fund return data and studied how 
such bias may distort hedge fund reported performance.  
The first part of this chapter introduces the major forms of hedge fund data bias, 
including survivorship bias, self-selection, and backfill bias as well as the 
autocorrelation problem with returns. The relevant literature is also reviewed in this 
section. The second part of the chapter discusses the sample data used in this research. 
I will introduce the steps taken to alleviate potential data bias. I find the combined 
survivorship bias and backfill bias to be around 3.09 per cent p.a. in the hedge fund 
sample and 1.03 per cent p.a. in the FOF sample. In the meantime, the autocorrelation 
of reported returns caused severe understatement of the standard deviation by around 
0.45 per cent in the monthly returns of both the FOF and hedge fund samples. The 
third part of this chapter discusses the relevant methodology adopted in this thesis. I 
will introduce some important downside risk measurements, including the Kelly and 
Jiang (2014) tail risk factor, the Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven-factor model, and other 
techniques used in the remainder of this thesis.   
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3.2 Hedge fund data bias 
3.2.1 Survivorship bias 
Survivorship bias occurs when data vendors delist the information of any fund that 
becomes defunct or otherwise stops reporting. There are various reasons for a hedge 
fund to discontinue information disclosure. For instance, a hedge fund may close down 
because it no longer has the capacity to profit from its strategy or it is forced to 
liquidate because of poor performance. This will result in a favourable bias in the 
average returns from the funds remaining in the sample, also known as “extinction 
bias” (Getmansky, Lee and Lo 2015). However, a hedge fund may stop reporting 
because it lacks ambition for new capital, especially when it receives abundant 
investments attracted by its past superior performance (Ackermann, McEnally and 
Ravenscraft 1999). Conceivably, delisting for this reason may cause an unfavourable 
bias in the average returns. In some circumstances, the delisting decision is made by a 
data vendor to avoid the liabilities of misreporting (Fung and Hsieh 1997a). The 
influence of this type of survivorship bias is not obvious, as it can happen to both 
underperforming and outperforming funds.  
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) studied survivorship bias in the US Offshore 
Funds Directory from 1990 to 1997. They found that survivorship bias could be around 
3 per cent p.a., as measured by the difference between the mean return of the whole 
sample index and the surviving fund index. A few similar studies estimated the 
survivorship bias in commercial hedge fund databases such as TASS and HFR, and 
the results varied depending on the sample period and the estimation method. For 
example, Barry (2003) documented a 3.8 per cent survivorship bias in the TASS 
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database from 1994 to 2001, while Agarwal and Jorion (2010) measured a 5.23 per 
cent survivorship bias in the same database during the same period.  
More convincing evidence was contributed by Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2013), in 
whose study a sample of hedge funds that had discontinued reporting to data vendors 
was formed. It was found that the average post-delisting performance of these “dead” 
funds is non-trivially bad, which means that the de-listing of these hedge funds resulted 
in a positive bias in the commercial databases. In addition, by comparing the 
distributions of the database sample and the non-reporting sample, the authors found 
that the most extreme disparity was at the left tails of the distributions; in other words, 
some of the worst-performing funds choose not to report to a commercial database.    
3.2.2 Self-selection bias 
Hedge fund managers usually have great autonomy when making a decision on 
external reporting, such as the timing of reporting, the databases to report to, and the 
frequency of reporting. Given such wide flexibility, managers can deliberately manage 
reporting at any stage of the fund life cycle for an optimal marketing effect, but at the 
same time, this practice will cause self-selection bias in the commercial databases.  
Bollen (2011) found that the cross-sectional hedge fund return distributions are 
consistently discontinued at zero in the three sample periods, whereas FOF distribution 
lost discontinuity in the first nine months of 2008. According to Fung and Hsieh (2002), 
FOF returns are less biased because they contain information on both database and 
non-database funds. Therefore, Bollen (2011) suggested that the discontinuity in 
return distribution is mainly caused by the action of hedge fund managers to avoid 
reporting losses.  
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The existing literature so far shows no firm agreement on the exact influence of self-
reporting bias. Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2013) compared a range of performance 
indicators between a sample of 1,445 non-database hedge funds and a sample of 
database funds. They found that the seven-factor alpha of non-database hedge funds 
is insignificant from zero and lower than the alpha of database hedge funds by 
105bps/quarter. Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2013) performed a similar comparison using 
13F filing information but found no significant differences between reporting and non-
reporting hedge funds in their mean return.  
Another self-selection related bias is called backfill bias. It occurs when a hedge fund 
waits to join a database until it has generated a good performance. The past 
performance between the fund inception date and the start of reporting date is thus 
backfilled and causes a positive bias in the average return. The presence of backfill 
bias has been recognised in early hedge fund studies, but the estimation varies a great 
deal across different sample periods. Taking the Lipper TASS database as an example, 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) documented a backfill bias of 1.4 per cent p.a. from 1994 to 
2000, yet Malkiel and Saha (2005) estimated a backfill bias of 7.31 per cent in the 
same database between 1994 and 2003. Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) updated the 
estimation of backfill bias and recorded a 2.97 per cent backfill bias from 1995 to 2009.   
3.2.3 Autocorrelation  
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, hedge fund returns exhibit strong serial correlation. 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) explained the reported hedge fund returns as a 
moving average of unobserved economic returns and found their model to be robust 
when fitting to a sample of 908 hedge funds. The authors attributed the autocorrelation 
to two reasons: investment in illiquid assets and return-smoothing.   
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Compared with mutual funds and pension funds, which are subject to strict investment 
regulation, hedge funds have a better capacity to invest in illiquid assets such as 
distressed securities and small cap shares. As Agarwal, Mullally, and Naik (2015) 
described, such illiquid holdings may impede asset valuation because their market 
price is not readily available. Thus, hedge fund managers have to use the most recent 
security price as the market value of the illiquid assets, but this gives rise to a stale 
price bias in the hedge fund database. In contrast, fund managers may perform return 
smoothing on game performance indicators, and this may also lead to serial correlation 
in a return series (Spurgin 2001; Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 2011).  
To sum up, hedge fund return information in a commercial database may be subject to 
a variety of bias that may distort the true risk-return relation in hedge funds. Although 
the reliability of the vendor hedge fund data remains questionable, some research 
provided evidence supporting the usefulness of such data. Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh 
(2013) found no significant difference between the performance of reporting mega 
hedge funds and non-reporting mega hedge funds. They further suggested that the 
reporting hedge fund performance can represent the performance of the non-reporting 
funds. In the next section, I will introduce details of how the above-mentioned data 
bias is processed. 
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3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Hedge fund data 
The hedge fund data used in this thesis is provided by Morningstar. The sample period 
starts in January 1995 and ends on 31 December 2012. The Morningstar hedge fund 
data contains 22,644 hedge funds with a combination of living funds and defunct funds. 
Morningstar further classifies the hedge funds and FOFs into different categories 
according to their investment strategies and major risk exposures. The full 
classification includes 39 categories, and the descriptions of the categories are listed 
in Appendix A. To ensure a sufficient number of funds in the hedge fund style analysis, 
I aggregated some of the categories. In addition, I have removed the funds providing 
fewer than 24 monthly returns to guarantee sufficient observations in the individual 
fund tests11. I dropped four funds that report constant returns in the whole sample 
period. As a result, 7,782 HFs and 4,275 FOFs remain in the sample. This sample size 
is about the same as in the Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016) study and larger than 
the sample size in another hedge fund tail risk paper by Jiang and Kelly (2012), which 
studied 6,252 hedge funds. The focus of this research is FOFs, which are known to 
report less biased information than the other hedge fund strategies (Fung et al., 2008; 
Edelman et al., 2012). I will also present some evidence in Section 3.3.1 to support 
this claim.  
                                                 
11 This is a common practice adopted in a wide range of hedge fund research; see, for example, Liang 
and Park (2010), Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011), and Kelly and Jiang (2014). These studies 
reported no resulting sample selection bias.  
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3.3.1 Hedge fund data bias alleviation  
As discussed in Section 3.2, hedge fund data may be subject to survivorship bias, self-
selection bias, and autocorrelation issues. I adopted the following processes to 
alleviate possible data bias in the raw data set. To account for survivorship bias, I used 
a combined dataset containing both living and dead hedge funds. In addition, following 
the approach of Fung and Hsieh (1997b and 2001), I removed the returns before the 
database entry dates for all sample funds to alleviate backfill bias. To reduce the 
autocorrelation in fund returns, I fit an MA(2) process to each hedge fund and 
unsmooth the fund returns, following the approach of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 
(2004). In particular, the observed return series {𝑅𝑡
𝑂} is expected to be a weighted 
average of the true return 𝑅𝐶 over the most recent three periods: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑂 = 𝜆0𝑅𝑡
𝐶 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐶 + 𝜆2𝑅𝑡−2
𝐶   (3.1) 
𝜆𝑙𝜖[0,1], 𝑙 = 0, 1,2  (3.2) 
𝝀𝟎 + 𝝀𝟏 + 𝝀𝟐 = 𝟏  
(3.3) 
The smoothing coefficients 𝜆l  can be estimated using the maximum likelihood 
approach. The unsmoothed return 𝑅𝑡
𝐶  can be estimated through a recursive process 
using 
𝑅𝑡
𝐶 =
𝑅𝑡
𝑂−𝜆1̂𝑅𝑡−1
𝐶 −𝜆2̂𝑅𝑡−2
𝐶
𝜆0̂
  (3.4) 
In Table 3.1, I display the summary statistics of both hedge funds and FOFs to show 
the effect of potential data bias on performance measurements. The Morningstar 
database reveals the status of a fund in three categories, dead, living, or merged, and 
the top panel in Table 3.1 reports the number of funds in each category. I find a higher 
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proportion of FOFs that are defunct, having been either liquidated or merged, than of 
hedge funds. This observation is consistent with the most recent research findings that 
FOFs have been affected more severely by the 2007–2008 GFC than other hedge fund 
styles (Schizas 2012; Edelman et al., 2012).  
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Table 3.1 Morningstar hedge fund data bias summary 
This table shows the performance statistics of Morningstar hedge fund data with the procedures of data 
bias alleviation. Three types of data bias are processed: survivorship bias, backfill bias, and 
autocorrelation bias. Panel A shows the information of raw data, Panel B shows the information of the 
data with alleviated backfill bias, and Panel C shows the information of the data with both backfill and 
autocorrelation bias having been alleviated. The difference between the combined mean and the mean 
of each dead, living, and merged category goes through a t-test for significance. The data sample period 
is from January 1995 to December 2012.    
 Funds of funds (FOFs) 
 
 
 Hedge funds (HFs) 
 Deada Living Merged Combined  Dead Living Merged Combined 
Count 2764 1315 196 4275  4736 2910 140 7786 
% of Total 64.7% 30.8% 4.6% 100.0%  60.8% 37.4% 1.8% 100.0% 
Panel A: Performance of FOFs and HFs – raw data 
Panel A: Morningstar hedge fund raw data 
 
 FOFs  HFs 
 Dead Living Merged Combined  Dead Living Merged Combined 
          
Mean 0.56***b 0.69*** 0.51 0.62  0.89*** 1.16*** 0.65*** 1.00 
Std. dev. 2.08 2.08 2.77 2.09  1.96 2.37 2.82 2.10 
Skewness -1.21 -0.86 -0.85 -1.11  -0.70 -0.34 -0.79 -0.59 
Kurtosis 4.57 3.16 2.77 4.18  2.06 1.07 3.41 1.83 
Sharpe ratio 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.18  0.33 0.39 0.14 0.36 
Panel B: Performance of FOFs and HFs – data with alleviated backfill bias  
Panel A: Morningstar hedge fund raw data 
 
 FOFs  HFs 
 Dead Living Merged Combined  Dead Living Merged Combined 
          
Mean 0.54*** 0.69*** 0.52 0.61  0.81*** 1.09*** 0.54 0.93 
Std. dev. 2.08 2.08 2.84 2.09  1.97 2.40 3.09 2.12 
Skewness -1.23 -0.83 -0.76 -1.11  -0.75 -0.38 -0.52 -0.63 
Kurtosis 4.65 3.11 2.65 4.19  2.32 1.23 2.96 2.01 
Sharpe ratio 0.14 0.22 0.10 0.18  0.29 0.35 0.10 0.32 
Panel C: Performance of FOFs and HFs – data with alleviated backfill bias and autocorrelation bias  
 
Panel C: Morningstar hedge fund data with alleviated backfill and autocorrelation bias 
 
 FOFs  HFs 
 Dead Living Merged Combined  Dead Living Merged Combined 
          
Mean 0.55*** 0.70*** 0.53 0.61  0.81*** 1.09*** 0.53 0.93 
Std. dev. 2.58 2.51 3.44 2.56  2.37 2.84 3.66 2.55 
Skewness -0.92 -0.61 -0.51 -0.83  -0.64 -0.35 -0.46 -0.55 
Kurtosis 2.98 1.85 1.54 2.65  1.55 0.67 2.36 1.27 
Sharpe ratio 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.14  0.24 0.3 0.08 0.27 
a. Morningstar defines three hedge fund statuses: Dead covers those that have been liquidated; 
living represents the extant funds at the last sample date; and merged comprises the funds that 
have merged into other funds. 
b. The asterisk indicates the significance of the difference between each category’s mean and the 
total mean, as indicated in Student’s t-test. *** represents significance at the 1% level.   
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Panel A shows the summary information of the raw data. Comparing the mean return 
of dead funds with the total in both FOF and hedge fund samples, I find a clear 
indicator of survivorship bias. For instance, the mean return of dead hedge funds is 
0.89 per cent monthly, which is 0.27 per cent lower than living hedge funds per month, 
or 3.65 per cent lower on the annual compounding basis. Aggregating the three types 
of hedge fund, the mean return of the total hedge funds is 1 per cent monthly, which 
is still significantly higher than that of dead hedge funds, according to the t-test result. 
The survivorship bias in FOFs is estimated to be 1.66 per cent on the annual 
compounding basis. In addition, both dead FOFs and hedge funds report lower 
skewness and higher kurtosis than their counterpart living funds, which indicates a 
survivorship bias in the return distribution as well.  
Panel B presents the information with reduced backfill bias. The change in mean 
returns from Panel A to Panel B strongly supports the claim made by Fung and Hsieh 
(2002) that FOF return information is less biased than the other hedge fund strategies. 
To be exact, the mean returns of all FOF categories in Panel B remain almost the same 
as in Panel A, but those of the four hedge fund categories have consistently decreased. 
However, the differences in standard deviations between the two panels are not as 
remarkable as in the mean returns. It seems that backfill bias mainly occurs in the 
means but not in the higher moments. Overall, backfill bias leads to a positive bias of 
1.01 per cent in the annualised return of my hedge fund sample after controlling for 
survivorship bias.  
Last, the effect of autocorrelation in hedge fund return is reported in Panel C. By 
construction, the unsmoothing technique of Getmansky, Lo, and Markarov (2004) 
adjusts standard deviation upward while leaving mean returns unchanged, and Panel 
C figures strongly support this claim. Compared with the standard deviations in Panel 
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B, the standard deviations of total FOFs and total hedge funds receive a 0.47 per cent 
and 0.43 per cent increase, respectively, after autocorrelation is removed. The change 
in Sharpe ratios across all the categories coincides with the claim that hedge fund 
managers could manipulate the Sharpe ratio by return smoothing.  
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics of the sample data 
In this section, I will summarise the descriptive statistics of the sample data after 
processing for data bias. Table 3.2 shows the headcounts of the selected data points in 
the sample.  
Table 3.2 Headcounts of Morningstar information variables (1995 to 2012) 
This table reports the headcounts of selected Morningstar information variables of hedge funds and 
FOFs. For each variable, the number of reporting funds is recorded in the column titled “Count”. Then 
the number is divided by the category total, 7,782 for hedge funds and 4,275 for FOFs, and the result is 
reported as a percentage in the column titled “% of HF/FOF total”.   
 
Hedge funds (HFs) 
 
HF total = 7782 
 
Funds of funds (FOFs) 
 
FOF total=4275 
 Count % of HF total  Count % of FOF total 
      
Domicile 7782 100.0%  4275 100.0% 
Fund legal structure 7782 100.0%  4275 100.0% 
Management fees 6979 89.7%  3463 81.0% 
Performance fees 6840 87.9%  3306 77.3% 
Average net assets 6182 79.4%  3641 85.2% 
High water mark 5809 74.6%  2585 60.5% 
Redemption frequency 5092 65.4%  2589 60.6% 
Advanced notice days 4620 59.4%  2331 54.5% 
Lockup months 4272 54.9%  1684 39.4% 
Uses leverage 2255 29.0%  1095 25.6% 
Average leverage 1592 20.5%  506 11.8% 
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The information used by my study includes advance notice days, average leverage, 
fund size, lockup months, management fees, performance fees, average net assets, 
domicile, fund legal structure, and high water mark. For each information variable, the 
number of reporting funds is recorded in the column titled “Count”. Then the number 
is divided by the category total, 7,782 for hedge funds and 4,275 for FOFs, and the 
result is reported as a percentage in the column titled “% of HF/FOF total”.   
The information in this table can be viewed as an indicator of data quality because a 
large sample is usually preferred. In contrast, this information also reflects the 
preference of hedge fund managers towards information disclosure. Although most of 
the information variables receive a significant amount of reporting from more than 50 
per cent of the total hedge funds or FOFs, they display a structural difference in the 
distribution of headcounts across hedge fund styles. In particular, 100 per cent of the 
funds report their domicile and legal structure to Morningstar, and the vast majority 
(more than 70 per cent) of them report the information on manager incentive facilities, 
including management fees, performance fees, and high water mark. Redemption 
restriction information, such as redemption frequency, lockup months, and advance 
notice days, receive reporting from around 40-60 per cent of funds. Last, the leverage 
variable receives the lowest reporting: less than 30 per cent of the sample funds are 
willing to disclose such information to the database. The difference in reporting here 
reflects the attitude of hedge fund managers towards reporting: on one hand, managers 
would like to get public attention through the commercial data vendors, but on the 
other hand, they would like to remain secretive regarding their investment strategies. 
A comprehensive discussion of hedge fund and FOF managerial characteristics will 
be presented in Chapter 4.  
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of the return information in the Morningstar hedge fund database 
The hedge fund and FOF samples are grouped according to investment strategy, and the number of monthly returns reported by each fund in the strategy group is 
counted. The section “Statistics of the number of reported returns” describes the proportion of the group total that reports a particular number of returns, i.e., “<36” 
indicates reporting of less than 36 monthly returns. The section “Quantile summary of the number of reported returns” shows the distributional attributes of each 
strategy group. For instance, the figures in the 1st Q. column represent the number of returns reported by the fund ranked in the 25th percentile from the lowest in 
each strategy group. The sample contains only the funds with at least 12 monthly returns after processing for backfill bias.   
  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of hedge fund returns 
 
 Panel A: Descriptive statistics of hedge fund returns 
 
Investment strategy  Statistics of the number of reported returns  Quantile summary of the number of reported returns  
 No. of funds < 36  36 to 60  61 to 120 >120  Min. 1st Q. Median Mean 3rd Q. Max. 
Debt 969 34.9% 25.0% 26.0% 14.1% 12 29 50 63.13 88 216 
Equity 4256 32.2% 22.9% 30.9% 14.0% 12 29 54 66.51 92 216 
Event-driven 487 22.4% 19.3% 36.1% 22.2% 12 39 71 82.28 115 216 
Multi-strategy 637 36.6% 26.5% 25.3% 11.6% 12 26 47 60.19 81 216 
Systematic futures 700 29.7% 20.7% 27.7% 21.9% 12 33 58.5 77.48 107.2 216 
Volatility 50 16.0% 46.0% 30.0% 8.0% 12 38.5 50 60.8 87.5 184 
Macro 683 31.2% 21.7% 29.6% 17.6% 12 31 55 70.15 95.5 216 
Hedge fund total 7782 31.9% 23.1% 29.7% 15.3% 12 30 53 67.82 93 216 
            
 Panel B: Descriptive statistics of FOF returns 
 
Investment strategy  Statistics of the number of reported returns  Quantile summary of the number of reported returns  
 No. of funds < 36  36 to 60  61 to 120 >120  Min. 1st Q. Median Mean 3rd Q. Max. 
Macro/systematic 360 24.7% 22.8% 39.2% 13.3% 12 36 62.5 71.24 89.25 216 
Debt 208 33.2% 28.8% 28.4% 9.6% 12 32 46 59.63 81 209 
Equity 1192 21.2% 22.1% 38.8% 17.8% 12 39 67 77.15 102.2 216 
Event 210 17.1% 21.9% 47.6% 13.3% 12 45 70.5 75.79 96.75 216 
Multi-strategy 2117 22.5% 26.3% 39.0% 12.3% 12 38 61 70.69 94 216 
Relative value 188 21.8% 21.8% 41.0% 15.4% 12 39 67 74.06 95 214 
FOF total 4275 22.5% 24.5% 38.9% 14.0% 12 38 63 72.4 95 216 
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Besides the information on hedge fund managerial attributes, I will also use fund return 
information intensively in this research. I will perform some cross-sectional regression 
analysis as well as time-series regressions at both the individual fund level and the 
portfolio level. In either case, the number of observations is a concern. Therefore, I 
counted the total number of monthly returns reported by each fund and present the 
statistics in Table 3.3. The hedge fund and FOF samples are grouped according to 
investment strategy, and the number of monthly returns reported by each fund in the 
strategy group is counted. The section “Statistics of the number of reported returns” 
describes the proportion of the group total that reports a particular number of returns; 
i.e., “<36” indicates reporting less than 36 monthly returns. The “Quantile summary 
of the number of reported returns” section shows the distributional attributes of each 
strategy group. For instance, the figures in the 1st Q. column represent the number of 
returns reported by the fund ranked in the 25th percentile from the lowest in each 
strategy group.  
The Morningstar database recognises 39 hedge fund investment strategies, and FOFs 
are classified as a subset of multi-strategy hedge funds. FOFs are further classified 
into six strategy groups by Morningstar. For ease of analysis and explanation, I 
aggregate these strategies into eight broad categories: debt, equity, event-driven, 
multi-strategy (excluding FOFs), systematic futures, volatility, macro, and FOFs. I 
keep the original classification of FOFs unchanged. In the end, I have seven hedge 
fund strategy groups and six FOF strategy groups. The headcounts of these groups are 
displayed in the first column of Table 3.3. The largest strategy group in the hedge fund 
sample is equity, containing 4,256 hedge funds. The size of the other hedge fund 
strategy groups is similar: between 500 and 1000 except for volatility, which contains 
only 50 hedge funds. In FOFs, multi-strategy and equity are the two largest strategy 
 52 
 
groups, and the other groups contain only around 200 to 400 funds. A comprehensive 
analysis of hedge fund strategies is presented in Chapter 4.  
As shown in the last row of Panel A, most of the hedge funds report more than 36 
monthly returns, and around 50 per cent of them submit 36 to 60 monthly returns. 
According to the quantile summary, the median of the reporting distribution is 53 
monthly returns. Specific to hedge fund strategy groups, event-driven hedge funds 
report the highest average number of returns measured by both mean and median, 
whereas multi-strategy hedge funds report the lowest average number of returns. 
Across all hedge fund groups, the lowest first quintile threshold is 29, which means 
that only 25 per cent of each strategy group report fewer than 29 monthly returns.  
Compared with hedge funds, FOFs, on average, have a longer reporting history. 
Around 77.5 per cent of FOFs report more than 36 monthly returns, and more than 
half of FOFs report more than 60 returns. The median of FOF reporting months is 63, 
10 months higher than hedge funds. Among the six FOF strategy groups, event and 
equity FOFs have the highest number of reporting months, as shown by the quantile 
summary. The lowest first quartile threshold is 32 monthly returns in the distribution 
of debt FOFs, while the same threshold for the other strategies is more than 36 monthly 
returns.  
In summary, although the initial filtering and backfill bias adjustment have removed 
many samples or return observations from the original sample, the remaining sample 
is still large and contains a good number of observations. As shown by the quantile 
summary in Table 3.3, if we use 24 months as the standard regression window, we can 
keep the majority of the funds in each strategy group without losing too much 
 53 
 
information. It should be noted that a 24-month-window contains a relatively small 
number of observations, which may lead to noisy and unreliable results12.   
3.3.3 Other data  
Throughout this research, I will also use equity data. The data includes the daily prices 
of the constituents of Thomson Reuters Global Equity Indices13 from 1 January 1995 
to 31 December 2013, the monthly time series of Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven 
factors14, the monthly time series of the Fama–French–Cohart four factors15 , the 
monthly time series of Robert F. Stambaugh’s liquidity factor16, and the monthly 
return of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX)17.  
 
 
                                                 
12 For most of the tests in this thesis, I have performed robustness tests using a 36-month regression 
window and received similar results.  
13 The constituents’ prices were downloaded from Datastream.  
14 I obtained Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) seven factors from David A. Hsieh’s Hedge Fund Data Library 
(https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFData.htm). 
15 Risk-free interest rate and momentum factor data were downloaded from the Kenneth R. French 
Data Library (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). 
16 The liquidity factor series was provided on Robert F. Stambaugh’s professional web page 
(http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaug/). 
17 VIX data was obtained from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) website 
(http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx). 
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3.4 Methodology 
In this section, I will introduce the methodology adopted in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
3.4.1 Estimation of risk measures 
I examined several risk measurements in the preliminary performance analysis. Four 
risk measures, standard deviation, semi-deviation, non-parametric VaR, and non-
parametric expected shortfall, are used to analyse the historical performance of hedge 
funds and FOFs at both the individual fund level and the portfolio level.  
3.4.1.1 Standard deviation (SD) 
Standard deviation is widely used as a fundamental risk measurement. It describes the 
level of dispersion of a set of data values. Many performance indicators require 
standard deviation as an ingredient, such as the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s alpha. 
However, standard deviation loses its reliability when the data values are not normally 
distributed, which is exactly the case for hedge fund and FOF returns. Assuming a 
time series of monthly return {𝑅𝑡} (𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇), the standard deviation of {𝑅𝑡} is 
estimated in the following way: 
𝑆𝐷𝑡 = √
∑ (𝑅𝑡−?̅?𝑡)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇−1
, where ?̅?𝑡 =
∑ 𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
 (3.5) 
3.4.1.2 Semi-deviation (SEMD) 
Semi-deviation is a downside risk measurement. Different from standard deviation, 
semi-deviation measures only the volatility below the mean return. Semi-deviation is 
a plausible risk measurement when the return distribution is left-skewed. The semi-
deviation is estimated as follows: 
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𝑆𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑡 = √
∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑛{(𝑅𝑖−?̅?𝑡),0}
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛−1
 , where ?̅?𝑡 =
∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
     (3.6) 
3.4.1.3 Value at risk (VaR) 
Value at risk was developed to indicate the level of possible loss to a portfolio given 
a confidence level of (1 − 𝛼), over a certain period. VaR can be understood as a 
threshold loss that one may expect not to be exceeded in a period with a confidence 
level of (1 − 𝛼). The calculation of VaR relies on assumptions concerning the return 
distribution, the investment horizon, and the significance level (1 − 𝛼). In this thesis, 
VaR is used to evaluate the historical performance of hedge funds and FOFs. Therefore, 
I follow a non-parametric approach to estimate VaR. For each fund or portfolio, VaR 
with a 95 per cent confidence level is estimated as the fifth percentile of all 
observations in the estimation window.  
3.4.1.4 Expected shortfall (ES)  
VaR is widely employed by practitioners as a downside risk measurement; however, 
it has several limitations. For example, VaR only states the threshold loss at a given 
confidence level and does not indicate the size of the loss should the threshold loss be 
exceeded. Expected shortfall, also known as conditional VaR (CVaR), is introduced 
as a remedy to this problem. Expected shortfall measures the expected total loss 
conditional on VaR being exceeded. Compared with VaR, ES gives more attention to 
the lower tail of a distribution. 
3.4.2 Orthogonalised return data   
In Chapter 5, I will use cross-sectional hedge fund returns to produce a tail risk factor 
to measure the extreme shocks to the hedge fund industry and use it to explain hedge 
fund and FOF returns on the basis of Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model. A 
problem inherent in this process is the existing high correlation between hedge fund 
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returns and the Fung–Hsieh (FH) seven factors. Without proper treatment, this 
correlation structure may be carried by the tail risk factor and lead to multicollinearity 
in the multifactor model. As a remedy, I orthogonalise individual hedge fund returns 
against the FH seven factors. In particular, I regress the returns of a hedge fund against 
the FH seven factors as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑖 𝐹𝑡
𝑘7
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  
(3.7) 
where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the return of fund 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑘
𝑖  is the loading of fund 𝑖 on factor 
𝐹𝑘. The FH seven factors will be introduced in detail in Section 3.4.4. The residual 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 
is used as orthogonalised returns to generate the tail risk factor in Chapter 5.  
3.4.2 Modelling the tail risk of hedge funds 
The primary goal of this thesis is to investigate the influence of tail risk on the returns 
of FOFs. The first challenge in this task is to find a reliable tail risk measurement that 
captures the dynamics of the tail risk shocks to the hedge fund industry. Tail risk is 
usually defined in relation to distributional characteristics. In general, tail risk is the 
extreme loss caused by an event with a higher probability than one would expect under 
the assumption of normality. Tail risk events trigger more frequent occurrence of large 
losses, resulting in a “fat left tail” in a return distribution. A mounting volume of 
literature shows that hedge fund distributions greatly depart from normality and 
exhibit clear attributes of a fat left tail (Agarwal and Naik 2000a; Eling 2006; Brooks 
and Kat 2002). Intuitively, if a tail risk event constitutes a common shock to the hedge 
fund industry, we can distil this information from the cross-sectional return 
distribution of hedge funds and use it as a tail risk measurement. Extreme value theory 
(EVT) provides a framework for studying the behaviour in the tail of a distribution.  
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According to the Fisher–Tippett theorem, the sample maxima of independent and 
identically distributed random variables can be mapped to only three possible 
distribution families: the Gumbel, the Fréchet, or the Weibull family. As Gabaix (2009) 
pointed out, distributions in the Fréchet domain describe the decay of the density 
function in the tail by a power law and can be used to model the “fat tails”. In this 
thesis, I follow the approach of Kelly and Jiang (2014) to estimate the tail risk index 
of the tail distribution function. The following description is a paraphrase of Kelly and 
Jiang’s (2014) description of the methodology.  
Kelly and Jiang (2014) assumed that lower tail risk events are described by a power 
law process, which takes the following form: 
P(Ri,t+1 < 𝑟 |Ri,t+1 < ut and ℱt) = (
𝑟
𝑢𝑡
)
−𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄
  (3.8)                                
where 𝑢𝑡 represents a threshold return, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the return of asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡 + 1 
with 𝑟 < 𝑢𝑡 < 0. Parameter 
𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄  determines the shape of the tail risk distribution and 
is named the tail exponent. A fat-tailed distribution has high value in the tail exponent. 
Because r < ut < 0, 
𝑟
𝑢𝑡
> 1. I follow Kelly and Jiang (2014) to require 
𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄ > 0 so 
that (
𝑟
𝑢𝑡
)
−𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄
 falls in the range between 0 and 1. In the tail component 
𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄ , 𝑎𝑖 is an 
asset specific parameter, representing  a constant tail risk level of asset 𝑖. In contrast, 
𝜆𝑡 is a function conditional on the information set ℱt. It measures the time-varying 
industry-wide extreme movements and is defined as the tail risk measurement. In 
Kelly and Jiang’s (2014) specification, the dynamic tail risk exposure of a risky asset 
is mainly driven by 𝜆𝑡 . Thus, one needs to separately estimate 𝜆𝑡  to gauge the 
systematic tail risk shocks in the market.  
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Empirically, I need to capture the update in the tail risk measurement that reflects the 
change in the systematic tail risk. According to Kelly and Jiang (2014), the monthly 
update in the tail risk measurement 𝜆𝑡  can be estimated by applying Hill’s (1975) 
power law estimator to the cross section of hedge fund monthly returns. The Hill 
estimator is defined as follows:   
𝜆?̂?
𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙
=
1
Kt
∑ ln
Rk,t
ut
Kt
k=1   (3.9) 
where Rk,t = (Pk,t − Pk,t−1)/Pk,t−1 is the k
th return that is lower than ut during month 
t, and Kt  counts the number of such exceedances within month t. Note that 
Rk,t
ut
 is 
assumed to follow a power law with exponent 
−𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄ ; then 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑅𝑘,𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)  should be 
exponentially distributed with scale parameter 
𝑎𝑖
𝜆𝑡
⁄ . According to the property of an 
exponential random variable, we have 𝐸𝑡−1 [𝑙𝑛(
𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑢⁄ )] =
𝜆𝑡
𝑎𝑖⁄ . As such, the cross-
sectional harmonic average tail exponent represents the expected value of the tail index 
update as follows: 
𝐸𝑡−1[
1
𝐾𝑡
∑ 𝑙𝑛
𝑅𝑘,𝑡
𝑢𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝑘=1 |ℱt] =
𝜆𝑡
?̅?
, where 
1
?̅?
≡
1
𝑛
∑
1
𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1   (3.10) 
In other words, the expected value of the Hill estimator is equal to the tail risk 
measurement 𝜆𝑡  scaled by the constant 
1
?̅?
, which means that the Hill estimator is 
perfectly correlated with tail risk.  
A key step in Hill estimator generation is to decide the threshold return 𝑢𝑡. There are 
sophisticated methods available to estimate 𝑢𝑡  (Dupuis and Victoria‐Feser 2006; 
Scarrott and MacDonald 2012, among others). However, these methods all require the 
estimation of extra parameters, which may lead to further bias in the estimator. Thus, 
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I follow the suggestion of Gabaix (2009) to set 𝑢𝑡 at the fifth percentile of the cross-
sectional return distribution18.       
3.4.3 Multifactor model 
Markowitz mean-variance analysis is widely used in portfolio analysis. Although the 
theoretical grounding of the mean-variance framework is solid, it suffers some 
limitations. Practically, mean-variance optimisation requires the estimation of a great 
number of parameters, including means, variances, and a variance-covariance matrix 
for all the assets in the investment universe. For a large panel of data with thousands 
of assets, parameter estimation work can be unduly heavy and lends mean-variance 
optimisation to sampling or modelling errors (Lai, Xing and Chen 2011). Factor 
models serve as a remedy to this problem. It is well known that asset returns are driven 
by changes in systematic risk. Factor modelling thus assumes a linear relationship 
between asset returns and the sources of systematic shocks, which are usually 
approximated by observable economic variables. 
A multifactor model was introduced by Ross (1973) to explain the risk and return 
relationship in financial assets through the arbitrage pricing theory. Some other 
examples of multifactor models in asset pricing research include Chen, Roll, and Ross 
(1983) as well as Fama and French (1993). A general multifactor model reads: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑖 𝑓𝑡
𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖
′f𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  
(3.11)  
where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the return of asset 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑁) during period 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇), 𝑓𝑡
𝑘 
is the 𝑘𝑡ℎ (𝑚 = 1,2, … , 𝑀) common factor, and 𝛽𝑚
𝑖  is the factor loading of asset 𝑖 on 
the 𝑚𝑡ℎ factor. In the end, there are two asset-specific factors; 𝛼𝑖 is the constant of 
                                                 
18 Kelly and Jiang (2014) tried different threshold levels without experiencing major changes in their 
results. 
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the factor model and 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 is the residual. The general factor model requires the following 
assumptions: 𝜀𝑡
𝑖~(0, 𝜎2) is uncorrelated with any of the common factors, 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 is serially 
uncorrelated and independent of the error terms of the other assets, and the factor 
realisations, f𝑡, are stationary with unconditional moments. Thus, the expected return 
of any asset 𝑖  is a combination of two components: an explained component as a 
weight average of 𝐸[f𝑡]  and an unexplained component  𝛼
𝑖 , as described in the 
following way:  
𝐸(𝑅𝑡
𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖+𝜷𝑖
′×𝐸(f𝑡)  (3.12) 
In addition, assuming that the covariance matrix of the factors is Ω𝑓, the variance-
covariance characteristics of any asset 𝑖 can be described as follows: 
var(𝑅𝑡
𝑖) = 𝛽𝑖
′Ω𝑓𝛽𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖
2  
cov(𝑅𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑅𝑡
𝑗) = 𝛽𝑖
′Ω𝑓𝛽𝑗  
(3.13) 
 
Technically, three types of factor models can be constructed to describe an asset return 
generation process: characteristic-based, macroeconomic, and statistical factor 
(Connor 1995). In a statistical factor model, the value of factor is derived from asset 
return using either principal component analysis or factor analysis techniques. In a 
characteristic-based model, common factors are approximated by the observed asset 
characteristics such as capitalisation, industry classification, and so on. In a 
macroeconomic factor model, common factors are measured by observable market 
variables such as unemployment rate, inflation rate, market indices, or time series, 
derived from the observable market variables such as credit spreads and implied 
volatility. These factors are usually self-selected by researchers, but the relationship 
between asset return and the factors are unknown. Therefore, a macroeconomic factor 
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model requires the estimation of betas based on the observed factor value. In the hedge 
fund literature, macroeconomic factor models have been intensively adopted to 
explain the risk and return relationship of hedge funds; see, for example, Liang (1999), 
Fung and Hsieh (2004a), and Agarwal and Naik (2004). Following this line of research, 
my thesis aims at enhancing the explanatory power of the existing hedge fund factor 
models by including the hedge fund tail risk factor. Thus, this thesis mainly uses the 
macroeconomic factor model to analyse the risk exposures of FOFs. 
To estimate the coefficients in a macroeconomic factor model, by rewriting Equation 
(3.11 as a time series regression in vector form: 
𝑹𝒊 = 𝟏𝑻𝛼𝑖 + 𝑭𝜷𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝟏, … . , 𝑵  (3.14) 
where 
𝑹𝑖 = (𝑅1
𝑖 ⋯ 𝑅𝑇
𝑖 ) ′, a (T×1) vector of asset return time series;  
𝟏𝑇 = (1 ⋯ 1) 
′ , a (T×1) vector; 
𝛼𝑖, a constant item;  
𝑭 = (
𝑓11 … 𝑓𝑀1
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑓1𝑇 … 𝑓𝑀𝑇
) , a (T×M) matrix of the realised value of 𝑀 common factors; 
𝜷𝑖 = (𝛽1
𝑖 ⋯ 𝛽𝑀
𝑖 ) ′, a (M×1) vector of common factor exposures;  
𝜺𝑖 = (𝜀1
𝑖 ⋯ 𝜀𝑇
𝑖 )′  , a (T×1) vector of a specific factor; and 
𝐸(𝜺𝒊 × 𝜺𝒊
′) = 𝜎𝑖
2𝑰𝑇.   
Because the realisations of 𝑭 are observable, 𝛼𝑖, 𝜷𝑖, and 𝜎𝑖
2 may be estimated using 
time series regression: 
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𝑹𝒊 = ?̂?𝒊𝟏𝑻 + 𝑭?̂?𝒊 + ?̂?𝒊 =  𝑿?̂? + ?̂?𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝟏, … . , 𝑵   (3.15) 
𝑿 = [𝟏𝑻 ⋮ 𝑭], ?̂? = (?̂?𝒊, ?̂?𝒊
′
)
′
= (𝑿′𝑿)−𝟏𝑿′𝑹𝒊  (3.16) 
?̂?𝒊
𝟐 =
𝟏
𝑻−𝑴−𝟏
?̂?𝒊
′?̂?𝒊  (3.17) 
3.4.4 Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model 
Most of the hedge fund multifactor models take on a similar structure to that of a 
macroeconomic model, as described by Equation (3.14). In this thesis, I utilise the 
popular Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven-factor model as the base model to explain the 
fund returns.  
The construction of Fung and Hsieh’s seven-factor model follows a top-down 
approach, and this project consists of a series of publications of Fung and Hsieh (1997b, 
2001, 2002, 2004a, and 2004b). The modelling starts by identifying common 
components in the returns of hedge funds using principal component analysis (PCA) 
or factor analysis (Fung and Hsieh 1997). Five mutually orthogonal principal 
components were identified and approximated by five “style factors” that are highly 
correlated to the principal components. The next step of the modelling was to 
approximate the “style factors” using observable market risk factors.  
In Fung and Hsieh (2001), the authors analysed the risk-return of trend-following 
funds and developed a portfolio of lookback straddles to model the returns of the trend-
following funds. In Fung and Hsieh (2002), fixed-income hedge funds were studied. 
These funds were found to be significantly exposed to yield spread. The authors thus 
went on to prove that the difference between Moody’s Investor Service Baa bonds and 
the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond can be used to approximate the yield spread. 
Equity long-short hedge funds were investigated by Fung and Hsieh (2004b), and these 
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were found to exhibit significant exposure to the equity market and the spread between 
returns on large capitalisation stocks and returns on small capitalisation stocks. These 
equity risk factors are measured by the returns of the S&P500 and the return difference 
between the Wilshire Small Cap 1750 Index and the Wilshire Large Cap 750 Index, 
respectively. Fung and Hsieh (2004a) summarised these findings and formally 
introduced the seven-factor model. This model takes the following form: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
7
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘  
 (3.18) 
where 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 is the excess return of fund k at time 𝑡, and 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 is abnormal return caused by 
managers’ skills. 𝛽𝑖
𝑘  is the kth fund’s risk exposure to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ factor, and 𝑒𝑡
𝑘  is the 
residual. The factors to be used in the model include the excess monthly return of the 
S&P500, a small-minus-big factor represented by the difference between the 
Russell2000 and the S&P500 monthly return (SMB); the change in the monthly return 
of 10-year Treasury bonds (TYB); the credit spread represented by the difference 
between Moody’s Baa yield and the 10-year Treasury bond yield (CRSP); and three 
option factors, the monthly returns of lookback straddles on treasury bonds, foreign 
exchange, and commodities (PTFSBD, PTFSFX, and PTFSCOM).  
3.4.4 Cross-sectional regression on fund tail risk exposures 
In Chapter 5, I use cross-sectional regression to investigate the relationship between 
fund characteristics and hedge fund tail risk exposures. The regressions take the 
following structure:  
𝛽k
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 = 𝛼k
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 + ∑ 𝜃m × 𝐶k
m
m + 𝜃k
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑋𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛k + 𝜃k
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑋𝑉𝑜𝑙k +
𝑒k
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  
(3.19) 
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In this equation, 𝛽k
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is the regression coefficient of HFTR for fund k, which is 
estimated in a multifactor model based on Equation 3.18 with HFTR being added as 
the eighth risk factor, shown by Equation 3.20.  
𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑖 𝐹𝑖,𝑡
7
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽𝑘
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 × 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘 
(3.20) 
 
𝛼𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is the intercept, 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 is the 𝑘𝑡ℎ characteristics of fund 𝑖, and 𝜃𝑘 is the coefficient 
of the characteristics, which is to be estimated in the cross-sectional regression. 
𝑋𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖 and 𝑋𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 represent the previous 24 months’ average return and variance for 
fund 𝑖, and 𝑒𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is the error term of the regression model. 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 denotes the following 
fund characteristics: fund age, size (measured by AUM), survivorship (dummy 
variable, 1 for living and 0 for defunct), incentive fees, management fees, high water 
mark (dummy variable), closed to all investments19 (dummy variable), leverage ratio, 
number of investments20, lockup months, redemption frequency, and advance notice 
days.  
3.4.5 Fama–MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression 
The primary objective of Chapter 6 is to investigate the performance of tail risk 
exposure in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns. To achieve 
this goal, I follow Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) to test this question using both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. The parametric tests in Bali, Brown, and 
Caglayan (2011) are performed in the Fama–MacBeth (1973) two-stage cross-
                                                 
19 This variable indicates whether a fund accepted external investments on inception.  
20 This variable shows the average number of investments of a fund on an annual basis.  
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sectional regression framework. The non-parametric tests are based on decile portfolio 
analysis. The two approaches are discussed in a general fashion below.  
Asset pricing theories suggest that asset returns are driven by the changes in risk 
factors. Theoretically, the asset return generation process can be described by a factor 
model, which decomposes the total expected return of an asset into different portions 
as premium rewards to various factor risk exposures. The Fama–MacBeth (1973) two-
stage regression (FM regression) was first developed to validate the CAPM but soon 
became a commonly adopted technique to estimate risk premiums and to validate the 
implications of a factor model. Assume that there are 𝑁 assets with returns denoted as 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 , (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁) and 𝑀 factors with the value denoted as 𝐹𝑚,𝑡, (𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀).  
The first step in FM regression estimates the factor exposures for each asset, using 𝑁 
regression: 
𝑅𝑡
1 = ?̂?1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑚
1 𝐹𝑚,𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀?̂?
1  
 
𝑅𝑡
2 = ?̂?2 + ∑ ?̂?𝑚
2 𝐹𝑚,𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀?̂?
2  
 
⋮ 
 
𝑅𝑡
𝑁 = ?̂?𝑁 + ∑ ?̂?𝑚
𝑁𝐹𝑚,𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀?̂?
𝑁  
(3.20)  
where ?̂?𝑖 , ?̂?𝑚
𝑖 , and 𝜀?̂?
𝑖  are the estimated constant, factor loading and error term, 
respectively, of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ regression.  
The second step in FM regression is a cross-sectional regression between the returns 
of all the assets at time 𝑡  as a dependent variable and their risk exposures as 
independent variables. The cross-sectional regression reads: 
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𝑅1
𝑖 = 𝑎1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚,1?̂?𝑚
𝑖𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀?̂?
1  
 
𝑅2
𝑖 = 𝑎2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚,2?̂?𝑚
𝑖𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀?̂?
2  
 
⋮ 
 
𝑅𝑇
𝑖 = 𝑎𝑇 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚,𝑇?̂?𝑚
𝑖𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝜀?̂?
𝑁  
(3.21)  
The coefficient term 𝛾𝑚,𝑡 represents the market premium for the 𝑚𝑡ℎ risk factor at 
time 𝑡. The average 𝛾𝑚,𝑡, such as ?̅?𝑚 =
∑ 𝛾𝑚,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
, is the risk premium throughout the 
sample period. To be validated as a risk premium, ?̅?𝑚 must be significantly greater 
than zero, as shown by the t-test.  
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Chapter 4: Overview of the fund of hedge funds 
industry  
4.1 Introduction 
Owing to the tremendous shock of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) to the entire 
hedge fund industry, tail risk in hedge funds has become a focal point of hedge fund 
research. In the pre-GFC era, the tail risk of hedge funds was generally believed to be 
caused by trading strategies, leverages, defective internal controls, fraud, or some 
other fund-specific factors and thus, in general, diversifiable. In light of this view, 
investors pursued funds of funds (FOFs) as a conservative alternative to hedge funds 
for risk diversification. However, the massive drawdown in the industry during the 
GFC seemed to be widespread, regardless of investment strategies, fund sizes, and 
locations, and across both FOFs and hedge funds. In recent years, several studies have 
shown that FOFs might not provide diversification of tail risk but rather aggregate the 
tail risk from the underlying hedge funds. Thus, FOFs may not be a conservative low-
risk investment vehicle, as many have thought.  
This chapter presents a study of the differences between individual hedge funds and 
FOFs with respect to management characteristics. It is essential to perform this 
comparative study for the following reasons. First, although it has been shown that 
FOFs tend to aggregate the tail risk in their holdings, the mechanism of the aggregation 
still remains unclear. This study will investigate such a mechanism from the 
perspective of fund-management characteristics. Second, from an investor’s viewpoint, 
it is essential to understand how FOFs are managed and how risk in FOFs is controlled 
in comparison to individual hedge funds. Finally, the research findings will have 
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important implications for policymakers under the current demand for stronger 
regulations of hedge funds and greater investor protection.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, the background 
information and the general operational characteristics of FOFs are summarised in 
comparison with hedge funds. Section 4.3 introduces the regulatory environment of 
FOFs with special focus on the hedge fund regulatory reforms in the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU). The major legal structures adopted by FOFs and 
hedge funds are discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 summarises the performance of 
FOFs and FOF strategies between 1995 and 2012. Finally, conclusions are drawn in 
Section 4.6.  
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4.2 General characteristics of funds of hedge funds  
According to Glattfelder et al. (2009), Alfred Winslow Jones, the owner of the first 
typical hedge fund in history, should also be credited with initiating the idea of FOFs 
by his allocations to the in-house multiple fund managers in 1954. The first formal 
FOF, however, is believed to be Leveraged Capital Holdings, which was established 
in Switzerland in 1969. Since then, especially after hedge funds regained popularity in 
the 1980s, FOFs have gradually grown into a significant force in the hedge fund 
industry.  
4.2.1 Industry size 
In the last two decades, the number of FOFs21 has increased sharply from less than 
200 in the early 1990s to more than 9,000 just before the 2008 GFC (see Figure 4.1). 
Measured by total assets under management (AUM), FOFs controlled around two 
billion USD assets in January 1990, and this figure increased to more than 1,400 billion 
USD by early 2008, as indicated in Figure 4.1. However, the entire FOF industry was 
heavily struck by the GFC, which by the end of 2009 had caused around 1,500 FOFs 
to shut down.22 Meanwhile, capital retreated fast from FOFs so that, in just a year, the 
AUM of FOFs more than halved its peak value in early 2008 and remained around 500 
billion USD until 2013. The total market share of FOFs, measured by the share of total 
AUM of the hedge fund industry, has also dropped dramatically from above 40% prior 
to the GFC to around 20% by the end of 201323 (see the lower panel of Figure 4.1).  
                                                 
21 As indicated by the number of reporting FOFs to the Morningstar hedge fund database.  
22 The shutdown fund number was derived from the Morningstar hedge fund database; 1552 FOFs 
reported fund liquidation between 1 July 2008 and 31 December 2009.  
23 A similar drop occurred during the 1994 to early 2000s period. However, the decrease in FOF 
market share in the 1990s is because the growth of individual hedge funds outpaced that of FOFs. 
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Figure 4.1 The growth and the market share of funds of hedge funds (FOFs) 
from January 1990 to December 2013 
 
4.2.2 Operational characteristics of FOFs 
In Table 4.1, I present the operational attributes of FOFs in comparison to hedge funds. 
FOFs are distinct from other hedge funds in many respects. For example, the survival 
rate of the sample FOFs is lower than that of the sample hedge funds, with only 30.76% 
of the FOFs having survived by the end of 2012. A higher proportion of FOFs do not 
accept further investments post inception. With regard to fund location, only 12.21% 
FOFs reside in the US, but about 27.9% hedge funds were domiciled in the US. 
Compared with hedge funds, a higher proportion of hedge funds (66.02%) use USD 
as the base currency, which means that hedge funds are more USA-centric.  
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The average hedge fund size is larger than that of an FOF, measured by either total 
assets or net asset value. The average life of the sample FOFs is about half a year 
longer than that of hedge funds. Moreover, FOF managers, on average, have about 
1.25 years more tenure than hedge fund managers. All the differences in Table 1 are 
significant at the 1% significance level except for fund size. 
Table 4.1 General management characteristics of hedge funds and fund of 
hedge fundsa 
This table reports the operational characteristics of funds of hedge funds in comparison with hedge 
funds. Survivorship, closed to all investment, closed to new investment, domicile (US), and base 
currency (USD) are constructed as binary data where 1 indicates “yes” and 0 indicates “no”. The value 
of the five data points shows the percentage of the funds with value 1.  
   
Hedge funds 
(1) 
Fund of hedge funds 
(2) 
Difference 
(2-1) 
Survivorship 37.38% 30.76% -6.62%***b 
Closed to all investment 6.31% 8.69% 2.37%*** 
Closed to new investment 7.01% 9.81% 2.79%*** 
Domicile (US) 27.90% 12.21% -15.69%*** 
Base currency (USD) 66.02% 50.97% -15.05%*** 
Average fund size (USD) 304,881,929 269,768,648 -35,113,281 
Average net assets (USD) 173,221,470 103,114,720 -70,106,750*** 
Average manager tenure (years) 8.48 9.73 1.25*** 
Average fund age (years) 7.26 7.73 0.46 
a. The test results of the differences for survivorship, closed to all investment, closed to new 
investment, domicile, and base currency are based on the chi-square test. The test results of 
average fund size, average net assets, average manager tenure, and average fund age are based 
on the t-test. “***” indicates that the difference is significant at the 1% significance level.  
 
4.2.3 Fee structure of FOFs  
FOFs are distinct from hedge funds in fee structure. Different from mutual-fund 
managers, who mainly earn management fees, hedge fund managers earn most of their 
fees based on performance. As such, a “two and twenty” fee structure is generally 
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adopted by hedge funds. In contrast, FOFs charge another layer of fees in addition to 
the fees charged by the underlying funds. This double-layer fee structure is generally 
agreed to be a disadvantage of FOF investment to investors. The distribution of the 
FOF fee structure, in comparison with hedge funds, is reported in Table 4.2 in 
comparison with hedge funds.  
Table 4.2 Fund of hedge fund (FOF) and hedge fund management fees and 
performance feesa 
This table reports the distribution of FOF and hedge fund management fees and performance fees. The 
distribution is calculated by excluding the funds reporting “NA”. Around 20% FOFs and 10% hedge 
funds report “NA” in the whole sample.  
 FOFs Hedge funds 
Management fees (%)   
0 1.4% 2.1% 
0-1.5 73.7% 58.5% 
1.5-2 20.8% 35.5% 
2-4 4.0% 3.8% 
>4 0.0% 0.1% 
   
   
Performance fees (%)   
0 18.4% 4.0% 
0-10 61.9% 5.6% 
10-15 8.1% 4.8% 
15-20 10.0% 80.4% 
>20 1.5% 5.2% 
   
Average management fees (%) 1.37 1.53 
Average performance fees (%) 9.09 18.7 
Average hurdle rate (%) 2.19 1.4 
 
The majority of FOFs (73.7%) charge management fees between 0 and 1.5%. Around 
61.9% of FOFs charge performance fees between 0 and 10%. Compared with FOFs, 
a higher proportion (35.5%) of hedge funds charge management fees between 1.5% 
and 2%. Moreover, most hedge funds (80.4%) charge performance fees between 15% 
and 20%. On average, the fee structure of hedge funds is consistent with the “two and 
twenty” industry convention, with management fees being charged at 1.53% and 
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performance fees at 18.7%, on average. By contrast, FOFs on average charge lower 
management fees (1.37%) and performance fees (9.09%). The hurdle rate used by the 
hedge funds is slightly lower than that of the FOFs. In other words, FOF managers 
have to deliver higher returns than hedge fund managers to earn performance fees. 
4.2.4 Liquidity restrictions of FOFs 
From the viewpoint of fund investors, liquidity is the length of time it takes to redeem 
their investments from a fund. Hedge funds impose restrictions on withdrawals, such 
as a lockup period, a notice period, and the frequency of redemption. All these 
requirements handicap withdrawals from the funds. Sometimes, a holdover provision 
is added in the investment agreement by which the fund manager can repay the full 
capital in steps, keeping the last payment until a predetermined date in the future 
(usually at the end of the financial year). Given the fact that hedge funds are able to 
return capital in different forms (cash or securities), FOFs may provide the redemption 
“in kind”, which means that FOF investors will receive securities that might be paid 
from the underlying funds. Many hedge funds require a redemption notice to be given 
in advance, and the investor can only require a redemption a limited number of times 
in a year. Thus, an FOF investor may face dual liquidity issues where the repayment 
of cash is decided not only by the arrangement of the FOF but also by the liquidity of 
the constituent hedge funds. The liquidity restrictions of FOFs are reported in Table 
4.3 in comparison with hedge funds.  
The distributions of redemption frequency of FOFs and hedge funds are generally 
consistent. Monthly or quarterly redemption is the most popular in both FOFs and 
hedge funds. However, the majority (68.6%) of FOFs do not require investors to lock 
up their investment, and this ratio is only 52.7% in hedge funds. In contrast, most FOFs 
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require investors to give a redemption notice. Around 73% of FOFs require notice to 
be given 30 to 120 days in advance, whereas only 37.7% of hedge funds require the 
same. Most hedge funds (58.3%) require a notice to be given less than 30 days in 
advance. The longer notice days required by the FOFs can be largely justified by the 
double-layer liquidity problem discussed earlier. 
Table 4.3 Liquidity restrictions of funds of hedge funds (FOFs) and hedge funds 
 FOFs Hedge funds 
Redemption frequencya 
 
  
Daily 2.9% 5.3% 
Weekly 2.4% 3.5% 
Monthly 51.2% 54.1% 
Quarterly 34.8% 32.1% 
Annually 8.7% 5.0% 
   
Lockup monthsb   
0 68.6% 52.7% 
1-6 4.6% 13.4% 
7-12 24.0% 29.6% 
13-24 1.5% 2.9% 
above 24 1.2% 1.5% 
   
Advance notice daysc   
0 2.0% 3.0% 
1-30 24.1% 58.3% 
31-60 36.7% 26.0% 
61-120 36.8% 11.7% 
above 120 0.5% 1.0% 
a. The distribution of redemption frequency is calculated by excluding the funds reporting “NA”. 
Around 40% FOFs and 35% hedge funds report “NA” in the whole sample. 
b. The distribution of lockup months is calculated by excluding the funds reporting “NA”. Around 
60% FOFs and 45% hedge funds report “NA” in the whole sample. 
c. The distribution of advance notice days is calculated by excluding the funds reporting “NA”. 
Around 45% FOFs and 40% hedge funds report “NA” in the whole sample. 
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4.2.5 Leverage of FOFs 
The information regarding fund leverage is reported in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 Leverage of funds of hedge funds (FOFs) and hedge fundsa 
This table reports the information regarding fund leverage. All data points are structured as a binary 
value where 1 represents “yes” and 0 represents “no” except average leverage.  
 Hedge funds 
(1) 
FOFs 
(2) 
Differences 
(2)-(1) Use leverage  79.96% 41.19% -38.77%
***b 
Leverage with margin borrowing 63.06% 14.16% -48.90%*** 
Leverage with bank credit 12.55% 28.22% 15.67%*** 
Leverage with futures 23.64% 6.67% -16.97%*** 
Leverage with other derivatives 0.93% 0.07% -0.86%*** 
Average leverage 2.89 0.72 -2.17*** 
a. The test results of the differences of use leverage, leverage with margin borrowing, leverage 
with bank credit, leverage with futures, and leverage with other derivatives are based on the 
chi-square test. The test result of average leverage is based on the t-test. “***” indicates 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
Around 80% of the hedge funds have reported using leverage, whereas only 41.19% 
of the FOFs use leverage for their portfolios. Many funds have disclosed their channels 
of leverage, which include margin account borrowing, bank credit, and leverage via 
futures or other derivatives. From my data sample, I found that the vast majority 
(63.06%) of the hedge funds obtained leverage through margin borrowing, usually 
provided by prime brokers. FOFs, in contrast, prefer traditional bank credit, as only 
14.16% of FOFs obtain leverage through margin borrowing. Because of the lack of 
derivatives on hedge funds, there is less demand from FOFs on derivatives for 
leveraging purpose. Thus, we have observed less than 7% of FOFs obtaining leverage 
in this way. Finally, the asset turnover of general hedge funds is much quicker than 
the FOFs. The average annual turnover of the hedge funds is about 20 times that of the 
FOFs. All the differences in the table are significant at the 1% significance level. 
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4.3 Funds of funds regulation  
In the wake of the GFC, the hedge fund industry regained focus from regulators 
because of the growing concern for better investor protection, greater information 
transparency, and systemic risk monitoring in hedge funds. While rules vary by 
jurisdiction, hedge fund managers have seen regulatory reforms launched to 
accommodate rigorous restrictions on hedge fund registration, share offering, 
information disclosure, and other aspects of fund operation. This section provides an 
overview of the major regulatory reforms relating to the hedge fund industry around 
the world and explains the influences of the reforms on FOFs. 
4.3.1 Global cooperation and IOSCO’s (funds of funds) hedge fund 
regulatory framework 
The global regulatory response to the 2008 GFC was initiated in a G20 meeting in 
November 2008, which called on a variety of international bodies such as the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oversee global policy development and 
implementation (Schwartz, 2013). In this process, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) contributed substantially to the development of a 
regulation framework for hedge funds.  
The IOSCO (2009) noted that hedge funds had enhanced the liquidity and efficiency 
of financial markets but also acknowledged that hedge funds had played an important 
role in transmitting and amplifying systemic risk. Holding this view, in the final report 
issued in 2009, the IOSCO raised six high-level principles on the regulation of hedge 
funds, such as the mandatory registration of hedge funds and hedge fund managers, 
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ongoing regulation on the registered funds, registration and risk control of primary 
brokers, mandatory disclosure of information relevant to systemic risk, and so on.24  
The 2009 IOSCO report did not pay special attention to FOFs, but it did mention that 
hedge funds had become more accessible to retail investors by means of FOFs. In fact, 
FOFs have been under the microscope of the IOSCO since 2002, when its Technical 
Committee launched a study on the regulatory issues arising from retail investors 
participating in hedge funds through FOFs. Further enquiries were carried out in 2007, 
and the final report of this study was issued in June 2008, almost at the same time as 
the housing-bubble burst in the US, which led to the GFC. The IOSCO (2008) 
reviewed the regulations on FOFs in a variety of jurisdictions and found that many 
countries did regulate or authorise FOFs under their existing regulatory framework for 
common collective investment schemes. However, some areas in these existing 
frameworks were found to be lightly or too generally regulated, such as the mandate 
of due diligence to be performed by FOF managers before and during investments. 
These identified problems were addressed in IOSCO’s 2009 report titled Elements of 
International Regulatory Standards on Funds of Hedge Funds. The standards written 
in this report, together with the six high-level principles on the regulation of hedge 
funds, constitute the foundation for the regulatory reforms in different jurisdictions in 
the aftermath of the 2008 GFC.  
4.3.2 US regulation 
Hedge funds and hedge fund managers in the US were largely unregulated in the pre-
GFC era, thanks to a variety of exemptions set in fund- or securities-related legislation 
(Kaal and Oesterle, 2016). A typical hedge fund in the US could avoid a number of 
                                                 
24 The final IOSCO hedge fund oversight report can be found at the following link: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf  
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regulations by offering itself to “accredited investors” only and limiting investor 
numbers below the threshold. For this reason, many early-established hedge funds 
were structured under limited partnership structures and mainly offered shares to high 
net worth individuals or “sophisticated” investors. Although regulators have taken 
action to broaden their regulatory scope to cover hedge funds, such efforts turned out 
to be in vain because of strong opposition from the industry.25  
A major change in the US hedge fund regulation took place with the enactment of the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd–Frank). 
Under this legislation, the SEC, as well as other regulatory agencies, was authorised 
to bring hedge funds under supervision. In particular, all hedge fund advisers with 
$150 million or more in assets were required to register with the SEC. This is to say, 
hedge fund advisers in the US could no longer seek SEC registration exemptions under 
the safe harbour clause of the Investment Advisers Act 1940. In addition, as explained 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010), the registered hedge fund advisers were required 
to disclose information on assets under management, use of leverage, counterparty risk 
exposure, trading and investment positions, types of assets held, trading practices, 
valuations policies, and other information deemed by the SEC necessary and 
appropriate for the assessment of systemic risk  .  
4.3.3 European Union regulation 
Prior to 2011, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
(UCITS) directives served as the major regulation at the EU level for UCITS-qualified 
hedge funds.26 As a result, many unqualified hedge funds were not strictly regulated 
                                                 
25 One example given in Kaal and Oesterle (2016) is Goldstein v. SEC, where the DC circuit vacated 
the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking by the SEC. 
26 Such as open-ended, liquid, well diversified, limited leverage, etc. 
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until the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) 
directive. The AIFM directive was enacted in 2011 as part of a broader financial 
regulatory reform of the EU following the GFC. It was introduced to regulate 
alternative investment funds (AIFs) that did not fall under the UCITS classification. 
Similar to Dodd–Frank, the AIFM directive affects hedge funds through regulating 
fund managers directly. Technically, the AIFM directive also regulates overseas hedge 
funds marketing in European markets. According to the directive, fund managers have 
to comply with a vast range of requirements, including information disclosure, capital, 
conduct of business, leverage, and so on to be authorised under the AIFM directive to 
conduct business in EU countries. As such, most hedge funds operating in the EU will 
be overseen by either UCITS or the AIFM directive unless they qualify for an 
exemption.27  
4.3.4 Australian regulation 
Hedge funds in Australia are regulated under the same framework as open-ended retail 
funds. Like other types of managed funds, hedge funds are mainly governed by the 
Corporations Act 2001, which is enforced by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC). Specifically, if a hedge fund offers to retail 
investors, it must register with ASIC and fulfil a variety of requirements on operation 
and information disclosure. The regulation on the hedge funds’ offering to institutional 
investors is comparatively lax, as their investors are better placed than retail investors 
to monitor the performance of their investment.  
In June 2013, ASIC issued its first direct ruling on hedge funds, known as Regulatory 
Guide 240 (RG240) – Hedge Funds: Improving Disclosure. RG240 introduced a broad 
                                                 
27 The AIFM directive exempts the hedge funds controlling less than 100 million euros or less than 
500 million euros when unleveraged.  
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definition of “hedge fund” that captures a vast range of funds, especially the funds that 
were traditionally not thought to be hedge funds. In particular, ASIC (2013) defined 
hedge funds in two ways – a fund promoted by its responsible entity as a “hedge fund” 
or a fund that exhibits at least two of five specified characteristics: complex investment 
strategy or structure; use of leverage; use of derivatives; use of short selling; and 
charging a performance fee. In addition, RG240 explicitly includes FOFs under its 
oversight. For retail investors to make informed decisions, hedge funds are required to 
follow two “benchmarks” and nine disclosure principles to disclose information in 
their product disclosure statements (PDSs). In the viewpoint of ASIC (2013), the 
independent valuation of assets and periodical reporting should be followed by all 
hedge funds as two benchmarks. Moreover, a PDS should disclose information 
regarding investment strategy, investment management of the fund, fund structure, 
custody of the assets, liquidity, use of leverage, derivatives, and short selling, as well 
as withdrawals.  
The recent reform of hedge fund regulation around the world proceeded within the 
hedge fund and FOF regulatory framework of IOSCO to achieve better investor 
protection, information transparency, and systemic risk monitoring in the hedge fund 
industry. The influence of the reforms on FOFs, however, is sophisticated and needs 
further study.  
Tighter regulation – for example, the demand for higher transparency – may benefit 
FOFs and other hedge fund investors with lower costs for preforming due diligence. 
Moreover, there is a requirement on hedge funds to maintain higher liquidity and relax 
redemption restrictions. As such, FOFs are able to implement active portfolio and risk-
management techniques (Zanolin, 2013). Finally, by complying with the higher-level 
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regulation, FOFs are able to raise capital in the market where they were not allowed 
to previously.  
Despite the potential benefits, the change in hedge fund regulation will cause extra 
costs for FOFs. Higher compliance costs including registration, disclosure, and 
auditing fees will be the most explicit costs brought by the regulatory reforms. In 
addition, a general trend of global hedge fund regulation is to bring all funds under the 
oversight of regulators (such as in the EU) and require the funds to perform due 
diligence to a higher standard. As Brown, Gregoriou, and Pascalau (2012) reported, 
the due diligence cost can be at least $12,500 for an industry-circulated report or as 
high as $50,000 for a customised report. Consider a well-diversified, midsize FOF 
with $200m AUM (assets under management) allocated across 30 underlying funds. 
The due-diligence cost will be around 0.2-0.8% of its AUM, which consumes a large 
portion of the fund-management fee (1% of the AUM). Thus, the tightened regulation 
on due diligence will also add a heavy burden on small or midsize FOFs.  
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4.4 Funds of funds legal structure 
Table 4.5 reports the summary statistics of the 10 commonly adopted hedge fund legal 
structures. The chi-square test suggests that the legal structure compositions of hedge 
funds and FOFs are significantly different at the 1% significance level. The open end 
investment company (OEIC) is adopted by around 20.5% of hedge funds, which leads 
limited liability company (LLC), partnership (3C1), and others narrowly. The latter 
three legal structures, of almost equal weight, account for almost 15% of the hedge 
fund structure. By contrast, about 37.6% of FOFs have been structured as OEIC, and 
the second-largest proportion (13.7%) of FOFs are registered as SICAV, an open-
ended collective investment scheme named Société d'investissement à capital variable 
in French and commonly adopted in Western European countries.  
Table 4.5 Legal structure of hedge funds and funds of funds (FOFs) 
This table reports the legal structures adopted by global hedge funds and FOFs according to the 
Morningstar database. 
 Hedge funds FOFs Difference***b 
Corporation 6.4% 4.0% -2.4% 
Exempted limited partnership 4.8% 1.8% -3.0% 
FCP 1.6% 6.4% 4.8% 
Limited liability company 15.1% 12.4% -2.7% 
Open ended investment company 20.5% 37.6% 17.1% 
Partnership (3C1) 14.1% 5.5% -8.6% 
Partnership (3C7) 8.2% 6.2% -2.0% 
SICAV 4.4% 13.7% 9.3% 
Unstructured hedge fund 11.1% 8.0% -3.1% 
Others 13.8% 4.4% -9.4% 
a. The chi-square test shows that the difference in the legal structure compositions of hedge funds 
and FOFs is significant at the 1% level.  
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The variation in legal structures can be partly explained by fund domicile. For example, 
most of the funds structured as partnerships (3C1) were established in the US, whereas 
the majority of the funds adopting OEIC were incorporated outside the US (usually in 
the UK). Traditional hedge funds are formed under a general or limited partnership 
structure, by which the activities of hedge funds are subject to less regulation than they 
would be if under a company structure. In addition to regulation, a variety of other 
factors may influence the decision on the suitable legal structure, such as tax, target 
clients, and so on. The influence of the legal structure on the operation, investment, 
and payout of a fund can be marked. For example, should a fund be organised as a 
limited partnership (LP), the limited liability designation will not provide liability 
protection to the general partner, who is usually the administrator and manager of the 
fund. By contrast, under the limited liability company (LLC) structure, all members 
including fund managers are responsible for only limited liability.  
Figure 4.2 presents the change in FOF and hedge fund legal structure compositions by 
AUM from 1995 to 2012. As reflected in the top panel, OEIC dominated the other 
legal structures in the late 1990s but since the early 2000s has gradually lost its market 
share. By the end of 2012, OEIC FOFs controlled more than 25% of the total AUM of 
the FOF industry. The other legal structures, including corporation, partnership 3C7, 
and unstructured hedge fund were almost equal in weight by the end of 2012. The 
change in the legal structure of hedge funds, as exhibited in the bottom panel of Figure 
4.2 is comparatively moderate. The most striking change is in the growth of hedge 
funds that are adopting an LLC or OEIC structure. In contrast, corporation and 
partnership 3C1 and 3C7 have gradually lost market share since the early 2000s.  
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Figure 4.2 Fund of hedge funds (FOF) and hedge fund legal structure 
composition by assets under management (AUM) 
 
 
As shown in my sample, the most commonly adopted structure for FOFs are OEIC 
and SICAV. OEICs are collective investment vehicles established as companies to 
invest in other companies with adjustable investment strategy and fund size. SICAV, 
usually adopted by funds domiciled in Luxemburg and other Western European 
countries, can be viewed as the European version of OEIC, as the two structures are 
very similar with respect to regulation, corporate governance, and fund custodian (UK 
Trade and Investment, 2015). The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK 
regulates OEICs under the Open-Ended Investment Companies (Companies with 
Variable Capital) Regulations, 2001. As open-ended investment vehicles, OEICs 
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provide shareholders great flexibility to enter or quit the companies. Moreover, the 
minimum investment charged by an OEIC is only £25 per month or £500 in a lump 
sum, which makes it easier to attract retail investors. OEIC funds are subject to strict 
regulations. For example, OEIC funds have to file their prospectuses, instruments of 
incorporation, key investor information documents, and annual and periodic reports 
with the FCA. An Authorised Corporate Director (ACD), who is also registered with 
and regulated by the FCA, is responsible for managing the daily operation of the OEIC. 
Furthermore, there are restrictions on the diversification of an OEIC’s portfolio, which 
are imposed by the FCA in relation to UCITS schemes. An appealing feature of the 
OEIC structure to fund management groups is its capacity to act as umbrella funds, 
where the OEIC is structured as a combination of many sub-funds. Each of the sub-
funds pursues a specific investment objective so that the investors of the OEIC can 
switch between the sub-funds at almost no cost. 
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4.5 Funds of hedge funds investment strategies 
4.5.1 FOF investment strategy composition 
FOFs are reported as a category of hedge fund investment strategies 28  in the 
Morningstar database, which classifies hedge fund strategies into 22 categories. For 
ease of reporting, I aggregated these strategies according to their focus asset classes. 
Thus, in my sample, hedge fund strategies are classified as equity, debt, event driven, 
multi-strategy, systematic futures, and macro. Furthermore, the FOFs sample is 
classified into six strategy groups (following the classification of the Morningstar 
database): equity, debt, event, multi-strategy, systematic, and relative value. It should 
be noted that the investment strategy classifications for hedge funds and FOFs are 
based on different definitions. As a result, the equity FOF strategy differs from the 
equity hedge funds in many respects, such as holdings, benchmarks, and liquidity. The 
description of FOF strategy can be found in Appendix A.  
Table 4.6 Investment strategy composition of hedge funds and funds of hedge 
funds 
This table reports the investment strategy distribution of hedge funds and FOFs by fund number. The 
left panel reports the strategy distribution of all sample funds including both FOFs and hedge funds. 
The right panel reports the strategy distribution of FOFs only.  
 
 % of total funds FOF strategy % of total FOFs 
Debt 8.52% Debt 4.87% 
Equity 37.42% Equity 27.88% 
Event driven 4.28% Event 4.91% 
Multi-strategy 5.60% Multi-strategy 49.52% 
Systematic futures 6.15% Systematic 8.42% 
Volatility 0.44% Relative value 4.40% 
Macro 6.00%   
Funds of funds 37.59%   
 
                                                 
28 A comprehensive explanation of the strategies can be found at www.morningstar.com.  
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Table 4.6 shows the investment strategy composition (by fund number) of hedge funds 
and FOFs. With regard to hedge fund investment strategy, I found that FOFs 
constituted the largest strategy group in the total fund sample, while equity hedge 
funds ranked second. Almost 80% of the funds in the sample have adopted the above 
two strategies. It should be noted that FOFs differ from other hedge funds in the 
investment activities by diversification. An FOF may have intensive exposure to one 
asset class while diversifying across managers or dispersed risk exposures achieved 
by diversification across asset classes. The two types of diversification seem to share 
the strategy composition of FOFs evenly. Around 50% of the FOFs choose to diversify 
across asset classes by pursuing a multi-strategy. In the remaining 50% of the FOFs, 
the equity strategy dominates the others. The change in FOF strategy composition 
from 1995 to 2012 is plotted in the upper chart of Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 Fund of hedge funds (FOF) and hedge fund investment strategy 
composition by assets under management (AUM) 
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According to the area plot of FOF strategy composition, multi-strategy FOFs 
dominated the other strategies, while equity FOFs lost most market share from 1995. 
Another notable observation is that macro FOFs have grown rapidly in the share of 
AUM since the 2008 GFC. By the end of 2012, macro FOFs accounted for around 17% 
of total AUM, which was about the same as that of equity FOFs. In contrast, hedge 
fund strategy composition by AUM displays a distinct picture. Equity hedge funds’ 
share in total hedge fund AUM has significantly shrunk. By contrast, macro, as well 
as systematic futures hedge funds, has won more market share in the post-GFC era.  
4.5.2 The performance of FOF investment strategies 
The performance of the sample FOFs is reported in Table 4.7. Although the average 
variance of the FOFs is lower, they have underperformed the hedge funds pertaining 
to the higher moments, especially with regard to skewness. I found that the average 
skewness of the FOFs was triple the skewness of the hedge fund, which means that an 
investor will receive extreme loss with higher probability in a FOF’s portfolio. All the 
general difference in performance measurements are significant at the 1% level except 
kurtosis. 
Table 4.7 The performance of funds of hedge funds (FOFs) and hedge funds 
 
FOFs 
(1) 
Hedge funds 
(2) 
Differences 
(1-2) 
Average monthly return 0.18 0.49 -0.31***a 
Average variance 28.20 52.88 -24.68*** 
Average kurtosis 5.51 5.33 0.18 
Average skewness -0.61 -0.20 -0.41*** 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 
1% level “***”, 5% level “**”, and 10% level “*”.  
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To investigate the performance of FOF investment strategies, I formed six equally 
weighted FOF strategy portfolios and plotted the cumulative returns of the portfolios 
(see Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.4 Cumulative returns of equally weighted fund of hedge funds strategy 
portfolios between 1995 and 2012 
 
We can roughly partition the whole period into three sub-periods: 1995 to the early 
2000s, including the dot-com bubble burst; the early 2000s to mid-2007, before the 
GFC; and the post-GFC period of mid-2008 to 2012.  
It is clearly shown in the chart that the Russian default and the collapse of LTCM (the 
Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund) in 1998 hit the FOF industry heavily. 
Debt FOFs, which had led the industry from 1995, experienced a sharp drawdown 
around 1998 and has lagged behind the other strategies since then. The only strategy 
that has benefited from this crisis is macro/systematic FOFs. During the first sub-
period, equity FOFs led the other strategies most of the time, mainly because of the 
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high-tech boom of the late 1990s. The rapid increase in equity FOF cumulative return 
halted around 2001, which coincided with the dot.com bubble burst. The other FOF 
strategies, however, were not heavily influenced by the downturn in the equity market 
and maintained the upward trend in their cumulative returns. Macro/systematic FOFs 
won large returns at the same time and hence led the industry until 2012.  
The second sub-period can be viewed as a golden age of FOFs because all the strategy 
portfolios experienced rapid growth until the 2007–2008 GFC. Most of the strategies 
managed to double their value during this period. Another striking feature of this 
period is the co-movements of the strategies. The cumulative return charts of some 
strategies have even tackled and moved in parallel between 2005 and 2008, such as 
those of relative value and debt FOFs.  
At the beginning of the last sub-period, we have observed the magnificent impact of 
the GFC on the entire FOF industry. In only a few months, the large drawdown brought 
most portfolios back to around their 2004 valuations. Since 2008, the FOF industry 
entered a period featured by high fluctuation. In addition, there is a clear trend that the 
returns of the portfolios become more correlated. With regard to the performance of 
specific portfolios, the macro/systematic portfolio has once again exhibited good 
resilience in a crisis period. It maintained its rise at the start of the GFC, while the 
growth in other portfolios turned weak. In addition, the drawdown in the 
macro/systematic portfolio lasted for the shortest period among the six portfolios, fully 
recovering in the aftermath of the GFC by the end of 2010.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter presented a comprehensive overview of the FOF industry, with most of 
the characteristics of FOFs introduced in comparison with hedge funds.  
I found that only 12.7% FOFs were established in the US, but a large number of FOFs 
are operating offshore. Because hedge funds in general have lower liquidity than the 
other asset classes, i.e., equity and debts, FOFs tend to set more handicaps in investor 
redemption, mainly by requiring more notice days in advance. Consistent with 
previous studies, we found that FOFs charge lower management fees and performance 
fees than hedge funds. Leverage is another area where FOFs exhibit clear distinctions. 
Only around 40% of the FOFs have reported to use leverage, and the average leverage 
ratio of the FOFs is much lower than that of the hedge funds. 
Different from hedge funds, a higher proportion of FOFs AUM was controlled by 
OEIC FOFs in Europe and partnership 3C7 in the US as of the end of 2012. There is 
no such dominating legal structure in hedge funds.  
Multi-strategy and macro/systematic FOFs have taken the market share of the other 
strategies in the last decade, while the entire FOF industry size has shrunk rapidly 
since the 2007–2008 GFC. Equity FOFs have attracted most of the investment 
compared with the other FOFs following a single investment strategy. By investigating 
the cumulative returns of six equally weighted FOF strategy portfolios, I found that 
the co-movements of the portfolios have become more prominent in the post-GFC era. 
Most of the portfolios were deeply influenced by the worst hedge fund crisis in history. 
The macro/systematic FOF portfolio is the only one that has exhibited good crisis 
resilience. Finally, I found the return distribution of the equally weighted FOF 
portfolio is more left skewed than the equally weighted hedge fund portfolio.  
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The recent global hedge fund regulation reforms are also reviewed in this chapter. The 
current regulation framework aims at better investor protection, information 
transparency, and systemic risk monitoring in the hedge fund industry. Although the 
influences of the reforms on FOFs can be sophisticated, the tightened regulation will 
nevertheless impose higher compliance and due-diligence costs on FOFs. Except for 
the stricter regulation, FOF managers also face other challenges, such as deteriorated 
investor confidence and tail risk management. Higher transparency in the hedge fund 
industry makes hedge fund cloning or indexing easier. It is quite clear that the other 
investment vehicles specialising in hedge fund investment will compete with FOFs in 
the foreseeable future.  
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Chapter 5: Tail risk of funds of hedge funds 
5.1 Introduction 
A fund of hedge funds (FOFs) is a pool of money that is directly invested in individual 
managed funds. In the last few decades, an increasing amount of capital has flowed 
into the hedge fund industry via FOFs. In a recent industry report issued by eVestment 
(2016), the total value of assets under management (AUM) of FOFs reached USD 840 
billion during the first quarter of 2016, which represented approximately 28.25% of 
the total market value of the entire hedge fund industry.  
FOFs have several characteristics that are appealing to the investment community. For 
example, FOFs require lower minimum investments, which allows retail or small 
institutional investors to gain broad exposure to hedge fund investments. Moreover, 
the dynamic investment strategies of a hedge fund, as well as the secretive nature of 
the same, lead to a higher search cost for retail investors. FOFs provide an effective 
channel for investors to access the scarce skills of successful hedge funds through their 
due-diligence selection process. Although FOF investors are charged at both the 
underlying fund level and the FOF manager level, the extra cost is believed to be 
justified by the fund selection skills of a FOF manager29. Finally, FOFs are usually 
considered well-diversified investment vehicles with average returns and lower levels 
of volatility.  
Despite the popularity of FOFs within the investment community, the risk of investing 
in hedge fund portfolios is not that clear. Though there is extensive literature on the 
                                                 
29 While most hedge funds have a “two and twenty” fee structure or, in other words, a 2% charge on 
asset management and a 20% charge on any profits earned, funds of funds usually have lower 
performance-based fees and about the same level of management fees.  
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performance and risks of hedge fund investments, the majority of risk-return analysis 
in the hedge fund literature removes FOFs from their sample because FOFs do not 
invest directly in traditional asset classes. The poor performance of FOFs during the 
recent financial crisis has cast doubt on the capability of FOF risk management 
practices. According to a recent study by Dai and Shawky (2013), the 2008 global 
financial crisis (GFC) has caused a severe amount of deterioration in the returns of 
FOFs despite the fact that they hold a large number of hedge funds.  
The severe loss of FOFs during the crisis period is surprising. Conventional mean-
variance analysis suggests that FOFs should have at least average returns with lower 
volatility. But why do FOFs seem to suffer more in a severe industry-wide downturn? 
I wish to investigate this question by employing the rich literature that is available on 
extreme value theory (EVT) and tail risk studies.  
In this chapter, I will place particular interest on the tail risk exposure of FOFs in an 
attempt to understand the role of tail risk in explaining FOF performance. I examine 
to what extent the tail risk exposure of FOFs differs from that of hedge funds. 
Furthermore, I aim to identify the characteristics of FOFs that determine their tail risk 
exposure. I found that the average return of FOFs was substantially lower than that of 
hedge funds and the return distribution of FOFs is more skewed to the left. I also found 
that the risk of FOFs has experienced a structural change since mid-2006. As indicated 
by various risk measures, FOFs display an inability to diversify risk. The risk of FOFs 
during the 2007-2008 GFC was even higher than that of other hedge fund strategies. 
Furthermore, I developed a tail risk estimator by using cross-sectional hedge fund 
returns (HFTR). I found that 44.64% (3474 out of 7782) hedge funds have significant 
negative exposure to HFTR, and this ratio increases to 83.79% (3582 out of 4275) in 
the sample of FOFs. At the strategy level, all hedge fund and FOF portfolios exhibit 
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significant negative exposures to HFTR except for the hedge funds that adopt a 
volatility strategy30. The explanatory power of HFTR remains significant over the pre-
GFC period, even after controlling for further risk factors. By introducing HFTR into 
Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model, the explanatory power of the model is 
substantially increased. The enhancements are prominent at both the individual fund 
level and the portfolio level. I have also documented a relationship between fund 
characteristics and the tail risk exposures of FOFs and hedge funds. In particular, I 
found that FOFs with a short history, higher management fees, and requiring a shorter 
lockup period are more sensitive to tail risk in particular. My simulation analysis 
confirms that, while FOFs are more diversified, the systematic component of risk 
becomes more dominant in a risk-return determination. This result explains why tail 
risk is more concentrated at FOFs level.  
To further examine the source of FOFs’ tail risk exposure, I replicated Kelly and 
Jiang’s (2014) tail risk factor, also known as an equity market tail risk factor (EMTR), 
using global equity market data. I found that the EMTR acted quite distinctively in 
explaining the returns of FOFs and hedge funds. I suggest that the tail risk in the hedge 
fund industry is not purely caused by equity market extreme events. My results provide 
strong evidence that, given the higher exposure to tail events, it could be a danger to 
depict FOFs investment as a low-risk category to retail investors.    
The chapter is organised as follows. I will introduce the approaches of the study in 
Section 5.2. The empirical results are presented and analysed in Section 5.3. I then 
present further discussion on the implications of the results in Section 5.4. Conclusions 
are provided in the last section.  
                                                 
30 Volatility hedge funds trade volatility as assets, such as VIX index assets.  
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5.2 Description of approaches 
As explained in Section 5.1, the primary objective of this chapter is to investigate the 
influence of hedge fund tail risk on the returns of FOFs. I will perform the following 
steps to achieve this objective. First, I will develop a tail risk measurement that 
captures the dynamic tail risk shocks in the hedge fund industry. Based on the tail risk 
factor, I will examine whether tail risk exposures explain the variation of FOFs returns 
in both a time series and the cross-section. Finally, I will study the relationship 
between FOF characteristics and the tail risk exposure.  
5.2.1 Hedge fund tail risk factor 
I selected 7,782 sample hedge funds and unsmoothed the returns of the funds following 
the description in Section 3.3.1. Furthermore, I orthogonalised the return time series 
of each hedge fund using Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model, following the 
steps described in Section 3.4.2. Next, in month 𝑡, I plotted the distribution of the 
cross-sectional orthogonalised returns of the sample hedge funds and used the return 
at the fifth percentile on the left tail as the threshold return u of the Hill estimator. 
Thus, all the returns falling below the threshold return will be used to derive the Hill 
estimator 𝜆?̂?
𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙
 following Equation 3.9. By performing this process for each month 
from January 1995 to December 2012, I eventually obtained a time series of the 
monthly Hill estimator. After this, I standardised the monthly estimators as follows31: 
𝜌𝑡 =
𝜆?̂?
𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙
−𝜇
𝜆𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙
𝜎
𝜆𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙
   (5.1) 
                                                 
31 By standardising the estimator, we can interpret alpha in the multi-factor model as the expected 
return when the risk factor premia are set to their means. However, I hope to note that the 
standardised tail risk estimator is not directly observable in reality. Thus, care should be taken when 
interpreting the coefficient (beta) of the tail risk factor.     
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where 𝜌𝑡 is the standardised Hill estimator of month 𝑡 while 𝜇𝜆𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙  and 𝜎𝜆𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙  are the 
mean and standard deviation of the 𝜆?̂?
𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑙
time series, respectively. I named 𝜌𝑡 as the 
hedge fund tail risk measurement (HFTRM). Finally, I fitted the AR(q) processes to 
the tail risk measurements. The innovations of the AR(q) process are used to proxy the 
tail event shocks, which I refer to as the hedge fund industry tail risk factor (HFTR) 
hereafter. The parameter q is decided by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
5.2.2 Equity market tail risk factor 
In the spirit of Kelly and Jiang (2014), I used the daily prices of the constituents of the 
Thomson Reuters Global Equity Index from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2013 to 
derive the EMTR. There are approximately 6,000 to 10,000 stocks with valid data in 
each year. I applied the Fama–French three-factor-model and kept the residuals for 
each stock to remove the influences of the other common factors. Then, for each month, 
I used the orthogonalised return at the fifth percentile on the left tail as the threshold 
return u of the Hill estimator. Following the same procedure described in Section 5.2.1, 
I developed a time series of equity market tail risk measurement (EMTRM) and fit the 
AR(q) process to the time series. The innovations of the AR(q) process are defined as 
the equity market tail risk factor (EMTR). One of the main arguments of this chapter 
is that, besides the extreme drawdowns in the equity market, the tail risk in the hedge 
fund industry can be caused by a variety of other reasons. It follows that the HFTR 
can better explain the tail risk exposure of FOFs than a pure equity market tail risk 
factor. Thus, in most of the empirical tests of this chapter, the EMTR will be used as 
a comparison tail risk estimator of the HFTR.  
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5.2.3 Can tail risk explain the return variation in a time series? 
I utilised the popular Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven-factor model as the base model to 
explain the fund returns; however, my interest was to see whether the tail risk factor 
can add explanatory power to the existing hedge fund return factor models. My multi-
factor model takes the following general form: 
Rt
k = αt
k + ∑ βi
kFi,t
8
i=1 + et
k   
(5.2) 
where 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 is the excess return of fund k at time 𝑡, and 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 is abnormal return caused by 
managers’ skills. 𝛽𝑖
𝑘  is the kth fund’s risk exposure to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ factor, and 𝑒𝑡
𝑘  is the 
residual. The first seven factors are Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven factors, as 
explained in Section 3.4.5. The eighth factor is the tail risk factor HFTR/EMTR (as 
described in Section 5.2.1/5.2.2). The coefficient of HFTR/EMTR was estimated using 
multivariate regression as described by Equation 3.14. I have also added the Fama–
French momentum factor (MMT), the innovation in aggregate liquidity factor (LQD), 
and the monthly return of VIX to form an eleven-factor model for a robustness check. 
I used Treasury-bill yield to represent the risk-free interest rate.  
5.2.4 Can fund characteristics explain the variation in the cross-
section of hedge fund tail risk exposures? 
I performed cross-sectional regression to investigate the relationship between fund 
characteristics and the fund’s tail risk exposure. The regressions take the following 
structure:  
𝛽𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 + ∑ 𝜃𝑘 × 𝐶𝑖
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑋𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑋𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  
 (5.3) 
In this equation, 
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𝛽𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is the regression coefficient of HFTR for fund 𝑖, which is estimated over the 
whole period, 𝛼𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is the intercept, 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 represents the 𝑘𝑡ℎ characteristics of fund 𝑖, 
and 𝜃𝑘 is the coefficient of the characteristics to be estimated in the cross-sectional 
regression. 𝑋𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖  and 𝑋𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖  represent the past 24 months’ average return and 
standard deviation for fund 𝑖, and 𝑒𝑖
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is the error term of the regression model. I 
include the following fund characteristics in the regression: fund age, size (measured 
by AUM), fund attrition (dummy variable, 1 for living and 0 for defunct), incentive 
fees, management fees, high-water mark (dummy variable), closed to all investment32 
(dummy variable), leverage ratio, lockup months, redemption frequency, and advance 
notice days.  
                                                 
32 This variable indicates whether a fund accepted external investments on inception.  
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5.3 Empirical results 
5.3.1 Preliminary performance analysis 
First, I constructed equally weighted portfolios for both hedge funds and FOFs 
according to their investment strategies. The performance of the portfolios is reported 
in Table 5.1. Compared to an average monthly return of 1% by hedge funds, FOFs, on 
average, have a lower monthly return of 0.67%. The variance of the monthly return of 
the FOFs is 5.88%, which is marginally less than the hedge funds’ variance of 6.15%. 
Hedge funds using the volatility strategy record the highest monthly mean return and 
variance. This is not surprising because the sample size is only 50 and there are some 
extreme outliers, such as the VIX Portfolio Hedging (VXH) Program, which reports a 
22% monthly return and a 3251% monthly variance. In addition, volatility hedge funds 
usually bet on the magnitude of asset volatility and implement strategy using 
derivatives such as straddles and strangles. Such option strategies may lead to 
significant losses when market volatility moves against expectations. Both hedge fund 
and FOF portfolios display negative skewness, but the distribution of FOF returns is 
more left skewed at -0.83 compared to -0.28 for hedge funds. The historical VaR of 
FOFs is 2.6, which is 0.6 higher than that of hedge funds. Shapiro-Wilk test results 
reveal non-normality in the returns of both portfolios, which is consistent with the 
findings in other hedge fund studies, such as Olmo and Sanso-Navarro (2012). In 
general, FOFs tend to underperform their counterpart HF portfolios. For example, debt 
FOFs gain a 0.51% monthly return with a 5.58% variance, whereas debt hedge funds 
receive a 0.9% monthly return and a 5.27% variance. In summary, both hedge fund 
and FOF returns, on average, tend to be non-normally distributed. Some hedge fund 
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or FOF strategies are more prominent in extreme losses, such as the volatility strategy 
for hedge funds and debt strategy for FOFs. 
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Table 5.1 The performance of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds (January 1991 to December 2012) 
This table reports the performance statistics of hedge fund and fund of hedge funds (FOF) strategies. Each strategy group is represented by an equally weighted 
portfolio of the funds in that strategy group.  
  Counts % of subtotal Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis Historical VaR Normality testa 
Hedge fund 
strategies 
Hedge funds  7782 100.0% 1.01  6.15  -0.28  2.03  2 0.98***b  
Debt 969 12.5% 0.90  5.27  -1.30  10.35  1.7 0.87***  
Equity 4256 54.7% 1.05  10.07  -0.61  2.05  2.9 0.97***  
Event.driven 487 6.3% 0.95  4.72  -1.47  5.88  1.6 0.90***  
Multi-strategy 637 8.2% 0.92  4.23  -1.16  4.85  1.4 0.93***  
Systematic futures 700 9.0% 1.15  20.42  1.21  5.71  4.9 0.94***  
Volatility 50 0.6% 1.25  50.07  -2.54  52.23  2.1 0.48***  
Macro 683 8.8% 0.85  4.60  0.72  2.34  2.1 0.97***  
Funds of hedge 
funds strategies 
FOFs 4275 100.0% 0.67  5.88  -0.83  3.09  2.6 0.95***  
Macro/systematic 360 8.4% 0.81  7.86  0.24  0.12  3.4 0.99  
Debt 208 4.9% 0.51  5.58  -1.31  5.93  2.1 0.91***  
Equity 1192 27.9% 0.71  8.73  -0.59  2.35  2.8 0.96***  
Event 210 4.9% 0.58  4.62  -1.28  4.40  1.9 0.91***  
Multi-strategy 2117 49.5% 0.62  5.75  -1.01  3.96  2.5 0.94***  
Relative value 188 4.4% 0.50  3.81  -1.28  5.78  2.2 0.91***  
a. Shapiro-Wilk normality test was used in this research to test normality.  
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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Figure 5.1 The series of the risk measures of hedge fund strategies vs funds of hedge funds (December 1997 to December 2012) 
The time series of each risk measure is calculated using the monthly returns of equally weighted strategy portfolios on a 36-month rolling window. All the risk 
measures are standardised before plotting, so the diagrams show the changes in the risk of hedge funds relative to their historical average.  
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Next, I calculated the standard deviation, downside deviation (semi-deviation), 
historical value at risk (VaR), and expected shortfall (ES) for each hedge fund and 
FOF strategy portfolio on a 36-month rolling window. As such, I received 15 time 
series for each risk measure and plotted these time series in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. 
To enhance the comparability of the graphs, I standardised the time series using 
𝐶𝑡 =
𝑐𝑡−𝑐̅
𝜎𝑐
  
 (5.4) 
where 𝑐𝑡 is the risk measure at time 𝑡, 𝑐̅ is the average of {𝑐𝑡} over the entire period, 
and 𝜎𝑐 is the standard deviation of the risk measure over the entire period.  
Figure 5.1 shows the time series of all hedge fund strategies compared with the equally 
weighted FOF portfolio in relation to standard deviation, downside deviation, VaR, 
and ES. In each of the graphs in Figure 5.1, the FOFs time series is represented by a 
blue solid line, and the other hedge fund strategies are depicted by various dot lines. 
The graph on the top left indicates the standard deviation time series, which can be 
roughly separated into three sub-periods: December 1997 to May 2003, June 2003 to 
August 2007, and September 2007 to December 2012. During the first sub-period, the 
standard deviations of hedge fund strategies do not exhibit any sign of clustering or 
co-movement. There is a sharp increase in the volatility of equity hedge funds (the red 
dot line) in the early 2000s, which could be caused by the burst of the high-tech 
bubbles. Moving into the second sub-period, I observe some trend of convergence and 
co-movements. For example, most of the strategies show below-average standard 
deviation and indicate a stable change in the time series during this period. Systematic 
futures and volatility hedge funds are the exemptions. Both strategies exhibit high 
volatility during this period; however, by the end of the second sub-period, the 
volatility of these two strategies experience consistent decreases. By the end of August 
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2007, all the strategies exhibit below-average volatility. Focusing on FOFs, the 
volatility of FOFs starts to increase in mid-2005 and exceeds all the other strategies 
around June 2006. This structural change results in a high-level volatility that persists 
until the end of the sample period. The last sub-period starts in September 2007, or 
roughly the period in which the GFC took place. The volatility of all strategies tended 
to increase during this period. In mid-2008, there was a dramatic surge in the volatility 
of all funds except systematic futures and volatility hedge funds. FOFs do not provide 
any diversification benefit, as its relative level of standard deviation still leads the other 
strategies until the end of 2008. The other three graphs reveal similar patterns in the 
change of the downside risk of these hedge fund strategies. All of them show a 
structural change in the risk of FOFs relative to the other hedge funds around mid-
2006. In addition, the downside risk of FOF is among the highest during the GFC 
period and shows no sign of dropping until late 2011. Figure 5.1 shows some visual 
evidence that FOFs is as risky as the other hedge fund strategies. In extreme market 
conditions, such as the GFC, FOFs do not display a diversification benefit, which is 
consistent with the conclusions of Amin and Kat (2002) as well as Brown, Gregoriou, 
and Pascalau (2012).  
Figure 5.2 shows the risk measurement time series of FOF strategies compared with 
the equally weighted hedge fund portfolio (in this section, hedge funds). In all four 
graphs, the hedge fund time series is represented by a solid red line, and the FOF time 
series is indicated by a solid blue line. In the standard deviation graph on the top left, 
I find a clear pattern of co-movement in the volatility of FOF strategies. During the 
period from 2003 to mid-2007, all the strategies deliver lower-than-average volatilities, 
but they all experience a sharp increase in volatility around September 2008. In the 
aftermath of the GFC, the volatility of all FOFs remains high and has never returned 
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to that low level. The volatility of hedge funds is below that of most of the FOF 
strategies since 2006, even during the period of the GFC.  
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Figure 5.2 Time series of the risk measures of fund of hedge fund strategies vs hedge funds (December 1997 to December 2012) 
The time series of each risk measure is calculated using the monthly returns of equally weighted strategy portfolios on a 36-month rolling window. All the risk 
measures are standardised before plotting, so the diagrams show the changes in the risk of hedge funds relative to their historical average.  
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Figure 5.3 Time series of the risk measures of fund of hedge fund strategies vs hedge funds (January 2007 to December 2008) 
The time series of each risk measure is calculated using the monthly returns of equally weighted strategy portfolios on a 36-month rolling window. All the risk 
measures are standardised before plotting, so the diagrams show the changes in the risk of hedge funds relative to their historical average.  
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As the lines in Figure 5.2 become entangled during the GFC period, I plotted the same 
time series on a shorter horizon and show these graphs in Figure 5.3. The sample 
period of the plots in Figure 5.3 is from January 2007 to December 2008, which covers 
the majority of the GFC. These graphs show clear evidence that most of the FOF 
strategies experienced higher volatility or downside risk during the GFC relative to 
their historical average. In contrast, the increase in the relative risk of hedge funds is 
not as high as that of the FOFs. Specific to FOF strategies, macro/systematic FOFs 
tend to outperform their peer groups with regard to all the risk measures prior to the 
GFC but eventually aligned with the others when the GFC took place. Multi-strategy 
FOFs, however, lead the other strategies during the two-year period with respect to all 
the downside risk measures.  
5.3.2 The tail risk factors HFTR and EMTR 
The standardised time series of HFTRM and EMTRM are depicted in Figure 5.4. I 
plotted the two measurements respectively with the cumulative return of the S&P500 
index over the same period in the top and middle panel. In addition, in the bottom 
panel, I presented the two tail risk measurements on the same plot to highlight the 
differences.  
I found that EMTRM captures the major equity market drawdowns. Some remarkable 
peaks in the EMTRM chart correspond to the troughs in the S&P500 cumulative return 
chart. For example, EMTRM reaches its historical peak around late 2007 and stays at 
a high level until early 2010. During the same time, the S&P500 cumulative return 
experiences the largest drawdown. However, there are several mismatches, such as the 
one around 1997. A possible explanation is that EMTRM is generated using global 
market data, whereas the S&P500 return depicts the fluctuations in the US market. 
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The tail risk in 1997 was sourced mainly from Asian markets, so its impact on the US 
market is comparatively limited. 
In general, I find that HFTRM does not capture the major equity market drawdowns, 
although on limited occasions, some peaks in HFTRM correspond to the troughs in 
the S&P500 cumulative return chart. This is not surprising given that hedge funds have 
broad exposure to different asset classes. As a result, systemic shocks to the hedge 
fund industry do not always originate from the equity market. For example, the 
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 was triggered by the 
Russian default in the debt market. For the same reason, the plot of HFTR is not always 
consistent with the EMTR shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. For example, the 
EMTRM series hit its local peak around 1997, but it corresponds to a trough in the 
HFTRM series. It would not be an unexpected observation, as many hedge funds 
profited during the Asian market turmoil in 1997. 
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Figure 5.4 Tail risk measurements and SP500 cumulative returns 
This diagram shows the time series of the tail risk measurements compared with the cumulative return 
of SP500 index from 1995 to 2012. The blue line in the top and bottom panel represent equity market 
tail risk measurement (EMTR), and the red line in the middle and bottom panel shows the hedge fund 
market tail risk measurement (HFTR).  
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It has been well documented in the finance and econometrics literature that using non-
stationary time series in a regression model may lead to the spurious regression 
problem (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Entorf, 1997; Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin, 
2003). Thus, I perform KPSS and Dickey-Fuller test on the stationarity of the two tail 
risk measurements. The KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) is designed to test the 
null hypothesis that a time series is non-stationary around a deterministic trend. In 
contrast, the null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test assumes that there is a unit root 
in the time series so that the time series is difference non-stationary. For both tests, a 
p-value lower than 10% indicates significant evidence against the null hypothesis. 
Table 5.2 reports the KPSS test and Dickey-Fuller test results of EMTRM and HFTRM. 
According to Panel A, the KPSS test indicates no evidence that the EMTRM follows 
a deterministic trend, and the augmented Dickey-Fuller test can reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at the 10 percent significance level. We can observe similar 
test results of HFTRM in Panel B. In summary, we find no significant evidence that 
EMTRM and HFTRM series are trend-non-stationary or difference-non-stationary.   
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Table 5.2 Stationary test results of the tail risk measurements 
Panel A: equity market tail risk measurement 
KPSS Test for Trend Stationarity 
KPSS Trend = 0.2256 Truncation lag parameter = 3 p-value = 0.01 
Alternative hypothesis: non-trend-stationary 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -3.4172 Lag order = 5 p-value = 0.05291 
Alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Panel B: Hedge fund industry tail risk factor 
KPSS Test for Trend Stationarity 
KPSS Trend = 0.0499 Truncation lag parameter = 3 p-value = 0.1 
Alternative hypothesis: non-trend-stationary 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -4.7192 Lag order = 5 p-value = 0.01 
Alternative hypothesis: stationary 
a. The two tests are performed on the tail risk measurement time series from May 1996 to Feb 2010.  
 
I also performed the autocorrelation function (ACF) test to capture the autocorrelation 
in the tail risk measurements, and the results are provided in Figure 5.5. I can find 
some signs of autocorrelation in EMTRM. The partial ACF chart of EMTRM reveals 
the persistence of equity market tail event shocks. In contrast, HFTRM follows a white 
noise process, while the influence of the previous tail risk shock disappears in the 
following month. Moreover, the bottom panel of Figure 5.5 shows the result of the 
ACF test for the two factors. If a change in either of the measurements leads to changes 
in another, I should observe significant autocorrelation exceeding the significance line; 
however, the chart reveals that there is no strong lead-lag effect between the two tail 
risk measurements.  
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Figure 5.5 ACF of tail risk measurements 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2, I fitted the AR (q) process to both 
HFTRM and EMTRM to derive the tail risk factors HFTR and EMTR. I report the 
correlation between the risk factors that will be used in the remaining studies in Table 
5.3. Because the HFTR is derived from the cross-sectional residuals of Fung and 
Hsieh’s seven-factor model (2004a), it naturally displays weak correlations with other 
factors. Moreover, HFTR is the only factor that is insignificantly correlated to VIX, 
which reflects market expectations for future volatility. I found that EMTR is 
significantly correlated with S&P500 excess returns, Fung and Hsieh (2001) trending 
following factors, and VIX. The two tail risk factors are significantly correlated, but 
the correlation coefficient is only 0.2. On one hand, the significant correlation between 
the two tail risk factors indicates that HFTR does contain information regarding the 
tail risk shocks from the equity market. On the other hand, the low value of the 
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correlation also suggests that HFTR covers some different information that is not 
reflected in EMTR. These findings lead to my view that the tail risk in the hedge fund 
industry can only be partially explained by the tail risk event in the equity market. 
Therefore, I expect HFTR to work better than EMTR in depicting the tail risk in the 
hedge fund industry to better explain the returns of FOFs. 
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Table 5.3 The correlation matrix of market risk factors 
This table shows the pairwise Pearson correlation between the factors to be used in the regression analysis. The top diagonal shows the significance of the 
correlation, and the bottom diagonal shows the value of the correlations. 
 SP500b SMB TBY CRSP PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM MMTM LQD VIX EMTR HFTR 
SP500 1.00  *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ***  
SMB 0.07 1.00 *** *** *     ***   
TBY 0.21 0.19 1.00 *** *** ** ** ***  ***   
CRSP -0.31 -0.28 -0.69 1.00 *** *** ** ***  ***   
PTFSBD -0.23 -0.13 -0.35 0.29 1.00 *** ***   *** ***  
PTFSFX -0.21 -0.02 -0.17 0.22 0.27 1.00 *** *  *** ***  
PTFSCOM -0.17 -0.06 -0.14 0.17 0.23 0.38 1.00 ***  *   
MMTM -0.33 0.07 -0.18 0.22 0.02 0.12 0.22 1.00 * **   
LQD 0.25 0.01 0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 1.00 ***  * 
VIX -0.67 -0.19 -0.21 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.11 0.16 -0.20 1.00 ***  
EMTR -0.19 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.24 1.00 *** 
HFTR 0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 0.20 1.00 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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Table 5.4 Hedge funds and funds of hedge funds (FOFs) with significant negative hedge fund industry tail risk betas 
This table shows the statistics of hedge funds and FOFs with negative exposures to the hedge fund industry tail risk factor (HFTR). I classify these funds using 
three criteria: living or defunct, investment strategies, and whether the funds generate excess returns after controlling for the tail risk exposure.  
Number of hedge funds: 7782 Number of FOFs: 4275 
Panel A: hedge funds with significant negative tail risk beta  Panel B: funds of hedge funds with significant negative tail risk beta  
Number of hedge funds with sig. neg. 
beta 
3474 44.64% of 7782 Number of FOFs with sig. neg. beta 3582 83.79% of 4275 
 No. of funds % of 3474  No. of funds % of 3582 
Livingb 1381 39.75% Living 1144 31.94% 
Defunct 2093 60.25% Defunct 2438 68.06% 
Hedge funds 
strategies 
Debt 415 11.95% 
FOFs 
strategies 
Macro/systematic 286 7.98% 
Equity 1904 54.81% Debt 142 3.96% 
Event driven 204 5.87% Equity 994 27.75% 
Multi-strategy 311 8.95% Event 174 4.86% 
Systematic futures 333 9.59% Multi-strategy 1848 51.59% 
Volatility 16 0.46% Relative value 138 3.85% 
Macro 291 8.38%    
Sig +alphac 409 11.77% Sig +alpha 205 5.72% 
Sig -alpha 42 1.21% Sig -alpha 58 1.62% 
a. Morningstar database defines living funds as the funds reporting return information until the census date. Defunct funds include the funds liquidated before 
the census date and the funds that stop reporting to Morningstar before the census date.  
b. Alpha is the excess return calculated using the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
8
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘   where 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 is the excess return of a fund in month t and 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 
represents the monthly returns of eight factors, including Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven factors, the Fama–French momentum factor, the Pastor and 
Stambaugh aggregate liquidity factor, and EMTR, an equity market tail risk factor. 
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5.3.3 The tail risk exposure of individual hedge funds and FOFs 
I ran a linear regression for each fund in my sample to obtain their exposure to HFTR 
over the whole sample period. According to the significance of HFTR exposure, beta, 
I classified the hedge funds and the FOFs into three groups, respectively: funds with 
significant negative betas, funds with significant positive betas, and funds with 
insignificant betas. Table 5.4 reports the summary statistics of the funds with 
significant negative tail risk betas. To investigate the cross-sectional variation of the 
tail risk exposure of hedge funds and FOFs, I classified the funds in Table 5.4 using 
three criteria: the status of the funds (living or dead), the investment strategy of the 
funds, and the excess return of the funds after controlling for tail risk exposure.  
Approximately 44.64% of 7,782 hedge funds have significant negative exposure to 
HFTR, but 60.25% of these funds became defunct before 2013, as shown in Panel A. 
The strategy composition of the tail-risk-sensitive hedge funds is consistent with the 
strategy composition of the entire hedge fund universe. Hence, there is no particular 
hedge fund strategy that is effectively immune to the industry-wide tail risk shocks. I 
found that approximately 11.77% of 3,474 HFTR-sensitive hedge funds were able to 
deliver significant positive alpha.  
The HFTR regression results of individual FOFs are reported in Panel B of Table 5.4. 
The results are quite distinct from the results in Panel A. I found that around 83.79% 
of FOFs in the total sample had significant negative exposures to HFTR, and nearly 
68% of these funds became defunct before 2013. The implication of this finding is 
twofold. First, there does not seem to be a risk reduction despite FOFs holding 
diversified hedge fund portfolios. Instead, the tail risk exposures of individual hedge 
funds tend to be aggregated in a FOF’s portfolio. Second, tail risk exposure may help 
 119 
 
to explain the attrition ratio of FOFs. A smaller number of FOFs, approximately 5.7% 
of my FOFs sample, are able to deliver significant positive alpha after controlling for 
their exposure to HFTR. Similar to hedge funds results in Panel A, I found no 
particular FOFs strategy that is more sensitive or immune to the tail risk when 
comparing the strategy composition of the tail-risk-sensitive FOFs with that of the 
entire FOF sample. This observation is also consistent with the evidence documented 
in Figure 5.3, where the time series plot of all FOF strategies increased collectively 
during the GFC.  
I have repeated the above process using EMTR and the tail risk factor, and the test 
results are reported in Table 5.5. In total, the majority of hedge funds (87.3%) and 
FOFs (77.8%) are not influenced by EMTR to a significant extent. 888 (11.41% of 
7,782) hedge funds report significant negative tail risk beta, while a higher proportion 
of FOFs (21.87% of 4,275) are significantly exposed to EMTR. This result might 
challenge the traditional belief that FOFs are more diversified and less influenced by 
tail risk shocks than hedge funds. With regard to the investment strategy, I found that 
the funds pursuing equity strategies are prominent in EMTR exposure. Equity hedge 
funds account for approximately 63.63% of the EMTR-sensitive hedge funds, which 
is approximately 10% higher than the normal proportion of equity hedge funds in the 
total hedge fund sample (54.7% in Table 5.1 column 2). Similar to equity hedge funds, 
approximately 38.61% of EMTR-sensitive FOFs follow an equity strategy, while they 
account for only 27.9% in the whole FOF sample. In contrast, other HF and FOF 
strategies take lower shares in the EMTR-sensitive fund sample. Finally, I found that 
approximately 13.63% of EMTR-sensitive hedge funds gained significant excess 
return, and this ratio is lower in EMTR-sensitive FOFs (5.56%). 
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In summary, the results of individual fund time series regression support my claim that 
the tail risk in the hedge fund industry cannot be eliminated by FOF diversification. 
Instead, FOFs are more sensitive to the tail risk shock than hedge funds. In addition, 
HFTR can significantly explain the returns of the vast majority of FOFs and a large 
proportion of hedge funds.  
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Table 5.5 Hedge funds and funds of hedge funds with significant negative exposures to the equity market tail risk factora 
This table shows the statistics of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds with negative exposure to the equity market tail risk factor (EMTR). I classify these funds 
using three criteria: living or defunct, investment strategies and whether the funds receive excess return after controlling for tail risk exposure. 
Number of hedge funds: 7782 Number of FOHFs: 4275 
Panel A: hedge funds with significant negative tail risk beta  Panel B: funds of hedge funds with significant negative tail risk beta  
Number of hedge funds with sig. neg. 
beta 
888 11.41% of 7782 Number of FOHFs with sig. neg. beta 935 21.87% of 4257 
 No. of funds % of 888  No. of funds % of 935 
Livingb 376 42.34% Living 397 42.46% 
Defunct 512 57.66% Defunct 538 57.54% 
Hedge funds 
strategies 
Debt 108 12.16% 
FOHFs 
strategies 
Macro/systematic 49 5.24% 
Equity 565 63.63% Debt 25 2.67% 
Event driven 55 6.19% Equity 361 38.61% 
Multi-strategy 60 6.76% Event 35 3.74% 
Systematic futures 51 5.74% Multi-strategy 448 47.91% 
Volatility 3 0.34% Relative value 17 1.82% 
Macro 46 5.18%    
Sig +alphac 121 
 
13.63% 
 
Sig +alpha 52 5.56% 
Sig +alpha 2 0.23% 
 
Sig +alpha 3 0.32% 
a. The Morningstar database defines living funds as the funds reporting return information until the census date. Defunct funds include funds liquidated before 
the census date and funds that stop reporting to Morningstar before the census date.  
b. Alpha is the excess return calculated using the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
8
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘   where 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 is the excess return of a fund in month t and 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 
represents the monthly returns of eight factors, including Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven factors, the Fama–French momentum factor, the Pastor and 
Stambaugh aggregate liquidity factor, and EMTR, an equity market tail risk factor. 
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5.3.4 Tail risk factor contribution to the explanatory power of factor 
models 
I performed further regressions at an individual fund level to investigate whether the 
explanatory power of selected models can be enhanced by adding the tail risk factors. 
Traditional CAPM and the Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven-factor model are adopted as 
the base models in this analysis. I require all the funds in the sample to report at least 
36 monthly returns so that 5,301 hedge funds and 3,311 FOFs remain in the final 
sample. For each fund in the sample, I ran CAPM and the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor 
model, respectively, and kept a record of the adjusted R2 of both models. In the next 
step, I added HFTR/EMTR to the base models. I reported the cross-sectional average 
adjusted R2 in Table 5.6. In addition, I reported the percentage of the funds with 
significant betas to show the trade-off effect of the additional factors.  
The explanatory power of CAPM is, on average, 0.202 for hedge funds and 0.256 for 
FOFs. Adding EMTR to CAPM, the average adjusted R2 increases marginally by 
approximately 4%-6% for both hedge funds and FOFs; however, by replacing EMTR 
with HFTR, the average adjusted R2 increases by 34.7% to 0.272 for the hedge fund 
sample. This enhancement is even higher for the FOFs sample. I received an 
approximate 71.5% enhancement in average adjusted R2 and the explanatory power 
for the CAPM plus HFTR model reached 0.439. The addition of the two tail risk 
factors does not reduce the explanatory power of the equity market factor because the 
percentage of the funds with significant equity beta does not vary to a significant extent 
at each step of the test. Similar effects were obtained using the Fung and Hsieh (2004a) 
seven-factor model as the base model. HFTR enhances the explanatory power of the 
seven-factor model by 27.2% for the hedge fund sample and 59.2% for the FOF sample. 
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The explanatory power of the equity market factor remains stable after adding the tail 
risk factors. 
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Table 5.6 The contribution of tail risk factors to the selected factor models 
This table reports the enhancements in adjusted R2 of selected models because of the addition of the equity market tail risk factor (EMTR) or hedge fund industry 
tail risk factor (HFTR). I report the results on the hedge fund sample and fund of hedge funds (FOF) sample in Section A and Section B respectively. I require all 
the funds in my sample to report at least 36 monthly returns. I use 5% as the threshold of significance.  
Pricing models: CAPMa Fung and Hsieh seven-factor modelb 
 Original model 
Extra factor 
EMTRc 
Extra factor 
HFTR 
Original model 
Extra factor 
EMTR 
Extra factor 
HFTR 
Section A: hedge fund sample, total 5301 funds       
Average adjusted R2 0.202 0.211 0.272 0.257 0.265 0.327 
% increase of the original adj. R2 - 4.5% 34.7% - 3.1% 27.2% 
Sigd equity beta (% of total) 71.4% 67.9% 71.2% 64.6% 62.8% 63.6% 
Sig EMTR beta (% of total) - 18.5% - - 16.6% - 
Sig HFTR beta (% of total) - - 54.9% - - 55.1% 
       
Section B: FOF sample, total 3311 funds       
Average adjusted R2 0.256 0.271 0.439 0.306 0.321 0.487 
% increase of the original adj. R2 - 5.9% 71.5% - 4.9% 59.2% 
Sig equity beta (% of total) 89.2% 84.9% 89.5% 84.7% 82.3% 85.0% 
Sig EMTR beta (% of total) - 28.0% - - 27.6% - 
Sig HFTR beta (% of total) - - 91.7% - - 92.0% 
a. In CAPM, Rt
k = αt
k + βi (SP500t − Rft) + et
k   where Rt
k is the excess return of a fund in month t and SP500t − Rft represents the monthly excess return of the SP500 index over the risk free rate.  
b. Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model: Rt
k = αt
k + ∑ βi
kFi,t
8
i=1 + et
k   where Rt
k is the excess return of a fund in month t and Fi,t represents the monthly returns of eight factors, including Fung and Hsieh’s 
(2004a) seven factors and HFTR, the  hedge fund industry tail risk factor derived using the cross-sectional monthly return of the Morningstar hedge fund database. 
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5.3.5 The tail risk exposure of HF and FOF portfolios 
In this section, I tested the significance of HFTR/EMTR betas at the portfolio level. 
Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven factors were used as control variables, and all the 
portfolios were equally weighted. The EMTR regression results are reported in Table 
5.7. I found that all portfolios gained negative exposure to EMTR, which coincides 
with the indication that the higher the exposure to tail risk events is, the higher the 
losses to the funds will be. At the aggregated level, the influences of the tail risk on 
the equally weighted HF and FOF portfolios are significant and at similar magnitudes 
of -0.481 and -0.574, respectively. Controlling for the impacts of various risk 
exposures, the HF portfolio has earned a very significant excess return of 0.431% 
monthly, whereas the FOF portfolio failed to earn a significant excess return. The 
results in Table 5.7 demonstrate strong evidence that, despite the fact that FOFs are 
diversified investment vehicles, on average, FOFs do not provide excess returns but 
have higher exposure to EMTR. 
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Table 5.7 Hedge funds and fund of hedge funds exposure to EMTR from Jan 1995 to Dec 2012, controlling for FH seven factors 
 (Intercept) SP500 SMB TBY CRSP PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM EMTR Adj. R 
Hedge fund portfolio 0.431 0.397 0.233 -1.171 -0.769 0.001 0.012 0.012 -0.481 0.658 
 *** *** *** **   *  ***  
HF – Debt 0.288 0.246 0.102 -2.879 -2.708 -0.014 -0.004 -0.007 -0.376 0.507 
 ** *** *** *** *** *   **  
HF – Equity 0.404 0.562 0.349 -0.343 -0.102 -0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.453 0.737 
 *** *** ***      **  
HF – Event driven 0.413 0.313 0.192 -0.724 -1.326 -0.022 0.005 -0.007 -0.370 0.682 
 *** *** ***  *** ***   ***  
HF – Multi-strategy 0.399 0.258 0.124 -0.945 -1.392 -0.003 0.008 -0.001 -0.452 0.466 
 *** *** ***  **    **  
HF – Systematic futures 0.796 0.100 0.076 -2.697 -0.363 0.047 0.053 0.079 -0.804 0.305 
 *** *  **  *** *** *** **  
HF – Volatility 0.923 0.223 0.077 -0.122 -0.332 0.008 0.015 -0.038 0.636 -0.009 
 * *         
HF – Macro 0.369 0.199 0.124 -1.603 -0.660 0.001 0.012 0.027 -0.271 0.375 
 *** *** *** ***   ** *** *  
Fund of hedge funds portfolio 0.129 0.325 0.186 -1.734 -1.290 -0.010 0.012 0.019 -0.574 0.479 
  *** *** *** *   * ***  
FOHF – Macro/systematic 0.349 0.180 0.116 -2.968 -1.359 0.020 0.036 0.037 -0.770 0.290 
 ** *** ** ***  * *** *** ***  
FOHF – Debt 0.090 0.250 0.152 -2.049 -1.960 -0.016 0.013 -0.009 -0.496 0.412 
  *** *** *** *** * *  ***  
FOHF – Equity 0.100 0.429 0.278 -1.122 -0.665 -0.014 0.009 0.023 -0.569 0.559 
  *** ***     ** ***  
FOHF – Event 0.155 0.269 0.128 -0.697 -1.315 -0.017 0.008 0.004 -0.417 0.506 
  *** ***  ** **   ***  
FOHF – Multi-strategy 0.117 0.294 0.150 -2.000 -1.619 -0.011 0.010 0.015 -0.602 0.420 
  *** *** *** **    ***  
FOHF – Relative value 0.133 0.152 0.063 -1.521 -2.021 -0.017 0.011 0.007 -0.485 0.276 
  *** * ** *** *   ***  
a. The regression model: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
8
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘    where 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 is the excess return of a fund in month t and 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 represents the monthly returns of eight factors, which are described 
above. 
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.   
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Table 5.8 Hedge funds and fund of hedge funds exposure to HFTR from Jan 1995 to Dec 2012, controlling for FH seven factorsa 
 (Intercept) SP500 SMB TBY CRSP PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM HFTR Adj. R 
Hedge fund portfolio 0.409 0.411 0.230 -1.010 -0.674 -0.003 0.009 0.013 -0.948 0.768 
 ***b *** *** **   * * ***  
HF – Debt 0.272 0.256 0.100 -2.758 -2.636 -0.017 -0.006 -0.006 -0.728 0.594 
 *** *** *** *** *** **   ***  
HF – Equity 0.384 0.576 0.346 -0.146 0.015 -0.006 0.006 0.002 -1.022 0.810 
 *** *** ***      ***  
HF – Event driven 0.396 0.324 0.190 -0.627 -1.268 -0.025 0.002 -0.006 -0.655 0.742 
 *** *** ***  *** ***   ***  
HF – Multi-strategy 0.379 0.271 0.121 -0.796 -1.303 -0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.887 0.605 
 *** *** ***  **    ***  
HF – Systematic futures 0.760 0.121 0.073 -2.529 -0.264 0.040 0.047 0.080 -1.300 0.392 
 *** **  **  ** *** *** ***  
HF – Volatility 0.953 0.213 0.073 0.241 -0.114 0.012 0.020 -0.040 -0.372 -0.010 
 * *         
HF – Macro 0.357 0.208 0.121 -1.459 -0.575 -0.002 0.011 0.027 -0.685 0.504 
 *** *** *** ***   ** *** ***  
Fund of hedge funds portfolio 0.115 0.340 0.177 -1.683 -1.463 -0.013 0.008 0.022 -1.149 0.652 
  *** *** *** *** *  *** ***  
FOHF – Macro/systematic 0.329 0.200 0.106 -2.960 -1.586 0.015 0.031 0.041 -1.319 0.478 
 ** *** *** *** **  *** *** ***  
FOHF – Debt 0.077 0.263 0.145 -2.010 -2.109 -0.019 0.010 -0.007 -0.977 0.554 
  *** *** *** *** **   ***  
FOHF – Equity 0.086 0.445 0.269 -1.070 -0.836 -0.017 0.005 0.026 -1.143 0.676 
  *** *** *  *  *** ***  
FOHF – Event 0.144 0.280 0.121 -0.655 -1.441 -0.019 0.006 0.007 -0.851 0.639 
  *** ***  *** ***   ***  
FOHF – Multi-strategy 0.101 0.310 0.141 -1.951 -1.800 -0.015 0.007 0.018 -1.190 0.609 
  *** *** *** *** *  ** ***  
FOHF – Relative value 0.121 0.165 0.055 -1.481 -2.167 -0.019 0.008 0.010 -0.959 0.476 
  *** * ** *** **   ***  
a. The regression mode: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
8
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘    where Rt
k is the excess return of a fund in month t and Fi,t represents the monthly returns of eight factors, which are described above. 
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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The HFTR regression results are reported in Table 5.8. Almost all the strategy 
portfolios tend to be influenced by HFTR significantly, except volatility hedge funds. 
In addition, I found that most FOF strategies are unable to deliver significant alpha, 
whereas almost all HF strategies can deliver significant alpha. Finally, the R2 of each 
regression model in Table 5.8 is generally higher than the corresponding result in 
Table 5.7.  
I performed robustness tests, including running regressions on a shorter time horizon 
from Jan 1995 to May 2007, to eliminate the influence of the 2008 GFC and added 
more controlling variables, such as MMT, LQD, and VIX. I found that the HFTR beta 
remains significant in all robustness tests. The test results are reported in Table 5.9 and 
Table 5.10. I received consistent robustness test results from EMTR regressions as 
well, but the results have not been disclosed in the interest of saving space. Moreover, 
I performed the same regressions using value weighted portfolios, and the results are 
consistent with the findings based on equally weighted portfolios.  
My findings in this section strongly support the view that FOFs are significantly 
exposed to tail risk in the hedge fund industry. In addition to the HFTR, the credit 
spread factor (CRSP) and look-back straddle on treasury bonds (PTFSBD) have been 
found to explain returns of all FOF portfolios significantly.  
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Table 5.9 Hedge fund and fund of hedge funds exposure to HFTR from Jan 1995 to May 2007, controlling for FH seven factorsa 
 (Intercept) SP500 SMB TBY CRSP PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM HFTR Adj. R 
Hedge fund portfolio 0.577 0.385 0.273 -1.240 -0.452 0.002 0.014 0.017 -0.530 0.780 
 ***b *** *** **   ** ** ***  
HF – Debt 0.371 0.199 0.137 -1.512 -1.356 -0.020 0.005 0.002 -0.335 0.455 
 *** *** *** ** * ***   ***  
HF – Equity 0.552 0.587 0.415 -0.285 0.297 -0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.556 0.831 
 *** *** ***      ***  
HF – Event driven 0.542 0.266 0.208 -0.597 -0.808 -0.025 0.009 0.000 -0.318 0.707 
 *** *** ***   *** *  ***  
HF – Multi-strategy 0.659 0.192 0.143 -0.691 -1.068 0.000 0.014 0.000 -0.443 0.587 
 *** *** ***  *  ***  ***  
HF – Systematic futures 0.914 0.061 0.070 -4.945 -1.256 0.063 0.068 0.084 -0.977 0.445 
 ***   ***  *** *** *** ***  
HF – Volatility 1.089 0.312 0.101 -0.305 -2.784 -0.016 0.006 -0.067 -0.264 -0.006 
  *         
HF – Macro 0.414 0.202 0.154 -1.836 -0.724 0.003 0.016 0.026 -0.422 0.456 
 *** *** *** ***   ** *** ***  
Fund of hedge funds portfolio 0.324 0.295 0.230 -1.484 -0.797 -0.011 0.015 0.026 -0.696 0.637 
 *** *** *** **   *** *** ***  
FOHF – Macro/systematic 0.546 0.135 0.139 -3.217 -0.709 0.030 0.047 0.045 -0.966 0.527 
 *** *** *** ***  *** *** *** ***  
FOHF – Debt 0.233 0.192 0.184 -1.564 -1.381 -0.017 0.018 -0.003 -0.583 0.428 
 * *** *** **  ** ***  ***  
FOHF – Equity 0.269 0.428 0.337 -1.051 -0.361 -0.017 0.008 0.034 -0.686 0.646 
 ** *** ***   *  *** ***  
FOHF – Event 0.345 0.222 0.166 -0.758 -0.796 -0.013 0.010 0.010 -0.420 0.612 
 *** *** *** *  ** **  ***  
FOHF – Multi-strategy 0.335 0.242 0.184 -1.629 -1.119 -0.013 0.014 0.019 -0.700 0.556 
 *** *** *** ***  * ** ** ***  
FOHF – Relative value 0.369 0.064 0.082 -1.025 -1.468 -0.013 0.016 0.012 -0.524 0.352 
 *** *** *** ** ** ** *** * ***  
a. The regression mode: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
8
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘   where Rt
k is the excess return of a fund in month t and Fi,t represents the monthly returns of eight factors, which are described above. 
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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Table 5.10 Hedge fund and fund of hedge fund exposure to HFTR controlling for ten risk factors, with equally weighted 
portfoliosa 
 (Intercept) SP500 SMB TBY CRSP PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM MMT LQD VIX HFTR Adj. R 
Hedge fund portfolio 0.453 0.366 0.215 -1.125 -0.793 -0.001 0.011 0.011 0.016 2.418 -0.016 -0.915 0.777 
 ***b *** *** ** *  **   * ** ***  
HF – Debt 0.326 0.198 0.094 -3.010 -2.752 -0.017 -0.004 -0.005 -0.018 4.149 -0.014 -0.692 0.613 
 *** *** *** *** *** **    *** * ***  
HF – Equity 0.410 0.546 0.328 -0.223 -0.163 -0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.037 2.411 -0.013 -0.980 0.816 
 *** *** ***      *   ***  
HF – Event driven 0.472 0.247 0.181 -0.883 -1.344 -0.025 0.005 -0.006 -0.023 3.855 -0.020 -0.624 0.768 
 *** *** *** ** *** ***    *** *** ***  
HF – Multi-strategy 0.455 0.197 0.112 -1.013 -1.332 -0.007 0.009 0.001 -0.026 2.977 -0.021 -0.867 0.629 
 *** *** *** ** ***     ** *** ***  
HF – Systematic futures 0.813 0.072 0.052 -2.573 -0.349 0.044 0.050 0.077 0.029 1.213 -0.021 -1.275 0.390 
 ***   **  *** *** ***    ***  
HF – Volatility 1.386 -0.186 -0.044 -0.325 -0.387 0.030 0.038 -0.055 0.061 9.159 -0.148 -0.253 0.072 
 ***          ***   
HF – Macro 0.385 0.181 0.110 -1.503 -0.647 0.000 0.012 0.025 0.017 1.133 -0.011 -0.666 0.508 
 *** *** *** ***   ** ***   * ***  
Fund of hedge funds portfolio 0.129 0.321 0.154 -1.644 -1.665 -0.008 0.010 0.017 0.066 2.139 -0.013 -1.108 0.675 
  *** *** *** ***  * ** ***  * ***  
FOHF – Macro/systematic 0.383 0.160 0.087 -2.876 -1.586 0.019 0.033 0.038 0.026 -0.475 -0.019 -1.316 0.483 
 *** *** ** *** ** * *** ***   * ***  
FOHF – Debt 0.089 0.251 0.139 -2.033 -2.161 -0.018 0.010 -0.007 0.009 0.963 -0.005 -0.965 0.549 
  *** *** *** *** ** *     ***  
FOHF – Equity 0.086 0.432 0.238 -1.005 -1.154 -0.011 0.007 0.018 0.103 3.144 -0.014 -1.080 0.711 
  *** *** * *   * *** * * ***  
FOHF – Event 0.186 0.241 0.109 -0.719 -1.545 -0.017 0.007 0.005 0.016 2.245 -0.014 -0.826 0.648 
 ** *** ***  *** **    * ** ***  
FOHF – Multi-strategy 0.116 0.292 0.120 -1.913 -1.979 -0.011 0.008 0.013 0.060 1.868 -0.012 -1.153 0.626 
  *** *** *** ***    ***   ***  
FOHF – Relative value 0.142 0.139 0.048 -1.586 -2.306 -0.018 0.009 0.009 0.013 2.963 -0.007 -0.927 0.483 
  ***  *** *** **    **  ***  
a. The regression mode: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑡
8
𝑖=1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘   where Rt
k is the excess return of a fund in month t and Fi,t represents the monthly returns of eight factors, which are described above. 
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”. 
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5.3.6 Tail risk exposure and fund characteristics 
I further investigated the relationship between fund characteristics and the magnitude 
of their tail risk exposures. I applied additional filters to require all funds to report the 
variables used in equation 4. It should be noted that, in all the regression analysis 
performed, I use cross-sectional tail risk beta as a dependent variable. According to 
my specifications, the lower the value of tail risk beta, the higher the loss of a fund 
under a standard unit tail risk shock will be33. The regression results are reported in 
Table 5.11. When explaining the regression results, I have introduced only the 
characteristics that have significant coefficients.  
Table 5.11 Cross-sectional regression of fund characteristics and fund tail risk 
exposures 
 HF FOF 
Dependent variablea Beta to HFTR Beta to HFTR 
Intercept -0.551***b -0.366* 
Age 0.084*** 0.198*** 
Size -0.022 -0.001 
Survivorship -0.191*** -0.018 
Incentive fees -0.006 -0.054 
Management fees -0.044** -0.097*** 
High-water mark  0.088 -0.144* 
Closed to all -0.074 -0.095 
Leverage ratio 0.005 -0.032 
Lockup months 0.013* 0.048*** 
Redemption frequency 0.107*** 0.090** 
Advance notice days 0.025 0.010 
x24 month mean 0.054*** 0.129*** 
x24 month volatility -0.436*** -0.350*** 
Adj R2  0.179 0.325 
a. I run avregression on overall characteristics (1) and on individual groups of characteristics regarding fund size 
and age (2), fee structure (3), restrictions to investors (4), and leverage (5).  
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% 
level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”. 
                                                 
33 By construction, a negative HFTR beta indicates a loss caused by tail risk. Therefore, the lower the 
value of the HFTR beta, the higher the loss that will be caused by a unit increase of the tail risk in the 
hedge fund industry.  
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In general, tail-risk-sensitive hedge funds and FOFs share several characteristics, such 
as younger ages, higher management fees, and closure to new capital. In addition, tail 
risk exposure is positively related to restrictions on redemption. For both FOFs and 
hedge funds allowing more frequent redemptions and shorter lockup periods, the 
losses caused by HFTR exposure are higher. Living hedge funds have been found to 
be more tail sensitive; however, most of the defunct funds stopped reporting prior to 
the 2008 GFC. Finally, I found that FOFs that use a high-water mark (HWM) tend to 
suffer from increases in HFTR. A high-water mark works to reward fund managers 
for net profits (after the previous losses are recovered) so that a fund manager with a 
HWM has to balance the return and risk. To avoid extreme losses, an HF with an 
HWM in performance appraisal will tend to reduce their exposure to tail risk. This can 
be realised by either holding a more diversified portfolio or hedging for the tail risk 
exposure to a specific asset class; however, a FOF manager who wishes to avoid 
extreme losses might have difficulty managing exposure to HFTR. This is partially 
due to the lack of a hedging instrument for tail risk in the hedge fund industry. More 
importantly, as my previous findings suggest, the tail risk of individual hedge funds 
tends to be aggregated in the portfolio of a FOF. As a result, a FOF manager relying 
on diversification to control risk tends to load on higher exposure to tail risk in the 
hedge fund industry.  
The findings in Table 5.11 are consistent with my intuition regarding fund tail risk 
exposure. For example, younger funds tend to gamble on tail risk events to improve 
track records for attracting more investments. The funds charging higher management 
fees have incentives to improve performance by taking higher tail risk exposure to 
compete with the other funds charging lower fees. If a fund is closed to new investors, 
the manager will lack an incentive to maintain a stable track record and would rather 
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take on a higher risk for better returns. Additionally, funds requiring shorter lockup 
periods, a lower redemption frequency, or fewer lockup months are more likely to 
liquidate their positions at a loss to meet urgent redemption requirements. 
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5.4 Discussion 
“…diversification implosion, although style exposures are still diverse, market 
exposures can converge” (Fung and Hsieh, 1997a, p. 300). 
Intuitively, the skills of hedge fund managers show an enormous amount of variation 
and can be diversified in a FOF portfolio. As a result, FOFs gain returns mainly from 
their systematic risk exposure. We assume that a hedge fund return can be explained 
by the following factor model: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑓𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡   (5.5) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the return of fund 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑓𝑘 is the kth factor that explains the fund 
return, and 𝑒𝑖  is the residual of the model. According to my specifications, 
∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑓𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1  captures the return from the exposure to systematic risk. Furthermore, 
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 contains the return gained by fund managers’ skills and other fund-specific risks 
that can be diversified. Now, assume a FOF manager who allocates a proportion 𝑤𝑖 of 
his/her capital to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ fund in a pool of 𝑁 hedge funds. Thus, the return of the FOF 
is given by 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑓𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1   (5.6) 
Given the diversification effect, ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  moves close to zero, so the return of a 
hedge fund portfolio is further explained by its systematic risk exposures. Technically, 
I expect the 𝑅2  of the multi-factor regression to increase with the number of 
underlying funds in the FOF.  
I performed the following test to verify my proposition. First, I ranked all the funds 
according to their performance in the last two years and randomly selected two hedge 
funds in the top 10% to construct an equally weighted portfolio. The portfolio is 
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liquidated and reconstructed at the end of every year following the same strategy. 
Eventually, I had a portfolio containing two hedge funds from the top 10% of the 
performing funds and named it the “base portfolio”. With replacement, I increased the 
number of the constituents of the base portfolio by one each time until there were 30 
hedge funds in the portfolio. As such, I constructed 29 equally weighted FOFs with an 
increasing number of constituents. Second, I regressed the excess returns of the 
simulated FOFs on HFTR, controlling for the FH seven factors, and kept a record of 
the adjusted 𝑅2𝑠 for each regression. Repeating the above process 1000 times so that 
I received 1000 observations, I adjusted 𝑅2s for each group of the FOFs with the same 
number of constituents. The box plots of adjusted 𝑅2 are depicted in Figure 5.6. This 
figure provides evidence on my proposition wherein the explanatory power of the 
multifactor model improves with the number of underlying funds.  
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Figure 5.6 Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 changes with the number of underlying funds 
 
Next, I need to show that the change in adjusted 𝑅2 is mainly or partially caused by 
the aggregation of tail risk. I refer to the rich literature on total variance decomposition 
to evaluate the contribution of HFTR to the total variance of the simulated FOFs. As 
the regressors in my model are correlated, I adopted the approach of Lindeman et al. 
(1980). A more well known name for this approach is “Shapley value regression”. 
Technically, each order of regressors yields a different decomposition of the model 
sum of squares. Thus, Lindeman et al. (1980) suggested measuring the relative 
importance of a specific regressor using the average of sequential sums of squares over 
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orderings of regressors, which I call the LMG value in the remaining discussion. An 
explanation of the LMG value can be found in Appendix B.  
I use the R package “relaimpo” developed by Grömping (2006) to calculate the LMG 
value for each simulated FOF and plotted the results in Figure 5.7. This figure shows 
the average LMG of the FOFs with the same number of underlying funds in the 
simulated tests. As shown in the chart, the mean LMG increases with the number of 
underlying funds. This observation provides evidence for my proposition that hedge 
fund tail risk aggregates in a well-diversified FOF portfolio. The results remain robust 
after adjusting various parameters, i.e., the number of constituents, the number of 
control factors, the repeating test times, sampling with or without replacement, and 
portfolio construction strategies.  
Figure 5.7 Relative contribution of HFTR to total R2 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the tail risk of FOFs relative to hedge 
funds. I constructed the hedge fund tail risk factor (HFTR) using monthly returns of 
7,782 hedge funds. I examined the tail risk exposures at the individual fund level as 
well as the strategy level by comparing FOFs and hedge funds. The major research 
findings are summarised below.  
My regression results using HFTR provide significant evidence against the tail risk 
management ability of FOF managers. At the individual FOF level, I found that the 
majority of my sample FOFs (83.79% of 4,275 FOFs) have significant negative 
exposure to HFTR during the sample period. At the portfolio level, all FOF portfolios 
exhibit significant negative exposure to this factor. This leads to the view that FOFs 
actually aggregate the tail risk from their constituent hedge funds. This result indicates 
that there is a limitation/negligence in tail risk management during the fund selection 
process of FOFs. In the regressions at both the individual fund level and the portfolio 
level, I documented significant enhancements in adjusted R-squares after HFTR was 
added. Thus, I suggest that HFTR is a systematic risk factor that influences the returns 
of both hedge funds and FOFs. 
In addition, I documented a number of relationships between fund characteristics and 
tail risk exposure. I found that tail-risk-sensitive hedge funds and FOFs share some 
characteristics, such as younger ages, higher management fees, and closure to new 
capital. There are also unique characteristics that explain the cross-sectional HFTR 
beta variations in FOFs. For example, HFTR-sensitive FOFs use a high-water mark in 
performance evaluation.   
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My study highlights a few interesting issues subject to further investigation. For 
example, previous studies such as Jiang and Kelly (2012) and Agarwal, Ruenzi, and 
Weigert (2016) attempted to link the tail risk in hedge funds to the extreme events in 
the equity market. My results suggest that there are other sources of tail risk in the 
industry itself that are more critical for FOFs. In addition, my results show that the tail 
risk seems to be amplified at the FOF level despite the claim that the selection of funds 
by FOF managers is a result of due diligence and operation monitoring. How to 
effectively incorporate the tail risk in FOF managers’ risk management practices 
obviously is a more challenging but important issue to the investment community. 
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Chapter 6: Can tail risk exposure predict the return 
of a fund of hedge funds in different market states? 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which the tail risk exposure of a fund of 
funds (FOF) is capable of predicting its return in the next period. The predictability of 
a hedge fund return is of great importance given the massive drawdowns of FOFs 
during the 2007–2008 GFC. FOFs were marketed as a conservative investment vehicle 
for retail investors to gain exposure to the hedge fund industry (Dai and Shawky, 2012). 
In particular, an investor with limited capital and lacking fund-selection skills can 
invest in multi-hedge funds via a single investment in a FOF. The growth in FOFs 
before the GFC was mainly driven by the trust that a FOF could help to secure the 
absolute returns of individual hedge funds and, in the meantime, reduce the excessive 
risks through diversification. Although doubts were raised in the early 2000s – see, for 
example, Lhabitant and Learned (2002), among others – it is the substantial losses of 
FOFs in the GFC that rang alarm bells that such believers might be too naïve. In recent 
decades, the hedge fund industry has experienced several systematic turbulences, and 
we have observed very strong industry contagions on each of these occasions. For 
example, the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund in 
1998 finally led to large-scale capital withdrawals from the entire hedge fund industry. 
Another well-known example of massive capital withdrawals from the hedge fund 
industry occurred in 2008 with the revelation of the Ponzi scheme run by Madoff. 
According to Wilson (2015), the Madoff affair took a heavy toll on FOFs, even though 
most FOFs did not have direct exposure to Madoff. As shown in Chapter 5, FOFs tend 
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to aggregate the tail risk in the underlying hedge funds, which means that a turmoil in 
the hedge fund market may eventually turn out to be a disaster for FOFs. Thus, 
understanding the tail risk in an FOF portfolio becomes a matter of urgency for both 
practitioners and researchers.  
In practice, a FOF manager can hardly adjust the holdings when the market turns 
sharply weaker because of the many restrictions set by hedge funds on redemptions. 
Chapter 4 noted that most hedge funds allowed only monthly or quarterly redemptions. 
Moreover, they also required investors to give a redemption notice well before the 
redemption, i.e., 30 days, and there were quite a few hedge funds requiring a 
redemption notice to be given 60 to 120 days in advance. With such restrictions, a FOF 
manager normally has to wait at least one to two months to actually liquidate a position 
in an underlying fund. In a worst-case scenario, hedge funds may implement a gate34 
and/or suspension provision to handle the massive redemption caused by a market 
disruption, such as in the 2007–2008 GFC. As a result, the tail-risk-sensitive hedge 
funds may remain in a FOF’s portfolio well after the shock of the tail risk event. Thus, 
it is reasonable to expect that the tail risk exposure of FOFs may possess certain 
predictive power on returns, at least during a bearish period.  
In contrast, there is mounting literature on investors earning tail risk premiums in a 
variety of asset classes, such as equity (Chollete and Lu 2012; Kelly and Jiang 2014; 
Rauch and Alexander 2016) and fixed-income securities (Li and Song 2016). We have 
also documented in Chapter 5 that FOFs have significant exposure to the tail risk 
(measured by HFTR) in the hedge fund industry and charge a tail risk premium when 
                                                 
34 A gate provision sets the maximum percentage of total assets that can be withdrawn on a scheduled 
redemption date (Stowell 2010), while a suspension provision bans all redemption requests for a 
certain period.  
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investing in hedge funds. If FOFs tend to lose during a bearish market period, we 
should expect them to be rewarded by writing tail risk insurance for the hedge funds 
in normal time, which means that the predictive power of tail risk exposure may exist 
in a normal or bullish period. Taken together, FOFs may benefit from tail risk exposure 
in a bullish market but suffer in a bearish market. Such a state-dependent relationship 
between FOF returns and tail risk exposure forms a challenge to performing 
predictability research on tail risk exposure under the traditional framework. Therefore, 
in this research, I will investigate the return predictive power of FOF tail risk exposure 
under different market states.  
I followed two approaches that are generally adopted in research into hedge fund 
return predictability. First, I performed Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regression to 
investigate the relation between the tail risk exposure of a FOF and its return one, two, 
and three months ahead. Using ordinary least square (OLS) regression, I documented 
state-dependent predicting power in HFTR beta. I further performed quantile 
regression to examine whether the predictive power of tail risk exposure varies along 
the distribution of hedge fund returns. My results indicate that, controlling for Fung 
and Hsieh’s seven factors, the tail risk beta significantly explains the FOFs’ return in 
both low and high percentile in the next one to three months regardless of market states. 
I have also documented similar explanatory powers for the tail risk betas calculated on 
various rolling windows. Second, I sorted FOFs according to their tail risk exposures 
and constructed tail-risk-sensitive and insensitive portfolios. I found very significant 
differences between the portfolio returns assuming monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, 
and annual rebalancing frequency. My tests were performed over the whole sample 
period, bullish months and bearish months. In general, I found that the predictive 
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power of tail risk exposure was marked under different market states but neutralised 
over the whole sample period.  
This research contributes to the hedge fund return predictability literature in the 
following respects. First, I constructed a new tail risk factor, which directly measures 
the extreme movements in the hedge fund industry rather than the tail risk shocks in 
the equity market only. My measurement reflects a broader range of sources for the 
extreme losses in the hedge fund industry. Second, I presented evidence of the 
predictive power of FOF tail risk exposure. The results remain robust after controlling 
for Fung and Hsieh’s seven factors. Third, I found that the possible losses to a unit 
HFTR exposure in a bearish market were double the gain of the same exposure in a 
bullish market. My results indicate a lack of hedging strategy for hedge fund tail risk. 
From a practical point of view, FOF investors and managers should be aware of the 
non-linear payoff from HFTR exposures. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
introduces my procedures to reduce hedge fund data bias. Section 3 presents the 
methodology and models. The results are discussed in Section 4, and I conclude the 
study in Section 5.  
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6.2 Description of approach 
6.2.1 Identifying bullish and bearish months in the hedge fund 
market  
In this paper, I apply the hidden Markov model (HMM) to identify bull and bear 
markets in the hedge fund industry. In the economics literature, HMM was introduced 
by Hamilton (1989) to model the business cycle in the US economy, and it was quickly 
adopted in financial studies for regime-dependent time-series modelling – see, for 
example, Thomas, Allen, and Morkel-Kingsbury (2002) and Rossi and Gallo (2006). 
In this study, I fit the two-state HMM to the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index 
from January 1995 to December 2012.  
A standard HMM consists of a state space 𝑆, value space 𝑉, and a set of arrays 𝜆 =
(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋). Let us define the following: 
𝑆 = (𝑠1 … 𝑠𝑘) to represent the 𝑘 possible states; 
𝑉 = (𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛) to represent possible observation value; 
𝑄 = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑇) to be the hidden states sequence from time 1 to time 𝑇, taking 
value in the state space 𝑆; and 
𝑂 = (𝑜1, 𝑜2, … , 𝑜𝑇) to be the space of the observed value from time 1 to time 𝑇, taking 
value in the value space 𝑉. 
Furthermore, I define A  as a transition array, sorting the probability of transition 
among the 𝑘 states from time 𝑡 − 1 to time 𝑡: 
𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗],  𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑞𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖|𝑞𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑗), 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘} 
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I set 𝐵 as an emission array, sorting the probability of observing a return under state 𝑖 
at time 𝑡: 
𝐵 = [𝑏𝑖(𝑘)],  𝑏𝑖(𝑘) = 𝑃(𝑜𝑡 = 𝑣𝑘|𝑞𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖), 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}, 𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} 
Last, 𝜋 is set as an initial probability array setting the probability of the initial market 
state: 
𝜋 = [𝜋𝑖], 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑞1 = 𝑠𝑖), 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}  
There are three types of questions where an HMM can be applied:   
1. For the evaluation question where HMM 𝜆  and observation 𝑂  are given, 
calculate the probability of the observation 𝑃(𝑂|𝜆); 
2. For the decoding question where HMM 𝜆  and observation 𝑂  are given, 
calculate the most likely state sequence 𝑃(𝑄|𝑂, 𝜆);  
3. For the learning or optimisation problem, where HMM 𝜆 and observation 𝑂 
are given, find another HMM 𝜆1 such that 𝑃(𝑂|𝜆1) > 𝑃(𝑂|𝜆). 
My interest in Chapter 6 is to estimate the hidden state sequence 𝑄 given the observed 
value series 𝑂, which is a typical decoding problem as described above. The decoding 
question is usually solved using the Viberbi algorithm (Viterbi, 1967). In principle, 
Viberbi algorithm aims to find the maximum probability state path 𝑄 =
(𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑇) that ends in state 𝑖 at time 𝑇. This can be done by solving the best score 
function: 
𝜹𝑻(𝒊) = 𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒒𝟏,𝒒𝟐,…,𝒒𝑻−𝟏 
𝑷(𝒒𝟏, 𝒒𝟐, … , 𝒒𝑻 =
𝒊, 𝒐𝟏, 𝒐𝟐, … , 𝒐𝑻 | 𝝀)    
(6.1) 
A recursive calculation is required to solve 𝛿𝑇(𝑖): 
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𝜹𝑻+𝟏(𝒋) = 𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝒊 
[𝜹𝑻(𝒊)𝒂𝒊𝒋]𝒃𝒊(𝒐𝑻+𝟏)    (6.2) 
with initialization 
𝜹𝟏(𝒊) = 𝝅𝒊𝒃𝒊(𝒐𝟏)   (6.3) 
and termination 
𝑷∗ = 𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝟏≤𝒊≤𝒌 
[𝜹𝑻(𝒊)]   (6.4) 
which means we start from the endpoint with the highest probability, and then 
backtrace from there to find the best path to the beginning. I used the R package 
depmixS4 to implement the Viberbi algorithm and set 𝑆 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2) to represent a state 
space with two states: bull market and bear market. For a detailed explanation of HMM 
and decoding a hidden state, please refer to Rabiner (1989). 
6.2.2 Predictability tests: Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional test 
I applied Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) two-step regression to test the predictive power 
of HFTR; a recent similar application of the method can be found in Bali, Brown, and 
Caglayan (2011). At step one, for each FOF in the sample, I regressed its excess return 
against HFTR and various risk factors. An HFTR time series was generated following 
the description in Chapter 3. The mathematics representation of step one is as follows: 
𝑹𝒕
𝒊 = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝒕
𝒊,𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒕
𝒊,𝒌𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒕
𝒌𝒏
𝒌=𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕
𝒊      (6.5) 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 is the hedge fund tail risk factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡 , and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ  controlling risk factor 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 for FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The test was performed on a fixed 24-month window 
moving one month ahead starting from January 1995. This process generated a time 
series of monthly HFTR beta for each FOF. At step two, I regressed the cross-sectional 
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beta exposures in one month against the cross-sectional excess returns in the next 
month: 
𝑹𝒕+𝟏
𝒊 − 𝒓𝒕+𝟏
𝒇
= 𝝎𝒕 + 𝜽𝒕
𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹𝜷𝒕
𝒊,𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹 + 𝝐𝒕+𝟏   (6.6) 
where 𝜔𝑡  and 𝜖𝑡+1 are the intercept and error term, respectively, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑓
 is the 
excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the tail risk exposure of FOF 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡 as estimated in equation 3, and 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  is the slope of the Fama–MacBeth 
regression. Finally, I calculated the average of 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 and tested its significance using 
the Newey–West t-test. I concluded the predictive power of tail risk exposure if the 
average 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 was significantly different from 0. To test the robustness, I performed 
the above procedures for 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 estimated over different lengths of moving windows, 
controlling for two sets of risk factors.  
Hedge fund tail risk exposure takes effect on the occurrence of extreme events, which 
are described by the left tail of a return distribution. However, during a normal period, 
FOFs will earn a stable tail risk premium. Thus, my next question is whether the 
predictive power of HFTR exposure varies along different portions of a distribution. 
Technically, OLS regression is unable to answer this problem. Thus, I employed 
quantile regression, as described in Section 3.4.2. In particular, the quantile regression 
run in this chapter follows the representation below: 
𝑹𝒕+𝟏
𝒊 − 𝒓𝒕+𝟏
𝒇
= 𝝎𝒒,𝒕 + 𝜽𝒒,𝒕
𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹𝜷𝒕
𝒊,𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹 + 𝝐𝒒,𝒕+𝟏   (6.7) 
where 𝜔𝑞,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑞,𝑡+1  and 𝜃𝑞,𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  are the intercept, the error term, and the slope of a 
quantile regression around the 𝑞𝑡ℎ percentile of the cross-sectional FOF returns at 
time 𝑡 + 1.  
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6.2.3 𝜷𝑯𝑭𝑻𝑹 decile portfolio analysis 
Following the approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), I constructed decile 
portfolios based on tail risk exposure and tested the significance of the return 
difference between high and low tail risk portfolios. In particular, each month, decile 
portfolios of FOFs were formed according to the ascending order of tail risk beta 
calculated by equation 6.5. The portfolios were held during a period of t and then 
liquidated. The monthly returns of the portfolios were aggregated to form 10 monthly 
return-time series. To test whether previous tail risk exposure predicts the next 
period’s return, I applied a t-test on the mean return of a long/short portfolio, which 
sells the high tail risk beta portfolio and purchases the tail risk beta portfolio since we 
are interested in negative betas. In my specifications, the lower the value of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is, 
the higher the sensitivity to the hedge fund tail risk factor will be. Therefore, if the 
𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 in the prior month predicts the next period’s return, we should expect the next 
month’s excess return of the long/short portfolio to be significantly lower than zero. It 
should be noted that the above-mentioned approach does not have practical 
implications, as there is no readily available facility through which one may short a 
FOF. Besides, it is very costly to form a portfolio of FOFs because of triple-layer fees. 
However, our interest here is whether different tail risk exposures may cause cross-
sectional variation in the future return, and decile portfolio sorting can effectively 
serve this purpose.  
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6.3 Empirical results 
6.3.1 Bullish and bearish months in the hedge fund market 
I classified the whole period from January 1995 to December 2012 into bullish and 
bearish periods by fitting a two-state HMM to an HFRI hedge fund composite index. 
The bearish period in the hedge fund industry contains the following 68 months: May 
to August 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 
2009, and May 2011 to May 2012. Thus, the remaining months constitute the bullish 
period for the hedge fund market. In Figure 6.1, I plot the cumulative return of the 
HFTR hedge fund composite index from January 1995 to December 2012 in the top 
panel and the probability of the hedge fund market being bearish in the bottom panel.  
Figure 6.1 HFRI hedge fund composite index cumulative return  
The top panel of the diagram depicts the cumulative return of the HFTR hedge fund composite index from 
January 1995 to December 2012. Fitting the hidden Markov model (HMM) to the monthly return of the index, I 
classify the whole period into bullish and bearish periods. The probability of the hedge fund market being bearish 
is plotted in the bottom panel of the diagram. 
 
 150 
 
As reflected in Figure 6.1, the bearish periods identified by the HMM are consistent 
with the major drops in the cumulative return of HFRI index, which also correspond 
to most of the tail-event shocks to the hedge fund industry, i.e., the Russian financial 
crisis in 1998, the dot.com bubble burst in the early 2000s, and the 2007–2008 GFC.  
In reality, hedge fund managers are able to adjust portfolios when market conditions 
become unfavourable, but FOF managers have to lock in their positions for a longer 
period because of the various redemption restrictions being charged by hedge funds. 
Thus, it is expected that, in general, FOFs tend to underperform hedge funds when the 
overall hedge fund market falls in the bearish periods. In Table 6.1, I report the 
performance of hedge funds and FOFs under different market states.  
The figures in Table 6.1 can be viewed as the performance of the equally weighted 
hedge fund and FOF strategy portfolios. In the following discussion, I refer to these 
portfolios using the names of fund strategies.35 Over the sample period, the average 
monthly return of HFs is 0.927%, which is about 51% higher than the mean return of 
FOFs (0.613%). The difference in mean return drops in the bullish periods, where HFs 
yield a 1.433% average monthly return and FOFs yield a 1.079% average monthly 
return. However, during the bearish periods, FOFs incur a 0.402% monthly loss, which 
is about 2.3 times the average monthly loss of hedge funds (0.175%). Furthermore, 
FOFs do not show outstanding risk-diversification effects, as the variance of FOFs is 
consistently higher than that of hedge funds, notwithstanding the market states. Fung 
and Hsieh (2000) provided two possible justifications for the underperformance of 
FOFs. First, FOF investors have to pay management fees to both FOF managers and 
the managers of the hedge funds included in the FOF portfolio. The second-layer fee 
                                                 
35 For example, HF represents an equally weighted hedge fund portfolio.  
 151 
 
is suggested to be a reward for fund-selection skills and the due diligence applied by 
FOF managers (Ang et al., 2008), but, on average, it reduces the returns of FOFs. 
Second, FOF data are less subject to survivorship bias and back-selection bias than are 
hedge funds. That is, the return of a FOF usually contains unsatisfactory returns that 
are hidden from a data vendor by the hedge funds. This is especially the case when the 
market is in a bearish state, and it might lead to an abrupt decrease in the average return 
of FOFs in bearish periods, as reflected in Table 1. The observations in Table 1 
indicate that most of the hedge fund and FOF strategy portfolios are not able to deliver 
positive returns in the bearish periods. The only exceptions are systematic futures, 
volatility and macro HFs, and macro/systematic FOFs.  
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Table 6.1 The performance of hedge funds (HFs) and funds of funds (FOFs) under different market states 
This table reports the performance of equally weighted HF and FOF portfolios in different periods. The whole period is between January 1995 and December 2012. 
The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods according to the hedge fund market states identified by a hidden Markov model. The bearish periods 
include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, and May 2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are 
classified as bullish periods.  
  Number 
of 
funds 
Whole Period Performance Bullish Periods Performance Bearish Periods Performance 
 
 
Mean Variance 
Normality 
testa 
Mean Variance 
Normality 
test 
Mean Variance 
Normality 
test 
HF 
strategy 
portfolios 
HFs  7782 0.927 6.483 0.978*** 1.433 4.273 0.993 -0.175 9.628 0.978 
Debt 969 0.741 4.726 0.829*** 1.161 2.561 0.973*** -0.172 8.309 0.758*** 
Equity 4256 0.990 11.561 0.976*** 1.680 6.470 0.995 -0.511 19.567 0.979 
Event driven 487 0.909 5.266 0.896*** 1.459 2.730 0.978** -0.289 8.786 0.898*** 
Multi-strategy 637 0.810 4.474 0.917*** 1.229 2.578 0.965*** -0.103 7.468 0.928*** 
Systematic futures 700 1.044 15.587 0.983** 0.991 15.917 0.990 1.158 15.076 0.944*** 
Volatility 50 1.248 50.075 0.479*** 1.316 61.563 0.416*** 1.115 28.160 0.689*** 
Macro 683 0.793 3.538 0.993 1.055 3.380 0.990 0.224 3.456 0.988 
FOF 
strategy 
portoflios 
FOFs  4275 0.613 6.576 0.957*** 1.079 4.435 0.987 -0.402 9.846 0.953** 
Macro/systematic 360 0.720 7.576 0.990 0.823 7.075 0.985* 0.496 8.712 0.981 
Debt 208 0.551 5.711 0.901*** 1.027 3.542 0.974*** -0.485 8.968 0.862*** 
Equity 1192 0.642 9.569 0.964*** 1.225 5.721 0.990 -0.625 15.775 0.965* 
Event 210 0.592 4.737 0.912*** 1.083 2.903 0.957*** -0.478 7.137 0.912*** 
Multi-strategy 2117 0.590 6.430 0.942*** 1.040 4.511 0.982** -0.387 9.322 0.915*** 
Relative value 188 0.518 3.961 0.901*** 0.844 2.750 0.966*** -0.192 5.929 0.842*** 
a. Shapiro-Wilk normality test was applied to test the normality of return distributions. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, 
being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”. 
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6.3.2 Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional OLS regression results 
I tested the predictive power of HFTR in cross sections using Fama and MacBeth’s 
two-step tests. Based on equation 3, I generated 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 for each FOF, controlling for 
Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven factors. To test the robustness, I changed the 
estimation window for 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 from 12 months to 18, 24, 30, 36, and 48 months. Next, 
I operated cross-sectional regressions, according to equation 4, for one month ahead 
of excess returns 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖  on the cross section of 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅. This helped to generate a time 
series of 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅. In this step, I estimated 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 during the whole sample period, both 
bullish periods and bearish periods. I used Newey–West (1987) t-statistics to examine 
the significance of mean 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅, and the results are reported in Panel A of Table 6.2. 
Furthermore, I performed the same procedure using 10 factors as controlling variables 
when estimating 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
. The results of 10-factor 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are reported in Panel B of 
Table 6.2.  
It is worth clarifying the implication of the average 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅. Recall that the value of 
HFTR is positively related to the level of tail risk in the hedge fund industry. In other 
words, the higher the HFTR is, the higher the chance is that the industry will 
experience a tail risk shock. It follows that 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 takes a negative value if fund 𝑖 
incurs a loss when tail risk increases. Thus, the lower the value of 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is, the higher 
the exposure of a FOF to tail risk movements in the hedge fund market will be. Finally, 
𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 measured how 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 was related to the next month’s return, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 . A positive 
𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 indicated a positive relation between the two values; e.g., a large exposure to 
HFTR in the prior month led to a loss in the next month. Conversely, a negative 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
suggested that a large exposure to HFTR in the prior month led to a gain in the next 
month.  
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Table 6.2 Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead fund of fund (FOF) returns on hedge fund tail risk 
factor (HFTR) beta under different market states 
This table reports the average slope coefficients of Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead FOF returns on the HFTR beta. Monthly HFTR betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for 
each FOF following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 is the hedge fund tail risk 
factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 for FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The time series of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are estimated over 
fixed 12-month, 18-month, 24-month, 30-month, 36-month, and 48-month rolling windows, respectively. Next, the cross-section of one-month-ahead funds’ excess returns are regressed on the funds’ 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
in each month. The average slope coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions are tested by Newey–West (1987) t-statistics for significance. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods 
according to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. The bearish periods include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, 
and May 2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are classified as bullish periods.  
Rolling window width 12 months 18 months 24 months 30 months 36 months 48 months 
Panel A: average slope coefficients of the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated controlling for Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven factors 
 
 Bearish period 0.164**a 0.331** 0.342** 0.233 0.218 0.177 
 Bullish period -0.102
** -0.170** -0.175** -0.133 -0.128 -0.143 
 Whole period -0.013 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.003 -0.021 
Panel B: average slope coefficients of the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated controlling for ten factorsb 
 
 Bearish period 0.017 0.265** 0.305** 0.293** 0.287* 0.173 
 Bullish period -0.021 -0.121
** -0.167** -0.123 -0.106 -0.130 
 Whole period -0.008 0.011 0.000 0.029 0.042 -0.014 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
b. The ten factors include the seven factors in Panel A, Fama–French momentum factor, the innovation in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity factor, and the monthly returns of 
VIX. 
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I documented interesting findings in Table 6.2. Controlling for seven factors and 10 
factors, I found that short-term 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑠 have very significant predictive power in either 
bullish or bearish periods but nil over the whole sample period. As reported in Panel 
B, the value of 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 for 12-, 18-, and 24-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  is significantly positive 
during the bearish periods but significantly negative during the bullish periods. In 
other words, if a FOF takes large exposure to HFTR in the previous 12, 18, or 24 
months, it tends to gain in the next month if the market is bullish but suffers losses if 
the market state turns bearish in the next month. Moreover, I found that the absolute 
value of average 𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 during the bearish periods was more than double the average 
𝜃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 in the bullish periods. This means, for a FOF taking a bet on the next month’s 
market state, e.g., 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 = −1, its next month’s tail risk loss if the market turns 
bearish is more than double its possible gain if the market stays bullish. This finding 
is consistent with my claim in Section 4.2.3 that FOFs write crash insurance to hedge 
funds. Finally, because the length of bullish periods (150 months) is approximately 
double that of bearish periods (68 months), the bullish gains are large enough to offset 
the bearish losses. Thus, I could not find any significant evidence of the predictive 
power of HFTR exposure over the whole sample period.  
Hedge funds are low-liquid assets thanks to the various restrictions on fund 
redemptions – such as long redemption frequency, lockups, and advance-notice 
requirements. Therefore, typical FOF managers can hardly rebalance their position 
promptly even if they have perceived high tail risk shocks in the industry. In light of 
this practical issue, I investigate the predictive power of HFTR beta over longer 
periods. In particular, I perform the same procedures as described for Table 6.2, but I 
use two-months-ahead and three-months-ahead cross-sectional returns as the 
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dependent variables in Fama–MacBeth regressions. The regression results are reported 
in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, respectively.  
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Table 6.3 Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead fund of fund (FOF) returns on the hedge fund tail risk 
factor (HFTR) beta under different market states 
This table reports the average slope coefficients of Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead FOF returns on the HFTR beta. Monthly HFTR betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for 
each FOF following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 is the hedge fund tail risk 
factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 for FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The time series of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are estimated over 
fixed 12-month, 18-month, 24-month, 30-month, 36-month, and 48-month rolling windows, respectively. Next, the cross-section of one-month-ahead funds’ excess returns are regressed on the funds’ 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
in each month. The average slope coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions are tested by Newey–West (1987) t-statistics for significance. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods 
according to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. The bearish periods include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, 
and May 2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are classified as bullish periods.  
Rolling window width 12 months 18 months 24 months 30 months 36 months 48 months 
Panel A: average slope coefficients of the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated controlling for Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven 
factors 
 
 Bearish period 0.164**a 0.331** 0.342** 0.233 0.218 0.177 
 Bullish period -0.102
** -0.170** -0.175** -0.133 -0.128 -0.143 
 Whole period -0.013 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.003 -0.021 
Panel B: average slope coefficients of the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated controlling for ten factorsb 
 
 Bearish period 0.017 0.265** 0.305** 0.293** 0.287* 0.173 
 Bullish period -0.021 -0.121
** -0.167** -0.123 -0.106 -0.130 
 Whole period -0.008 0.011 0.000 0.029 0.042 -0.014 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
b. The ten factors include the seven factors in Panel A, Fama–French momentum factor, the innovation in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity factor, and the monthly returns of 
VIX. 
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Table 6.4 Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of two-months-ahead fund of fund (FOF) returns on the hedge fund tail 
risk factor (HFTR) beta under different market states 
This table reports the average slope coefficients of Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead FOF returns on the HFTR beta. Monthly HFTR betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for 
each FOF following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 is the hedge fund tail risk 
factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 for FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The time series of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are estimated over 
fixed 12-month, 18-month, 24-month, 30-month, 36-month, and 48-month rolling windows, respectively. Next, the cross-section of one-month-ahead funds’ excess returns are regressed on the funds’ 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
in each month. The average slope coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions are tested by Newey–West (1987) t-statistics for significance. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods 
according to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. The bearish periods include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, 
and May 2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are the bullish periods.  
Rolling window width 12 months 18 months 24 months 30 months 36 months 48 months 
 
Panel A: average slope coefficients of the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated controlling for Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) seven factors 
 
 Bearish period 0.116 0.310** 0.315** 0.190 0.097 0.242 
 Bullish period -0.097*** -0.199*** -0.146** -0.108 -0.110 -0.146 
 Whole period -0.025 -0.023 0.018 0.002 -0.031 0.002 
 
Panel B: average slope coefficients of the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated controlling for ten factorsb 
 
 Bearish period 0.030 0.330*** 0.333** 0.276** 0.210 0.235 
 Bullish period -0.025 -0.158*** -0.127 -0.094 -0.101 -0.135 
 Whole period -0.006 0.010 0.037 0.042 0.017 0.006 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
b. The ten factors include the seven factors in Panel A, Fama–French momentum factor, the innovation in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity 
factor, and the monthly returns of VIX. 
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As reflected in Table 6.3, short-term 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑠, especially the betas after controlling for 
other risk factors, remain significant in predicting the two-months-ahead returns in 
bullish and bearish markets separately. I still cannot observe any predictability in the 
whole sample period. For three-months-ahead returns, as shown in Table 6.4, the 
predictive power of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑠 almost disappears, except for the 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated over 
an 18-month moving window.  
6.3.3 Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional quantile regression results 
Compared with OLS regression, quantile regression generates better estimation along 
the tails of a distribution. Thus, I repeat the second step test in Section 6.3.2, the cross-
sectional regression, using quantile regression around the 10th, 20th, …., 90th 
percentile of the cross-sectional FOF excess returns. Eventually, I generated nine time 
series of 𝜃𝑞,𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅. For each series of 𝜃𝑞,𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅, I tested the significance of the mean using 
Newey–West (1987) t statistics. I operated cross-sectional quantile regression for the 
excess returns one, two, and three months ahead separately, and the results are reported 
in Table 6.5.  
Panel A reports the significance of average 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 using one-month-ahead return as a 
dependant variable. I found during the bearish period that the returns of the FOFs 
below the 50th percentile were significantly related to the tail risk exposure 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 in 
the previous month, whereas the returns of FOFs above the 50th percentile did not 
show such a relationship. Moreover, all the significant average 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅s are positive, 
which indicates higher losses caused by an increase in tail risk exposure. In contrast, 
when the market state turns bullish, all the average 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅s of the FOFs in the above 
40th percentiles become significantly negative, while the average 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅s of the lower 
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percentiles become insignificant. As I have pointed out in the previous section, a 
positive 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 indicates gains on higher tail risk exposure.  
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Table 6.5 Cross-sectional quantile regressions of fund of fund returns on hedge fund tail risk factor (HFTR) beta  
This table reports the average slope coefficients of Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month, two-months, and three-months-ahead FOF returns on the HFTR beta. Monthly HFTR 
betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for each FOF following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 
is the hedge fund tail risk factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 afor FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The time series 
of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are estimated over a fixed 24-month rolling window. Next, the cross-section of one-month, two-months, and three-months-ahead funds’ excess returns are regressed on the funds’ 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 in each 
month. The average slope coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions are tested by Newey–West (1987) t-statistics for significance. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods according 
to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. The bearish periods include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, and May 
2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are classified as bullish periods.  
Panel A: Predicting one-month-ahead return 
 Quantile regression percentiles 
Sample period 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
Bear 0.81***a 0.67*** 0.49*** 0.41*** 0.30*** 0.19 0.05 -0.08 -0.10 
Bull 0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.28*** -0.36*** -0.46*** -0.48*** 
Whole 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.11 0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.22*** -0.33*** -0.34*** 
Panel B: Predicting two-months-ahead return 
 Quantile regression percentiles 
Sample period 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
Bear 0.83*** 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.40*** 0.30* 0.18 0.04 -0.09 -0.18 
Bull 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.14* -0.19*** -0.25*** -0.33*** -0.38*** -0.44*** 
Whole 0.33*** 0.24*** 0.14* 0.06 -0.02 -0.10 -0.20*** -0.28*** -0.35*** 
Panel C: Predicting three-months-ahead return 
 Quantile regression percentiles 
Sample period 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
Bear 0.81*** 0.69*** 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.33*** 0.22 0.08 -0.05 -0.18 
Bull 0.14* 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.16* -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.32*** -0.34*** 
Whole 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.22*** -0.29*** 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”. 
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For the whole sample period, I documented significant positive 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅s along the left 
tail (the10th and 20th percentile) but significant negative 𝜃𝑞,t
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅s along the right tail 
(the 70th, 80th, and 90th percentile). This result indicates a non-linear relationship 
between 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 and FOF the next period’s return. In general, if an investor invests in 
a FOF with significantly low 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅, the next month’s return from the fund tends to 
two extremes: either gaining from tail risk exposure and outperforming other FOFs or 
losing substantially because of tail risk so as to drop in the lower percentile of the 
industry. My quantile regression result remained robust for both two-months- and 
three-months-ahead returns, as reported in Panels B and C of Table 6.5.  
I also performed other robustness tests, including estimating 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  controlling for 
more risk factors (as reported in Table 6.6) and a rolling window size varying between 
12 and 48 months, and received very stable results. In summary, I confirm that 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
possesses return predictive power when the future market state is clear. However, if 
an investor randomly selects a FOF with significantly low 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 without knowing the 
market state in the next period, the return should be largely unpredictable. In the next 
section, I will perform decile portfolio construction to further investigate the predictive 
power of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅.  
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Table 6.6 Cross-sectional quantile regressions of fund of fund returns on hedge fund tail risk factor (HFTR) beta controlling for 
ten risk factorsa  
This table reports the average slope coefficients of Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month, two-months, and three-months-ahead FOF returns on the HFTR beta. Monthly HFTR 
betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for each FOF following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 
is the hedge fund tail risk factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 afor FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The time series 
of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are estimated over a fixed 24-month rolling window. Next, the cross-section of one-month, two-months, and three-months-ahead funds’ excess returns are regressed on the funds’ 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 in each 
month. The average slope coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions are tested by Newey–West (1987) t-statistics for significance. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods according 
to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. The bearish periods include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, and May 
2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are classified as bullish periods.  
Panel A: Predicting one-month-ahead return 
 Quantile regression percentiles 
Sample 
period 
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
Bear 0.72***b 0.59*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.24 0.15 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 
Bull 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.32*** -0.36*** -0.38*** 
Whole 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.26*** 
Panel B: Predicting two-months-ahead return 
 Quantile regression percentiles 
Sample 
Beriod 
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
ear 0.79*** 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.38*** 0.29* 0.19 0.07 -0.06 -0.15 
Bull 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.14* -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.31*** 
Whole 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.15* -0.22*** -0.25*** 
Panel C: Predicting three-months-ahead return 
 Quantile regression percentiles 
Sample 
Beriod 
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
ear 0.78*** 0.65*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.30* 0.19 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 
Bull 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.15* -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.28*** 
Whole 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.16* 0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.16* -0.21*** 
a. The ten factors include the Fung and Hsieh (2004a) seven factors, Fama–French momentum factor, the innovation in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity factor, and the 
monthly returns of VIX. 
b. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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6.3.4 Decile portfolio analysis of HFTR betas 
Decile portfolio analysis has been widely adopted in return predictability analysis 
(Bali, Brown and Caglayan 2011) and performance persistence analysis (Capocci, 
Corhay and Hubner 2005; Capocci, 2009). The central idea is that, if a factor possesses 
return predictive power, portfolios with heavy exposures to this factor will perform 
distinctly from those with weak factor loadings. With respect to my research purpose, 
I expected the portfolios with heavy negative HFTR loadings to generate lower returns 
than those less sensitive to HFTR. Based on my findings in the previous section, short-
term 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  exhibits more significant state-dependent predictive powers. Thus, I 
started my tests using 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated on rolling 24-month windows. I performed the 
test over the whole sample period – both bearish periods and bullish periods – and the 
results are correspondingly summarised in Panels A, B, and C of Table 6.7. 
In each panel, I report the post-sorting portfolio 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 , alpha, and average excess 
return for each decile portfolio. The decile portfolios are numbered from 1 to 10, 
sorting in ascending order of their HFTR exposures in the prior month. Therefore, 
portfolio 1 contains all the FOFs with the largest loadings (lowest negative 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) on 
HFTR in the prior month, while portfolio 10 comprises the FOFs with the lowest 
HFTR loadings in the prior month. In the last column, I report the three performance 
measurements of the portfolio constructed by taking a long position in portfolio 1 and 
a short position in portfolio 10. I analysed the results by comparing the value of each 
performance measurement across different periods.  
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Table 6.7 Decile portfolios sorted by the risk exposure (𝛃𝐇𝐅𝐓𝐑) to the hedge fund tail risk factor (HFTR) 
The decile portfolios are formed every month from Jan 1997 to Dec 2012 by sorting funds of hedge funds (FOF) based on their 24-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅. Monthly HFTR betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for each FOF 
following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 is the hedge fund tail risk factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 
is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 for FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. All regressions in this table are based on eight factors 
including Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven factors and HFTR. Panel A reports 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅, average excess return, and eight-factor alpha for each decile portfolio over the whole period. The low value of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
represent high sensitivity to HFTR and vice versa.  In addition, the last column reports the performance of the portfolio formed by longing portfolio 1 and shorting portfolio 10. The whole period is partitioned 
into bullish and bearish periods according to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. Panel B and Panel C report the performance of the decile portfolios in the bearish periods 
and bullish periods, respectively. The significance of each value is tested using Newey–West (1987) t-statistics.  
 1 (Low) 
Tail Beta 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) Low-High 
Panel A: Whole period (Jan 1997–Dec 2012) 
Post sorting 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 -2.266***a -1.896*** -1.722*** -1.371*** -1.216*** -0.91*** -0.801*** -0.723*** -0.721*** -0.654*** -1.612*** 
Next month’s av. excess return 0.227 0.382 0.373 0.346 0.383* 0.308* 0.273* 0.24* 0.275* 0.284* -0.057 
Next month’s eight-factor alpha -0.099 0.063 0.09 0.091 0.167 0.147 0.134 0.115 0.156* 0.177 -0.276 
Panel B: Bearish period (May to August 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, and May 2011 to May 2012) 
Post sorting 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 -2.569*** -1.998*** -1.958*** -1.696*** -1.576*** -1.117*** -0.959*** -0.802*** -0.819*** -0.736*** -1.833*** 
Next month’s av. excess return -1.361** -0.853 -0.829 -0.738 -0.561 -0.418 -0.481 -0.443 -0.373 -0.234 -1.127*** 
Next month’s seven-factor alpha -0.141 0.059 0.077 0.07 0.158 0.14 0.08 0.052 0.108 0.227 -0.369 
Panel C: Bullish period (the whole period excluding the bearish periods stated in panel B) 
Post sorting 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 -2.128*** -1.869*** -1.6*** -1.172*** -0.973*** -0.762*** -0.657*** -0.629*** -0.619*** -0.581*** -1.574*** 
Next month’s av. excess return 1.097*** 1.059*** 1.032*** 0.941*** 0.901*** 0.706*** 0.687*** 0.615*** 0.63*** 0.568*** 0.530** 
Next month’s seven-factor alpha 0.015 0.017 0.079 0.083 0.201* 0.114 0.201** 0.152 0.197** 0.131 -0.116 
 1 (Low) 
Beta 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) High-Low 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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First, the results indicate very strong persistence in HFTR betas. In all three panels, 
the post-sorting HFTR betas monotonically increase from portfolio 1 to portfolio 10. 
This means that, if a FOF has high HFTR in the previous month, it tends to load on 
similar exposure in the following month. The persistence is well known under different 
market states.  
Second, the excess returns of the decile portfolios are found to be state-dependent. 
According to Panel A, the next month’s excess returns of the portfolios taking lower 
HFTR loadings (portfolio 6 to portfolio 10) are significantly higher than 0 at the 10% 
significance level. In contrast, the FOFs with higher tail risk exposure fail to generate 
significant excess returns. Separating bearish months and bullish months, the results 
in Panel B and Panel C deliver a more interesting message. During the bearish months, 
portfolio 1, which loads on the highest tail risk, suffers a significant loss of around 
1.361% in the next month, while other portfolios deliver insignificant excess returns. 
In contrast, during the bullish months, all portfolios have generated significant positive 
excess returns, and the returns are monotonically descending from portfolio 1 to 
portfolio 10. Focusing on the performance of low/high portfolio, I find that the low 
portfolio significantly outperformed the high portfolio in bullish periods but 
underperformed the high portfolio in bearish periods. These results suggest that HFTR 
exposure performs well insofar as predicting the return of FOFs under different market 
states. 
Last, the results of alpha across all portfolios in the three panels are mostly 
insignificant. The only exception is portfolio 9, which earns significant alpha over the 
whole sample period and also during the bullish months. 
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Table 6.8 Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of strategy-classified fund of fund (FOF) returns on hedge fund tail risk 
factor (HFTR) beta under different market states 
This table reports the average slope coefficients of Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of strategy classified FOF returns on the HFTR beta. Monthly HFTR betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for 
each FOF following 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 is the hedge fund tail risk 
factor, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 is the HFTR exposure of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘
 represents the risk exposure to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ controlling risk factor 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘 for FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The time series of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are estimated over 
fixed 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month rolling windows, respectively. Next, the cross-section of one-month-ahead and three-months-ahead excess returns are regressed on the funds’ 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 in each month 
respectively. The average slope coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions are tested by Newey–West (1987) t-statistics for significance. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods 
according to the hedge fund market states identified by the hidden Markov model. The bearish periods include May to August in 1998, November 1999 to September 2002, November 2007 to February 2009, 
and May 2011 to May 2012. The remaining periods are classified as bullish periods.  
  
Panel A: Fama–Macbeth regression of 1-month ahead return on 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 =
𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 + 𝜀𝑡+1. This panel reports the value of 𝛾𝑡+1 of 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  estimated on 12-, 
24-, and 36-month moving windows, respectively. 
Panel B: Fama–Macbeth regression of 3-month ahead return on 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+3 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡+3𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 + 𝜀𝑡+3. This panel reports the value of 𝛾𝑡+3 of 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  
estimated on 12-, 24-, and 36-month moving windows, respectively. 
FOF strategy Market states 12 months 24 months 36 months 12 months 24 months 36 months 
Debt 
Bear 0.185 0.656*a 0.319 0.154 0.367 0.208 
Bull -0.087 -0.387*** -0.419*** -0.137 -0.300** -0.420*** 
Whole 0.017 0.022 -0.140 -0.028 -0.035 -0.188 
Equity 
Bear 0.346** 0.413*** 0.273** 0.144** 0.354*** 0.273** 
Bull -0.146*** -0.240*** -0.250** -0.101** -0.207** -0.268** 
Whole 0.018 -0.009 -0.052 -0.019 -0.006 -0.061 
Event 
Bear -0.215 -0.061 0.013 -0.057 0.098 0.288 
Bull -0.116 -0.318** -0.227 -0.098 -0.262** -0.333** 
Whole -0.149** -0.227* -0.136 -0.085 -0.133 0.095 
Macro 
Bear 0.104 0.361* -0.028 0.183 0.468 0.107 
Bull -0.153 0.084 -0.209 -0.183* 0.187 -0.188 
Whole -0.067 0.182 -0.141 -0.059 0.288** -0.075 
Multi-strategy 
Bear 0.168* 0.342** 0.325* 0.144* 0.426** 0.362* 
Bull -0.075* -0.284*** -0.197** -0.106** -0.138 -0.137 
Whole 0.006 -0.062 0.000 -0.022 0.064 0.053 
Relative value 
Bear 0.344 -0.049 -0.052 -0.082 -0.067 -0.011 
Bull -0.047 -0.236** -0.302** -0.062 -0.249** -0.316** 
Whole 0.092 -0.165 -0.207* -0.069 -0.179* -0.198* 
a. The asterisk symbols indicate the significance level of the test results, being significant at the 1% level “***”, 5% level “**” and 10% level “*”.  
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6.3.5 Decile portfolio analysis of HFTR betas by FOF strategies 
My previous results show that tail risk exposure may help to predict the performance 
of a FOF when the market state is certain. To gain more insights into whether the 
predictive power varies across FOF styles, I performed cross-sectional regression and 
portfolio sorting analysis using the FOFs in each investment style, and the results are 
shown in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, respectively.  
Panel A of Table 6.8 reports the cross-sectional regression of one-month-ahead return 
on HFTR betas. For most of the FOF styles, 24-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is found to predict the 
next month’s excess return significantly if the market is bullish. When the market state 
turns bearish, 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 can still help to predict the next month’s return if the FOFs follow 
a debt, equity, macro, or multi-strategy style. I also found that 24-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 
predicts the return of the event FOFs regardless of market states. In general, if an event 
FOF manager increases exposure to HFTR by one unit, they will improve the fund 
return in the next month by 0.227%, regardless of the market state. This predictive 
power is more significant when I use 12-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 as the regressor. In Panel B, I 
reveal the test results of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅, predicting three-months-ahead returns. Similar to the 
findings in Panel A, I find that 24-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 possesses the highest predictive power. 
When the market is bullish, 24-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  can significantly predict the three-
months-ahead returns of debt, equity, event, and relative value FOFs. However, if the 
market is bearish, only the returns of equity and multi-strategy FOFs can be predicted. 
Moreover, I find that the 24-month and 36-month 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 are able to predict the three-
months-ahead returns of the relative value FOFs irrespective of market states.  
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Table 6.9 The returns of strategy classified FOFs holding long-short 𝛃𝐇𝐅𝐓𝐑 portfolios 
This table reports the mean excess returns and HFTR betas of the portfolios adopting the following strategy. Each month (quarter), decile portfolios are formed from Jan 1997 to Dec 2012 by sorting funds 
of hedge funds (FOF) based on their previous 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 estimated on a fixed size moving window (12-month, 24-month, or 36-month). Monthly HFTR betas (𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅) are estimated for each FOF following 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the excess return of FOF 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑡 and is the hedge fund tail risk factor. This portfolio is held for a fixed period (one month or 
three months) and then reformed by repeating the above procedures. The next, a portfolio is constructed by taking a long position in the FOFs in the lowest decile (highest tail risk exposure) and a short 
position in the FOFs in the highest decile (lowest tail risk exposure). The long-short portfolios are constructed using FOFs following equity, multi-strategy, and other strategies respectively. All regressions 
in this table are based on eight factors, including Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) seven factors and HFTR. The whole period is partitioned into bullish and bearish periods according to the hedge fund market 
states identified by the hidden Markov model. The significance of each value is tested using Newey–West (1987) t-statistics.  
Panel A: One-month-ahead returns of the long-short portfolios 
  Sorted on 12-month moving window βHFTR Sorted on 24-month moving window βHFTR Sorted on 36-month moving window βHFTR 
FOF strategy  Whole period Bear market Bull market Whole period Bear market Bull market Whole period Bear market Bull market 
Equity Mean -0.097 -1.379
***a 0.544*** -0.103 -1.400*** 0.609** 0.119 -0.849** 0.706*** 
Beta -1.186*** -1.414*** -1.169*** -1.380*** -1.530*** -1.281*** -1.696*** -1.848*** -1.591*** 
           
Multi-strategy Mean 0.045 -0.731
** 0.433** 0.059 -0.829* 0.546** 0.023 -0.701 0.463* 
Beta -1.346*** -1.366*** -1.381*** -1.511*** -1.518*** -1.562*** -1.740*** -1.670*** -1.845*** 
           
Others Mean 0.399 -0.079 0.638
* 0.147 0.070 0.190 0.374 0.356 0.384 
Beta -1.533*** -1.909*** -1.369*** -1.708*** -2.367*** -1.487*** -1.754*** -2.317*** -1.289*** 
Panel B: the one quarter ahead returns of the long-short portfolios 
  Sorted on 12-month moving window βHFTR Sorted on 24-month moving window βHFTR Sorted on 36-month moving window βHFTR 
FOF strategy  Whole period Bear market Bull market Whole period Bear market Bull market Whole period Bear market Bull market 
Equity Mean -0.096 -1.172
*** 0.442*** -0.064 -1.334*** 0.632*** 0.156 -0.760* 0.712*** 
Beta -0.875*** -0.991*** -0.858*** -1.368*** -1.526*** -1.269*** -1.701*** -1.823*** -1.612*** 
           
Multi-strategy Mean 0.066 -0.610
* 0.404** 0.035 -0.844* 0.517** 0.002 -0.719 0.439* 
Beta -1.146*** -1.150*** -1.170*** -1.548*** -1.687*** -1.495*** -1.792*** -1.779*** -1.818*** 
           
Others Mean 0.405
* 0.062 0.576** 0.037 -0.065 0.093 0.412 0.360 0.444 
Beta -1.323*** -1.608*** -1.222*** -1.674*** -2.214*** -1.484*** -1.794*** -2.458*** -1.217** 
a. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.9 reports the results of portfolio sorting for different FOF investment styles. I 
combine debt, event, macro, and relative value FOFs in a set called ‘others’ because, 
in some months, decile portfolio sorting is impractical because of the low number of 
funds in these strategy categories. Thus, this new category contains all the FOFs 
following non-equity strategies. Panel A reports the mean return of the long/short 
portfolio36 in the month post-portfolio formation, and the portfolio sorting is on 12-
month, 24-month, and 36-month moving windows. The results are very consistent, as 
equity and multi-strategy long/short portfolios in general generate significant state-
dependant returns, while the ‘other’ long/short portfolio fails to do so. I document 
similar results in the one-quarter -ahead returns of the long/short portfolios, as reported 
in Panel B.  
My style analysis suggests that the predictive power of 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is both state-dependent 
and style-dependent. For equity and multi-strategy FOFs, 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 is able to predict their 
one-month-ahead or even, in some situations, three-months-ahead returns with good 
significance, whereas for debt FOFs, 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  is strongly correlated to the next one-
month and three-month returns if the market is bullish. Although the robustness is still 
under question, I do find that 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 predicts the returns of event and relative value 
FOFs with good significance irrespective of the market state. This is to say, a FOF 
investor may benefit from tail risk exposure via investing in event and relative value 
FOFs. 
                                                 
36 I assume that the portfolio takes a long position in the FOFs in the lowest 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 decile and a short 
position in the FOFs with the highest 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 decile.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has documented some evidence on the predictive power of FOF tail risk 
exposures. I applied a new tail risk factor, which directly measures the extreme 
movements in the hedge fund industry. This study is among the first to delink the tail 
risk in the hedge fund industry from the tail-event shocks in equity markets, which 
enables the measurement to reflect a broader range of sources for the extreme losses 
in the hedge fund industry. My findings suggest that FOFs write crash insurance for 
hedge funds so that they receive premiums in good market states while incurring 
serious losses in the bearish market. I find that the HFTR beta estimated over a short-
time horizon, e.g., <= 24 months, possesses very strong predictive power for the FOF’s 
return in the next month. This finding is based on the unsmoothed FOF data so that 
the influences of return smoothing have been largely removed. The results have 
important implications in the following aspects. First, they emphasise the importance 
of tail risk to FOF returns. The possible losses for a unit HFTR exposure in a bearish 
market are double the gain for the same exposure in a bullish market. Second, from a 
practical point of view, FOF investors and managers should be aware of the non-linear 
payoff from HFTR exposures. Finally, my results indicate a lack of hedging strategy 
for HFTR exposures. However, my style analysis results suggest that a small group of 
FOFs have managed to earn a positive return from tail risk exposure over the whole 
sample period, such as event and relative value FOFs. A closer look at these FOFs 
may help to develop an effective HFTR hedging strategy, and I leave this work to 
future studies.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of findings 
FOFs are normally marketed as a safe alternative investment that provides retail 
investors access to the hedge fund industry. Keeping the modern portfolio theory in 
mind, investors expect FOFs to generate hedge-fund-like returns with lower risk than 
a stand-alone hedge fund because of diversification; however, an inherent problem of 
the modern portfolio theory is the assumption regarding the normality of the 
underlying asset distribution, which has been proven invalid for hedge funds (Fung 
and Hsieh, 1997a; Agrawal and Naik, 2004). In fact, FOFs may carry significant tail 
risk that was not recognised by the investors until the 2007–2008 GFC. This research 
was motivated by a desire to investigate the tail risk in the returns of FOFs. In addition, 
this thesis studied the differences between FOFs and other hedge fund strategies with 
respect to managerial characteristics as well as tail risk exposures.  
FOFs are not merely portfolios of hedge funds. It is essential to know to what extent 
FOFs are different from other hedge funds for a better understanding of the tail risk in 
FOFs. In Chapter 4, I studied the differences between FOFs and hedge funds in terms 
of operational characteristics, fee structure, liquidity restrictions, leverage, and 
regulation and legal structure. The following differences stand out.  
First, I documented several differences between FOFs and hedge funds with regard to 
operational characteristics. As shown in my sample, a lower proportion of FOFs are 
domiciled out of the US and use the US dollar as a base currency. The average size of 
FOFs, measured by AUM, is lower than that of hedge funds. A higher proportion of 
FOFs chose to close to additional investment from either existing or new investors.  
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Second, with regard to the fee structure, FOFs have been found to follow a “one-and-
ten” structure with 73.7% of the FOFs charging management fees below 1 percent and 
more than 61.9% of FOFs charging performance fees below 10 percent. Hedge funds, 
in contrast, charge higher performance fees, but there is no clear evidence on hedge 
funds charging higher management fees.  
Third, because hedge funds are highly illiquid assets, the liquid issue is usually a 
concern of hedge fund investors; however, my calculations indicate that FOFs do not 
set higher redemption restrictions in comparison to hedge funds. Furthermore, the 
majority of FOFs (68.6% in my sample) do not require investment lockup. The only 
disparity in liquidity restrictions is in the requirement of advance-notice days. Most of 
the FOFs (75%) in my sample require at least 30 days’ advance notice on a future 
redemption, but the majority of hedge funds require less.  
Finally, there are striking differences between FOFs and hedge funds with respect to 
using leverage. Only 41.19% of FOFs report the use of leverage, but this ratio is 79.96% 
for hedge funds. FOFs also display a preference in using bank credit as the source of 
leverage. In contrast, most hedge funds add leverage using margin borrowing. 
I reviewed the regulatory environment changes in the post-GFC era and found that 
FOFs may be disadvantaged in the following respects. On one hand, FOFs have to 
face higher compliance and due diligence costs. On the other hand, the higher 
transparency in the hedge fund industry erodes the informational advantage of FOFs. 
They will have to compete with hedge fund indexers and ETFs specialising in hedge 
fund investment in the foreseeable future.  
Using the reported returns as indicators, I derived the change in the legal structure 
composition and investment strategy composition between 1995 and 2012 for both 
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FOFs and hedge funds. I found that OEIC FOFs still dominate the FOF market, but a 
large amount of the market share has been lost to FOFs structured as corporations, 
partnership 3C7, or unstructured hedge funds. In contrast, the legal structure 
composition of hedge funds has also experienced a structural change since 2000. 
Hedge funds organised as corporations or partnership 3C1/3C7 have lost a significant 
market share to funds under the structure of LLC or OEIC. The GFC in 2008 brought 
an important level of influence on the strategy composition of FOFs and HFs. In both 
samples, I found that the equity strategy has lost a large amount of market share to 
funds following a macro or systematic futures strategy; however, if we look at the 
entire hedge fund industry, FOF is the strategy that has suffered the highest losses 
from the GFC.  
The main takeaway from Chapter 4 is that FOFs, as a subcategory of hedge funds, 
exhibit important differences from other hedge funds with respect to a variety of 
organisational and managerial characteristics. The focus market, leverage activities, 
fee structure, and liquidity restrictions of FOFs may all drive the return-risk profile of 
FOFs to be unique. Therefore, it is valid and necessary to study FOFs as a separate 
group from the other hedge fund strategies.  
In Chapter 5, I investigated the tail risk in FOFs and compared the differences between 
FOFs and other hedge funds in relation to the tail risk exposure. My preliminary 
analysis shows that FOFs are more sensitive to the negative movements of markets 
compared with the other hedge fund strategies. As shown by the moving 36-month 
standard deviation, semi-variance, VaR, and ES charts 37 , FOFs displayed higher 
comparative increases in the four risk measures than macro, debt, and equity hedge 
                                                 
37 The risk measurements are standardised so the charts only show the risk of the strategies compared 
with their own historical risk.  
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funds during the 2007–2008 GFC. Another group of moving 36-month risk measure 
plots show further evidence that most FOF strategies have displayed a higher 
sensitivity to the changes in the market state in the GFC than hedge funds. These 
observations strongly support the claim raised in Brown, Gregoriou, and Pascalau 
(2012) that FOFs tend to aggregate the tail risk in their underlying hedge funds.  
Following the spirit of Jiang and Kelly (2014), I generated a tail risk factor that 
measures the dynamic change in the tail risk of the hedge fund industry and named it 
HFTR. I found that the movements of HFTR do not correspond perfectly to tail risk 
events in the equity market. The correlation analysis further confirmed that HFTR may 
cover more information than the tail risk factor derived by using only equity market 
information (EMTR). The major findings of the tail risk factor regression analysis are 
summarised below.  
First, using individual regressions based on HFTR or EMTR, I confirmed that FOFs 
are more sensitive to tail risk shocks. I found that approximately 44.64% of my sample 
hedge funds have significant negative exposures to HFTR, and 11.77% of these tail-
risk-sensitive hedge funds are capable of generating excess returns. A higher 
proportion (83.79) of the sample FOFs were found to be sensitive to HFTR, and only 
5.7% of these FOFs have generated significant excess returns. In addition, there is no 
particular FOF strategy that is immune to the changes in HFTR. The individual 
regressions based on EMTR yielded consistent results, where a higher proportion of 
FOFs are significantly exposed to the EMTR compared to hedge funds. The 
regressions at the portfolio level further confirmed the above-mentioned findings. All 
FOF strategies are significantly exposed to HFTR and EMTR except volatility hedge 
funds.  
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Second, I showed strong evidence that HFTR possesses additional explanatory power 
to the CAPM and Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-factor model. At the individual 
fund-level regression, I found that CAPM plus HFTR explains 43.9% of the variance 
of FOF returns, while Fung and Hsieh’s seven-factor model plus HFTR explains 48.7% 
of the variance of FOF returns. The explanatory power of CAPM and the seven-factor 
model have been improved by 71.5% and 59.2%, respectively. The enhancements to 
CAPM and the seven-factor model caused by EMTR are lower than HFTR but still 
significant. Thus, I suggest that HFTR should be included in hedge fund factor models 
when evaluating the performance of a hedge fund or FOF manager.  
Third, I documented several hedge fund managerial characteristics that may explain 
the variation of the cross-sectional tail risk exposures. I found that high-water mark, 
management fees, and closed to new capital are negatively related to the HFTR 
exposures of both FOFs and hedge funds, but age is negatively related to the funds’ 
tail risk exposures. Moreover, liquidity restrictions have been found to explain the 
HFTR exposures significantly. In particular, if a hedge fund or FOF allows more 
frequent redemption and a shorter lockup period, it tends to be more sensitive to tail 
risk shocks. This finding confirms the importance for both hedge funds and FOFs to 
use liquidity restrictions to protect their positions in bad market states.  
Finally, I suggested that, by construction, factor models separate the total return of a 
FOF into model-explained returns (factor returns) and unexplained returns (abnormal 
and residual returns). Diversification reduces the effect of residual and abnormal 
returns, so the explanatory power of systematic risk factors increases correspondingly. 
I attempted to test this argument using a simple simulation analysis. By tracking the 
explanatory power of HFTR in the regressions of the simulated FOFs with an 
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increasing number of constituents, I found that there is a positive relationship between 
the explanatory power of HFTR and the number of underlying hedge funds.  
Chapter 5 conveys important information to both researchers and practitioners. For 
hedge fund research, my findings confirmed that FOFs tend to aggregate tail risk in 
the hedge fund industry. In addition, I provided some evidence that the tail risk in the 
hedge fund industry is not primarily caused by the extreme movements in the equity 
market. Thus, further studies are required to discover the sources of the tail risk in the 
hedge fund industry. For hedge fund managers and investors, the HFTR developed in 
Chapter 5 can be used as an appropriate measure in risk assessment and return 
attribution analysis.  
According to the findings in Chapter 5, the HFTR significantly explains the returns of 
most of my sample FOFs. As described by the seven-factor plus HFTR regression 
results in Section 5.3.3, most of the FOFs are negatively exposed to the HFTR, which 
indicates potential losses caused by higher tail risk in the hedge fund industry. In 
reality, if a FOF invests heavily in tail-risk-sensitive hedge funds, the various 
redemption restrictions of the underlying hedge funds will impede the FOF from 
liquidating its position in the event of an extreme market downturn. Thus, the question 
that follows naturally is whether the HFTR can help to predict the performance of 
FOFs. I attempted to answer this question in Chapter 6.  
Recognising the possible state-dependent relationship between FOF returns and tail 
risk exposure, I investigated the return predictive power of tail risk exposure under a 
bullish and bearish market separately. By applying the decoding algorithm of the 
HMM to the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index, I separated the whole sample 
period into a bearish period of 68 months and a bullish period of 148 months. I found 
 178 
 
that, during the bearish periods, FOFs incur a higher average monthly loss than hedge 
funds. Furthermore, when a hedge fund market turns bearish, only macro/systematic 
FOFs are capable of delivering positive returns, while the other FOF strategies suffer 
losses of approximately 0.4% monthly. 
I investigated the return predictive power of the HFTR using Fama–Macbeth (1973) 
cross-sectional regressions based on OLS and quantile regression, respectively. In 
addition, I sorted HFTR decile portfolios and looked at the return differences between 
the high tail risk portfolio and the low tail risk portfolio during the post-portfolio 
formation period. This return predictability study documented the following findings.  
First, both Fama–Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression and decile portfolio 
sorting analysis confirmed significant predictive power in FOF tail risk exposure under 
bullish and bearish markets separately; however, the predictability behaves differently 
under different market states. In particular, I found that the relationship between the 
return of a FOF 𝑖 at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 , and its tail risk exposure, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
, at time 𝑡, is 
significantly positive during the bearish periods but significantly negative during the 
bullish periods. In other words, if a FOF experiences significant exposure to HFTR, it 
tends to gain in the next month if the market is bullish but suffers losses if the market 
state turns bearish in the next month. The decile portfolio sorting analysis documented 
consistent evidence. The strategy taking a long position in a low 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 (high tail risk 
exposure) portfolio and a short position in a high 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 (low tail risk exposure) 
portfolio yielded significant positive returns in the bullish period, but significant 
negative returns during the bearish period; however, there is no evidence that the mean 
return of the portfolio is significantly different from zero throughout the sample period.  
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Second, as indicated by my cross-sectional regression results, the sensitivity of 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖  
to 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 during the bearish periods is more than double the sensitivity in the bullish 
periods. This means that, for a FOF taking a bet on the next month’s market state, e.g., 
𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅 = −1, its next month tail risk loss if the market turns bearish is more than 
double its possible gain if the market stays bullish. This observation confirms the claim 
that FOFs write tail risk insurance for hedge funds.  
Finally, as shown by the results of the cross-sectional quantile regression, the 
predictive power of tail risk exposure behaves differently in predicting the extreme 
returns of FOFs. In particular, 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 and the lowest decile 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖  are positively related, 
but 𝛽𝑡
𝑖,𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅
 and the highest decile 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖  are positively related. The observation implies 
that the investment in a FOF with significantly low 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑅  tends to two extremes: 
either gaining from tail risk exposure and outperforming other FOFs or losing 
substantially because of tail risk and dropping to the lower percentile of the industry. 
7.2 Contributions 
The major contribution of this thesis is the generation of a tail risk factor (HFTR) that 
can significantly explain the returns of hedge funds and FOFs. HFTR directly reflects 
the tail risk dynamic in the hedge fund industry. Compared with the tail risk 
measurements based on equity market information, HFTR contains more information 
on the various causes of the extreme downside movements in the hedge fund industry. 
Indicated by the adjusted 𝑅2  of the seven-factor plus HFTR model, HFTR 
significantly enhances the explanatory power of Fung and Hsieh’s (2004a) seven-
factor model.  
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Based on the HFTR, this thesis contributed evidence to the literature about tail risk 
aggregation in FOFs. Compared with other hedge fund strategies, the diversification 
of FOFs reduces the contribution of residual and abnormal returns to total returns. As 
a result, the returns caused by systematic risk account for a larger proportion of the 
returns of FOFs. As shown in the simulation study in Chapter 5, adding more hedge 
funds in the portfolio of a FOF will increase the relative importance ratio (LMG) of 
HFTR. Thus, the diversification provided by FOFs should be taken as a double-edged 
sword. On one hand, it works to reduce the idiosyncratic risk in the underlying hedge 
funds, as modern portfolio theory suggests. On the other hand, it tends to aggregate 
the tail risk in the hedge fund industry.  
The findings of this thesis contain important implications for both regulatory bodies 
and FOF investors. FOFs are usually marketed as safe investment vehicles that help 
retail investors gain access to the hedge fund industry; however, as shown by the 
evidence in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, FOF investors are heavily exposed to tail risk in 
the hedge fund industry. Although FOFs earn stable premium returns by writing tail 
risk insurance for other hedge fund strategies, they suffer great losses when tail risk 
events attack the industry. Both regulatory authorities and investors should be aware 
of the unique role of FOFs in relation to tail risk in the hedge fund industry. For FOF 
managers, it is essential to time the changes in the states of the hedge fund market and 
mitigate the influence of tail risk using a variety of both internal and external facilities.  
7.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
The findings of this thesis suggest that tail risk is a non-diversifiable risk for hedge 
fund investors; however, the sources of hedge fund tail risk and the mechanism of tail 
risk transfer remain unclear. Moreover, because of the limited availability of hedge 
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fund data, the relationship between tail risk and hedge fund managerial characteristics 
could not be sufficiently investigated. In addition, as found in Chapter 6, there is a 
non-linear relationship between FOF returns and HFTR. This thesis, however, 
explains the return of hedge funds and FOFs mainly on the basis of multifactor models, 
which assume linearity in risk factor exposure.  
Thus, future research can extend the study of this thesis in the following directions. 
One of the interesting questions involves investigating the tail risk of FOFs using the 
holding information of FOFs. A better understanding of the dynamic relationship 
between tail risk exposure and FOF returns can be developed by looking at the changes 
in the holdings of FOFs under different market states. Such information can be 
obtained by using 13F filing information provided by the SEC. Another challenge 
involves developing a tradable tail risk factor. The HFTR presented by this thesis 
contains an implied assumption that the threshold return 𝑢 can be shorted, which is 
not practical in reality. The development of a tradable tail factor requires finding a 
trading strategy based on marketable securities that may yield returns highly correlated 
with the HFTR. This project would be of great interest to both FOF managers and 
hedge fund investors.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Definition of Morningstar hedge fund 
strategies 
Morningstar (2012) defined 31 hedge fund investment strategies. To fit the needs of 
this research, I aggregated hedge fund strategies into the following seven groups: debt, 
equity, event-driven, multi-strategy, systematic futures, volatility, and macro. I list the 
sub-strategies of each group in Table A.138.  
Table A.1 Aggregation of Morningstar hedge fund strategies 
Hedge fund strategy groups of this 
thesis 
Morningstar hedge fund strategies 
Debt 
Long/short debt 
Long-only debt 
Convertible arbitrage 
Debt arbitrage 
Event-driven 
Distressed securities 
Event-driven 
Merger arbitrage 
Multi-strategy 
Multi-strategy 
Long-only other 
Diversified arbitrage 
Systematic futures Systematic futures 
                                                 
38The definitions of the sub-strategies can be obtained at the following link: 
http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/Mornin
gstarHedgeFundCategories_Methodology.pdf  
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Volatility Volatility 
Macro 
Currency 
Global macro 
Equity 
Asia/Pacific long/short equity 
Bear-market equities 
Equity market neutral 
China long/short equity 
Emerging-market long/short equity 
Europe long/short equity 
Global long/short equity 
U.S. long/short equity 
U.S. long/short small-cap equity 
Emerging markets long-only equity 
Long-only equity 
 
In addition, Morningstar (2012) defined six FOF investment strategies. I left the 
classification unchanged in this thesis. The definitions of the strategies are listed in 
Table A.2. The definitions are directly quoted from Morningstar (2012). 
Table A.2 Morningstar (2012) FOF strategies 
FoF investment strategies Strategy description 
Debt 
 
“Debt funds have statistically significant betas to at least 
one debt index or to a credit or duration spread. These funds 
primarily (50% or greater) derive their directionality from 
debt-related hedge fund strategies. Debt funds can diversify 
across geography or can concentrate in a particular region. 
These funds can invest in strategies other than directional 
debt strategies, but the systematic risk is dominated by 
correlations to fixed income investments.”  
(Morningstar 2012, p. 12) 
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Equity 
 
“These funds have statistically significant betas to at least 
one equity index, and primarily (50% or greater) derive 
their directionality from equity-related hedge fund 
strategies. Equity funds can diversify across geography or 
concentrate in a particular region.”  
(Morningstar 2012, p. 12) 
 
Event 
 
“Event funds invest primarily in event-driven strategies, 
with 50% or more of the portfolio in one or more of the 
following event-driven strategies: merger arbitrage, 
distressed securities, and event-driven. Event funds tend to 
show high betas to the single-strategy Morningstar Index of 
the same name. If an event fund could also qualify for the 
equity, debt, or multistrategy categories, it shall be placed 
in the category with which its returns are most strongly 
related, considering cluster analysis and regression betas.” 
(Morningstar 2012, p. 13) 
 
Macro/systematic 
 
“These funds invest primarily (50% or greater) in the 
Morningstar global derivatives categories, which include 
systematic futures, global macro, volatility, and currency. 
Global Derivatives funds predominantly invest in highly 
liquid instruments such as futures and options, and use 
various instruments to trade currencies. The underlying 
funds’ strategies can be systematic or discretionary, 
technical or fundamental, or any combination of the four. 
These funds tend to be diversified across global derivative 
strategies.” 
(Morningstar 2012, p. 13) 
 
Multi-strategy 
 
“Multistrategy funds generally have statistically significant 
betas to multiple asset classes (such as debt, equity, event–
driven, and global derivatives), without enough asset-class 
concentration to belong to another hedge fund of fund 
category. That is, no one asset class drives a majority of 
the funds’ directionality.” 
(Morningstar 2012, p. 13) 
 
Relative value 
 
“These funds produce returns that cannot be explained well 
by directional hedge fund factors. These funds generally 
show r-squared results of less than 30% in multifactor 
regressions using common factors of hedge fund returns. 
The underlying funds in which these funds invest generally 
include a majority allocation to relative value/arbitrage 
strategies. In some cases, if other information proves more 
valuable than the regression results, Morningstar’s hedge 
fund analysts will have the discretion to make slight 
exceptions to the r- squared rule.” 
(Morningstar 2012, p. 13) 
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Appendix B. Description of the LMG value 
The following introduction to the LMG value is replicated from Grömping (2006, p. 
9). In particular, 
“assume the order of the regressors in any model is a permutation of the 
available regressors 𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑝  and is denoted by the tuple of indices 𝑟 =
(𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑝). Let 𝑆𝑘(𝑟) denote the set of regressors entered into the model before 
regressor 𝑥𝑘 in the order 𝑟. Thus, the portion of 𝑅
2 allocated to regressor 𝑥𝑘 in 
the order 𝑟 can be represented as: 
𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅2({𝑥𝑘}|𝑆𝑘(𝑟)) = 𝑅
2({𝑥𝑘} ∪ 𝑆𝑘(𝑟)) − 𝑅
2(𝑆𝑘(𝑟)) 
   Thus, LMG value of regressor 𝑥𝑘 can be given by: 
𝐿𝑀𝐺(𝑥𝑘) =
1
𝑝!
∑ 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅2({𝑥𝑘}|𝑟)𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  “ 
 
